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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1952-1953*
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS

T

opens on the note that corporate promoters may frequently have occasion to enter into contracts
prior to the formation of, but designed to benefit, those corporations whose intended interests they seek to promote. Upon incorporation, each such newly-formed company would be entitled to
adopt the benefits of these contracts and, if it should do so by
express resolution, become bound by the terms thereof even though
it could not have acted as principal at the time of making. 1 In the
absence of an express resolution on the point, it has been held
that an implied adoption may arise, particularly where the corporation has accepted the benefits of the promoter's pre-ineorporation contract, 2 although this is usually so only where the parties
can be said to have dealt in contemplation of the possibility of
such adoption.3 The case of Perry v. Nevin Hotel Company4 now
HIS CURRENT SURVEY

* The present survey is not Intended in any sense to be a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past year,
but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention to cases and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that of the
judicial year, embracing from 412 In. 309 to 415 Ill. 182; from 347 Ill. App. 182
to 350 Ill. App. 590. Statutory changes of general interest are also noted.
1 Rockford, Rock Island & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Sage, 65 Ill. 328 (1872).
See
also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.16, as to corporate acceptance of preincorporation subscription agreements, and § 157.20, dealing with payment for
pre-incorporation expenses.
2 Battelle v. Northwestern Cement & Concrete Pavement Co., 37 Minn. 89, 33
N. W. 327 (1887).
3 Washburn v. Hoxide Institute, 249 Ill. App. 194 (1928).
4 349 111. App. 22, 109 N. . (2d) 810 (1953).
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adds the further thought that, in cases where an implied adoption
is possible, the corporation may become bound to a contract which
would normally fall within the provisions of the Statute of
Frauds, 5 provided some written memorandum exists sufficient to
bind the promoter. That holding was achieved on the theory that
the ratification also constitutes a demonstration of confirmation
of authority on the part of the supposed "agent" to make the
memorandum in the first instance.6
While little has been said regarding the corporation and the
relation it bears to outsiders, some significant points have been
made concerning internal operations. The rule as to fair dealing,
rather than arm's length dealing, between corporate director and
shareholder, particularly when the former has secret knowledge
of matters affecting the worth of the outstanding shares, has been
the requirement in this state at least since the decision in the case
of Agatucci v. Corradi,7 a case which dealt with a purchase by
the director, in his own right, of shares held by the stockholder.
A logical extension of that rule has now been accomplished through
the medium of the case of Northern Trust Company v. Essaness
Theatres Corporationsto a situation wherein the cognizant director procured the purchase, by the corporation, of some of its outstanding stock without revealing the fact of a pending beneficial
transaction which would, if concluded, materially increase the
worth of the shares. The fact that a probate court had approved
and authorized the sale of the decedent's shares at the lower
figure was held to be immaterial since not properly res judicata
on the point.
Reminder is offered, by the case of Robb v. Eastgate Hotel,9
that the rights of dissenting minority shareholders who oppose a
sale of corporate assets are not limited to the statutory proceeding
5 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 59, § 1. The employment contract involved in the
Perry case was one intended to run for five years.
6 See 37 C. J. S., Frauds, Statute of, § 214.
7327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N. E. (2d) 630 (1945), noted in 24 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvmw 272.
8 348 Ill. App. 134, 108 N. E. (2d) 493 (1952), noted in 1953 Ill. L. Forum 144.
Leave to appeal has been denied.
9 347 Il1. App. 261, 106 N. E. (2d) 848 (1952).
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to secure the true worth of the shares held' ° but may extend to a
suit in equity, if fraud is present, to enjoin the proposed sale.
The views of the Appellate Court for the First District on the
point now coincide with those previously expressed by the court
sitting in the Third District." The decision in Schmidt v. CrowellCollier Publishing Company,1 2 on the other hand, suggests the
presence of a further limitation to be observed by the minority
shareholder when bringing suit in the event his corporation should,
at the time, be under the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court. It
was there held that a suit for damages for defamation of his
corporation, brought in its behalf, could not be conducted by the
shareholder, despite a failure on the part of the proper officials
to act, in the absence of a judicial order, entered by the bankruptcy
court, abandoning the claim as not being an asset in bankruptcy.
For lack of such an order, the minority shareholder's complaint
13
was there ordered dismissed.
It might be noted that the sale of unlicensed shares of cor14
porate stock, offered in violation of the Illinois Securities Act,
gives rise to a cause of action in favor of the purchaser for the
recovery of the amount so paid together with attorney's fees, 1 5
which action would not normally be barred short of five years
after the commission of the alleged wrongful act. 16 It was urged,
in the case of Schlossberg v. Chicago Dr. Pepper Bottling Company, 17 that the seller could short-cut this limitation period by
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 32, § 157.72. The presence of some procedural
defects in the statute in question is noted in connection with the comment on
the case of In re Silverman, 305 N. Y. 13, 110 N. E. (2d) 402 (1953), appearing
in 31 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW Rnvixw 364-8.
11 See Opelka v. Quincy Memorial Bridge Co., 335 Ill. App. 402, 82 N. E. (2d)
184 (1948), noted in 27

CHICAGO-KENT LAW

REvIEw 178.

Ill. App. 229, 110 N. E. (2d) 464 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
13 The decision also turned on the timeliness of the action. It was held that Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 14, containing a one-year limitation, had to be
applied and the cause was not saved by anything in Section 24, dealing with stay
orders, inasmuch as the cause, if one existed, arose after the injunctional order
had been entered.
12349

14 Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 121%, § 96 et seq. The statute in question
has been repealed and replaced by the Illinois Securities Act of 1953, effective on
January 1, 1954: Laws 1953, p. 1329, H.B. 146; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch.
121%, § 137.1 et seq.
15 Ibid., § 128.
16 Ibid., §135.
17 350 Ill. App. 166, 112 N. E. (2d) 173 (1953).
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making an offer to repurchase, subject to the condition that the
same be accepted within a reasonable time, on the theory that if
such offer was not so accepted the buyer should be estopped from
seeking a recovery under the statute. The court, on the basis of
the decision in Bunge v. Kirchkoff,"' held otherwise, but it is
worthy of notice that the new statute on the subject expressly
sanctions the action taken by the seller on this point. 19
Aside from noting that shareholders in state banking corpo20
rations are no longer to be exposed to super-added liability,
attention could be drawn to the fact that not for profit corporations
may now be organized to operate telephone services on a mutual
or co-operative basis ;21 that the former statute relating to credit
unions has been repealed and replaced with a more comprehensive
act ;22 and some changes have also been made in statutory law
with respect to the operation of community currency exchanges. 23
Even more significant is the fact that considerable enlargement
has occurred in the powers granted to unlicensed foreign corporations to loan money on notes or other evidences of indebtedness, to
take security interests in real or personal property within the
state, and to enforce the same, without becoming liable for those
consequences normally attendant upon the transaction of un24
licensed business within the state.
PRINCIPAL AND AGBNT

Perhaps the most startling case during the year in the field of
principal and agent, that of Aldridge v. FoX, 25 propounded a
question as to whether or not a master who is sued under the
18251 Ill. App. 119 (1929).
19 See laws 1953, p. 1329, H. B. 146, § 13C; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121

,
The revised statute requires action within thirty days after receipt
of an offer to repurchase.
20 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 6, was amended to so provide on November 24, 1952.
21 Laws 1953, p. 332, S. B. 173; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 163a3.
22 Laws 1953, p. 333, H. B. 828; II. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 496.1 et seq.
23 See Laws 1953, p. 985, H. B. 811, and p. 1081, H. B. 251. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,
Vol. 1, Ch. 16%, §§ 36, 43.1, and 45 are particularly affected.
24 Laws 1953, p. 1508, H. B. 410; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 212.
25 348 Ill. App. 96, 108 N. E. (2d) 139 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
See notes thereon In 31 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW REvvw 277, 41 Ill. B. J. 475, and 29
N. D. L. Rev. 98.

§ 137.13(c).
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doctrine of respondeat superior for a tort committed by his servant could be held liable in damages for a greater amount than
that imposed on the servant. The master and servant there concerned were sued under separate counts in the same complaint.
Separate verdicts were submitted as to each defendant, without
objection, and both the master and the servant were found guilty,
but in varying amounts, with the master being held liable for a
substantially greater sum than the servant. The master appealed,
contending that it would be illogical to hold that a third party,
injured by the act of the servant, could be held to have been
injured by the master to a greater extent than by the servant
through whom, and solely through whom, he had acted. The
Appellate Court for the First District did not agree, pointing out
that while the liability of master and servant should be deemed
consolidated and unified, since a single wrong was committed, the
liability was double-faceted in that separate actions could have
been instituted, although only one satisfaction could have been
obtained. As the master would not be allowed to complain if
the one jury had returned a verdict against him for a greater
amount than another jury might have returned in a suit against
the servant, it was said to follow therefrom that the plaintiff had
an election as to which of the two judgments he wished to enforce.
The right of an agent to compensation for his services was considered in the case of Nicholson v. Alderson,26 a real-estate broker's case dealing with a ninety-day exclusive authority to sell
the property in question which had been revoked by the principal
during the ninety-day period. The court held the broker was not
entitled to a stated commission as the broker's authority was
revocable at the will of the principal.
The Supreme Court, through its decision in Glasser v. Essaness Theatres Corporation,27 would appear to have joined with
other Illinois courts in the trend toward laxity with respect to
the agent's fiduciary duties owed to the principal. The case was
26347

Ill. App. 496, 107 N. E. (2d)

39 (1952), noted in 31 CHIOAGo-KIr

LAW

REviEW 180 and 1953 Ill. L. Forum 137.

27414 Ill. 180, 111 N. E. (2d) 124 (1953),
(2d) 510 (1952).

affirming 346 Ill. App. 72, 104 N. E.
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one in which an agent for a partnership, charged with negotiating
with the landlord for a lease of the premises in which the partnership business was carried on, was said not to have breached his
fiduciary duty when, following the landlord's refusal to renew the
lease, the agent purchased the premises for himself with a view
toward conducting therein the business formerly carried on by
the partnership. Along much the same line is the case of Van
Houten v. Trust Company of Chicago28 wherein the Supreme
29
Court, reiterating principles adopted by it many years ago,
pointed out that, after an agency relation has been terminated,
the agent is no longer under an obligation to account to the
principal for personal gains which would, if gleaned during the
existence of the agency relationship, have belonged to the principal.
The court also there stressed the fact that, if an agency contract
does not provide for a definite time period, it would be terminable
at will by the agent and the principal's knowledge of an event
from which termination could be inferred would be sufficient notice
that termination had occurred.
Of particular concern to lawyers should be another case dealing with the termination of an agent's authority, that of Fessler
v. Weiss.8 0 The attorney there concerned, retained by an insurance company to defend the insured under the terms of an automobile liability policy, had entered his appearance on behalf of
the defendant. It was held that the subsequent liquidation of the
insurance company because of insolvency did not affect the attorney-client relationship thus created, that primary responsibility
was owed to the insured, and the fact that the attorney was to be
paid by the insurance company did not detract from his duty to
defend the suit, leaving him without power to consent to the entry
of a judgment against the client in the absence of express permission from the client.
28 413 Iln. 310, 109 N. E. (2d) 187 (1952).
29 See Walker v. Carrington, 74 Ill. 446 (1874).
30 348 Il1. App. 21, 107 N. E. (2d) 795 (1952).
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LABOR LAW

After the United States Supreme Court had declared that a
state court had the right to inquire into the purposes of picketing,
with the further right, if it .found that the picketing was being
carried on for an unlawful purpose, to enjoin the same whether
peaceful or not,3 1 it was only a question of time until Illinois courts
would make use of the opportunity thus provided to participate
in the burial of the doctrine that peaceful picketing, the working
man's means of communication, was to be protected under the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. The opportunity
presented itself in the case of Bitzer Motor Company v. Local 604,
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 32 wherein a union
had engaged in peaceful picketing for the sole purpose, so the
trial court found, of inducing an employer to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the union although the employees had expressed a desire not to belong to the union. The
Appellate Court, affirming an injunction, declared that the picketing was being carried on for an unlawful purpose in violation of
public policy although, until then, the state had not spoken on
that subject matter. The public policy so found to exist was said
to demand that a workman should be free to join a union or not
without interference, restraint or coercion on the part of the
employer so, when the union engaged in picketing, it illegally
sought to force the employer, and indirectly the employees, into
selecting it as the proper collective bargaining representative.
The process of providing judicial interpretation for the Unemployment Compensation Act 3 appears to have made further
progress. The definition of "employment" there utilized excludes
from its purview services "performed by an individual as an
insurance agent or insurance solicitor," if such services are performed solely on a commission basis. 3 4 In Commonwealth Insur31 Building Service Employees Int'l Union v. Gazzam, 339 U. S. 532, 70 S. Ct.
784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950) ; Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U. S.
470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94 L. Ed. 995 (1950) ; Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339
U. S. 460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950).
32349 Ill. App. 283, 110 N. E. (2d) 674 (1953), noted in 41 Ili. B. J. 540.
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 300 et seq.
34 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 338.
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ance Company v. Board of Review, 3 5 the Supreme Court, interpreting this provision, declared that an insurance agent entitled
to a fixed minimum weekly advance against future commissions,
regardless whether the new business secured or commissions
earned in any week equalled the amount so advanced, was to be
regarded as a covered employee. 86
37
It did, however, in Parks Cab Company v. Annunzio, conclude that taxicab drivers operating under a company which
owned the taxicab licenses were not its employees for this purpose.38 The company, unwilling to engage in the actual ownership
and operation of the taxicabs, leased its licenses at a stated weekly
rental to persons who owned cabs, although it did maintain a
garage for the convenience of the drivers on a purely voluntary
basis.8 9 A claim that the actual relationship which existed between
the parties had received a different color under the city ordinance
regulating taxicabs, operating to make the license holder the
actual operator, was shrugged off with a declaration that the
Unemployment Compensation Act dealt with economic realities
40
and should be interpreted in the light thereof.
Those same economic realities appear to have influenced the
decision in the case of Grand Leader Department Store, Inc. v.
35 414 1I1. 475, 111 N. E. (2d) 345 (1953).
36 The Supreme Court did, however, decline to hold that the exclusion from coverage was intended to be limited to agents who sold new insurance exclusively. It
emphasized the idea that the broad phraseology of exclusion would encompass
those agents who collected premiums in a territory or "debit" allocated to them
on a commission basis, apart from their efforts in securing new business. This
last point seems rather doubtful in view of holdings elsewhere to the effect that
so-called "industrial" agents are to be regarded as employees whereas those exclusively engaged in selling new insurance are usually considered to be independent
contractors: Amstutz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 136 Ohio St. 404, 26 N. E.
(2d) 454 (1940).
37 412 Ill. 549, 107 N.E. (2d) 853 (1952).
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §§ 314 and 316.
39 Each license lessee agreed to be responsible for property damage, to report
all accidents to the company, to bear the cost of operating expenses and repairs,
and to transfer title to his cab to the company for security purposes. The company agreed, in return, to carry insurance, but did not exercise any control over
the operation of the cabs.
40 These economic factors, in the court's opinion, were of greater importance
than contrary decisions from other jurisdictions which appear to have attached
greater significance to franchise ordinances: Redwine v. Wilkes, 83 Ga. App.
645, 64 S. E. (2d) 101 (1951) ; Kaus v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 230
Iowa 860, 299 N. W. 415 (1941) ; Radley v. Commonwealth, 297 Ky. 830, 181 S. W.
(2d) 417 (1944).
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Department of Labor,41 a case in which a corporation, lessee of
a store building but not engaged in selling any merchandise therein,
had entered into a number of sub-leases with divers parties as
concessionaires for the sale, by them, of various types of merchandise. Within fixed limits, 42 each concessionaire conducted his
business according to his own wishes, hired and fired his own
employees, fixed their pay, and administered all the matters
incident thereto. When a question arose as to whether the lessorcorporation could be deemed to be an employer under the act, no
concessionaire having the requisite six employees! to make him
liable for contributions, the Supreme Court overruled both the
Department of Labor and the lower court as it reached the conclusion that it was not such, particularly since the individual
concessionaires conducted their several businesses at their own
risk and expense.
One other case dealing with coverage deserves mention. The
issue in Scripture-Press Foundation v. AnMnMio 48 was whether
the services were performed in the employ of a corporation
"organized and operated exclusively for religious . . . or educational purposes." ' 44 The Director of Labor had ruled that the
not-for-profit corporation there concerned, which had been organized for the primary purpose of producing, distributing, and
selling of religious literature and supplies, was not exempt since
its sales produced substantial profits which had been accumulated
in a surplus account. The Supreme Court, siding with the Director,
pointed to the fact that nothing in the articles of incorporation or
the by-laws required the transfer of the assets, upon dissolution,
to an exclusively religious organization but left it to the unfettered
discretion of the corporation to determine the manner of distribution. As a consequence, it was said the corporation could not be
regarded as one operated exclusively for religious or educational
purposes.
41415 Ill. 110, 112 N. E.

(2d)

461 (1953).

42 The concession leases contained elaborate provisions not only with respect
to the method of calculating rent but also with regard to many details for regulating the operation of each concession.
43 414 Ill. 339, 111 N. E. (2d) 519 (1953).
44 Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 331.
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Matters concerning the right to unemployment compensation
benefits also came up for consideration. In one case, that of
Robert S. Abbott Publishing Company v. Annunzio, 45 the question
was whether a claimant who, in the first instance, was ineligible
for benefits because his original unemployment was due to a labor
dispute,4 6 would later become entitled to compensation when the
employer's plant had resumed full operation and the claimant had
been permanently replaced. The Supreme Court answered the
question in the affirmative, pointing out that, once full production
had been resumed, the unemployment was no longer due to a
work stoppage. In the case of Illinois Bell Telephone Company v.
Board of Review, 47 however, a married woman who had left her
employment in order to accompany her husband to a distant city,
where he had secured a job, was declared unavailable for work
due to "marital circumstances" as defined in the statute. 4 Contrary to the holding of the administrative agency, the court also
declared that the various situations enumerated in the statutory
list of reasons for unavailability were not mutually exclusive, so
the existence of any one ground would be enough to prevent
49
eligibility for benefits.
Two cases deal with the employment relation in a narrower
sense. In one of them, that of Stein v. Isse Koch & Co., Chicago,
Inc.,50 it was held that where an employee, during his service in
the armed forces, was to receive commissions from his employer
on all merchandise sold in his territory by a substitute selected
by him, the agreement was not one terminable at will, but was to
run for the period of the employee's service in the armed forces,
45414 Iil. 559, 112 N. E. (2d) 101 (1953), noted in 31 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW
REViiW 376.
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 434.
47413 I1. 37, 107 N. E. (2d) 832 (1952).
48 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 420(c) (5).
49 The case of Stricklin v. Annunzio, 413 Ill. 324, 109 N. E. (2d) 183 (1952),
adds to the interpretation provided by the earlier holding in Mohler v. Department of Labor, 409 Ill. 79, 97 N. E. (2d) 762, 24 A. L. R. (2d) 1393 (1951). The
case dealt with a coal miner who, because of physical inability, discontinued
work in the mines, accepted retirement benefits from his union, and made twelve
applications for work during the ensuing period of seven months, but none prior
to the filing of a claim for unemployment compensation, who was said not to be
actively seeking labor, was unavailable for work, and not entitled to benefits.
50 350 Ill. App. 171, 112 N. E. (2d) 491 (1953).
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thereby operating to prevent the employer from terminating the
relationship prior to the employee's discharge from military duty.
In the other, that of Cummings v. Chicago, Aurora & Elgin Railway Company,5 1 an employee who had worked without an agreement as to the duration of his employment was said not to be
entitled to any damages for breach of the employment contract
when not rehired following a suspension of employment because
of a strike as the hiring was one terminable at will. The result
was reached despite the fact that the employee had been notified
the suspension was to last only until operations could be resumed.
Two slight modifications in statutory law were made by the
legislature. Under one of them, the Director of Labor is permitted
to grant emergency permits for the employment of women in
certain occupations in excess of the hours designated in the pertinent statute,6 2 and for other persons in excess of six days a week,
until the termination of the national emergency. 53 By the other,
the Industrial Home Work Law has been amended to classify the
5 4
items which may be produced thereunder.
WORKMEN 'S COMPENSATION

Case law on the subject of workmen's compensation produced
little of importance,5 5 the only significant holding being that attained in Todd School for Boys v. Industrial Commission.5 6 A
private boarding school there provided its students with academic
instruction and also furnished practical experience in agriculture,
aviation, sailing, and other activities. Older students usually
supervised the younger ones in these activities and, in addition,
performed tasks of a menial nature. An older student took a
group of youngsters on a bus excursion trip arranged by the school
51348 Ill. App. 537, 109 N. E. (2d) 378 (1952).
52 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 5 et seq.
53 Laws 1953, p. 1017, H. B. 813; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 8.1.
54 Laws 1953, p. 1880, S. B. 540; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 251.
55 See post, Civil Practice and Procedure, under the topic Appeal and Appellate
Procedure, notes 73 to 76, for a discussion of the case of Quitman v. Chicago
Transit Authority, 348 Ill. App. 481, 109 N. E. (2d) 373 (1952), where it was
held that the declaration of unconstitutionality laid down in Grasse v. Dealers
Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952), was available to aid in
the solution of another case then pending on appeal before an appellate court.
56412 Ill. 453, 107 N. E. (2d) 745 (1952).
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and met with a serious accident. He claimed workmen's compensation from the school on the theory that, as he rendered
services, he was an employee, especially since he did not pay full
tuition rates. The Supreme Court indicated that he could not be
considered to be an employee since the various tasks assigned to
him and to the others formed a part of the educational program
and were performed by all students regardless of the rate of
tuition paid.
Amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act 57 and the
Occupational Diseases Act 5 have become a regularly recurring
feature at each session of the general assembly and the most
recent session did not prove to be an exception. One amendment,
made necessary because of the holding in the case of Grasse v.
Dealers Transport Company,59 now provides that if a covered
employee suffers injury or death through the negligence of a third
person, he or his personal representative may initiate proceedings
against such third person, notwithstanding the employer's liability
to pay workmen's compensation.6" Another operates to exclude
members of the police department of cities having more than
200,000 inhabitants from coverage under the Act. 61 A third extends the time period to two years, formerly one year, within
which the death of an employee, attributable to an accidental in62 Still
jury, will entitle his dependents to claim compensation.
other amendments increase the rate of compensation 3 or provide
for lump sum payment arrangements in the event compensation
becomes payable to a widow or to a widow and one or more
children.4 Substantially the same changes and additions have been
6
made in the Occupational Diseases Act. 1
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq.
58 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 172.36 et seq.
59412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEW 375.
60 Laws 1953, p. 667, H. B. 985; I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b).
61 Laws 1953, p. 1552, H. B. 807; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1(b) (1).
62 Laws 1953, p. 667, H. B. 985; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.6(c).
63 Laws 1953, p. 667, H. B. 985. The sections affected are to be found in Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §§ 138.7 and 138.8.
64 See particularly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.7 (g), as amended by
Laws 1953, p. 667, H.B. 985.
65 Laws 1953, p. 683, H.B. 986. The provision makes changes in Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §§ 172.40 to 172.43, inclusive.
57
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PARTN ESHIPS

It is not often that courts of appeal are called upon to decide
questions of partnership law6" but the recent case of Woerter v.
Labowitch & Morris Discount Service6 7 is noteworthy for the
Appellate Court there found it necessary to reiterate the fundamental rule that a partnership is not a legal entity apart from the
individual members. As a consequence, it declared a judgment by
confession to be void wherein only the partnership, by its trade
name, had been made defendant.
A more subtle question was involved in the case of Dunbar v.
OtsonP s wherein the plaintiff had supplied labor and material to
the driller of an oil well in which the appellants had fractional
interests. In denying the plaintiff's claim that the appellants were
partners with the driller, the Appellate Court pointed out that
the existence of a mining partnership could not be proved merely
by showing joint ownership of the property. Joint working and
joint operation of the property were also essential.
Cases involving joint adventures are also rare, although
principles of partnership law are often relied on therein because
of the many similarities found present. One point of distinction
has been made, however, and that relates to the ability of one joint
adventurer, especially in a noncommercial or nontrading arrangement, to execute or endorse negotiable paper.6 The case of Roe
v. Cooke,70 while recognizing the distinction, appears to have
reached the conclusion that a prior course of conduct by the joint
adventurers may have been such as to become the basis for an
inference that one of the adventurers had express authority so to
66 The case of Grand Leader Department Store, Inc. v. Department of Labor, 415
Ill. 110, 112 N. E. (2d) 461 (1953), discussed above under the topic of Labor
Law, note 41, is interesting even though the court there, for purpose of unemployment compensation contributions, reached the conclusion that no partnership or joint enterprise existed between the parties. Certain leasing arrangements come perilously close to partnerships, particularly where the "landlord"
exercises a degree of control over the operations of the "tenant."
67 348 Ill. App. 168, 108 N. E. (2d) 519 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
68 349 Ill. App. 308, 110 N. E. (2d) 664 (1953). See also the companion case of
Dunbar v. Daily, 349 Ill. App. 314, 110 N. E. (2d) 667 (1953).
69 See, for example, Teed v. Parsons, 202 Ill. 455, 66 N. E. 1044 (1903), and
Ulery v. Ginrich, 57 il. 531 (1871).
70 350 Ill. App. 183, 112 N. E. (2d) 511 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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do. In that case, a check in final settlement of a debt due the
adventurers, made payable to one of them and paid on his endorsement, was held to be a discharge of the debt even though the other
adventurer was not given his share of the proceeds.
II. CONTRACTS
As often happens, no cases of novelty or importance were
decided in the field of general contract law during the present
survey year nor, for that matter, were any opinions rendered
bearing directly upon such specialized contractual topics as negotiable instruments and suretyship. Other related areas did, however, receive some attention.
INSURANCE

Statutory construction was called for the in the case of Landis,
for use of Talley v. New Amsterdam Casualty Company.' One
Peters owned and operated a garage and employed one Landis.
The insurance company had issued a certificate to Peters, which
he had filed with the appropriate state department, showing the
existence of a motor vehicle liability policy complying with the
requirements of Section 16 of the Illinois Truck Act.2 Landis,

while operating a truck with permission from Peters, temporarily
abandoned his emuloyer's business, made a Personal triD to
certain taverns, and thereafter injured Talley, who recovered a
judgment against Landis for a substantial sum. A garnishment
action was then instituted against the insurance company and it
defended on the ground the policy in question lacked an "omnibus"I
clause under which it might have been held liable. The Appellate
Court for the Second District, however, adopted by reference the
"omnibus" clause of the financial responsibility laws and allowed
recovery in the garnishment action to the extent provided for by
statute. Lacking express precedent in Illinois on the point, the
court nevertheless conceived it to be the apparent legislative intent
1347 Ill. App. 560, 107 N. E. (2d) 187 (1952).
2 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 253.
3 Ibid., Oh. 95Y2, § 58k.

Leave to appeal has been denied.
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to provide for coverage to all persons using motor vehicles with
the express or implied consent of the insured. Since Landis, as
driver, had initial permission to use the truck, his subsequent use
thereof was construed to be one with permission of the insured.
On that theory, he became an additional insured.
Of limited interest, but of importance to owners and operators of truck "fleets," as well as to underwriters, is the case of
NationalAuto UnderwritersAssociation v. Day.4 It would appear
that "fleet" insurance rates may, by statute, be lower than rates
on a few cars.5 For over twelve years, the Director of Insurance
had construed the pertinent statute to mean that the insured had
to own the "fleet" automobiles to get the benefit of the reduced
rate and not merely have management or central control over
automobiles owned by others. At the instance of Greyvan Lines,
an organization of individual truck owners banded together for
business purposes under one management, the Director conducted
hearings and promulgated new rulings extending the benefit of the
statute to groups of the character mentioned. This action was
upheld on the basis that any attempt to discriminate between
owned "fleets" and those separately owned but managed in common failed to give proper interpretation and effect to the statute.
A common incident, but with unusual results, was involved in
the case of Hawthornev. Frost.6 It appeared that a taxicab driver,
when negligently backing his cab, had caused the bumper thereof
to become engaged with that on plaintiff's car. The two drivers
alighted and the taxicab driver then assaulted the plaintiff without
provocation. After recovering judgment against the driver and
the cab owner, plaintiff endeavored, by garnishment, to reach the
proceeds of an automobile liability policy but was met, in the
trial court, with the contention that the policy, issued as required
by law, 7 covered only injury or death resulting from negligence
4 348 Ill. App. 554, 109 N. E). (2d)

630 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 73, § 1065.3, defines a "fleet" as being five or
more motor vehicles, all owned by one insured or all under one general managemeat and used principally for business purposes.
6348 Inl. App. 279, 108 N. E. (2d) 816 (1952), noted in 51 Mich. L. Rev. 939.
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95,
§ 59.
5
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in the operation of the cab, so the garnishment action was dismissed. On appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District
noted that this contention had some support in two earlier
Supreme Court decisions," but said the statements therein were
dicta, as the factual situations were not truly identical, and that
the modern trend elsewhere was opposed to the claims of the
garnishee. As the jury, by special interrogatory, had found the
assailant to be "operating" the cab at the time, the policy was
held to be broad enough to cover injury arising from "wilful" as
well as "accidental" negligence on the part of the insured or his
agent.
QUASI-CONTRACTS

One case with quasi-contractual aspects is worthy of notice,
not so much for what was done but for what was said there. In
Borrowdale v. Sugarman,9 the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint,
the first count being as in special assumpsit on four separate
express contracts of employment and the second, as in general
assumpsit, for the reasonable worth of services performed. At
the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved to compel the
plaintiff to elect the one cause on which the case should proceed,
but this motion was denied. The verdict, and the accompanying
judgment, were based on the first count as the trial judge noted
that "without any question it [the verdict] was not based on a
quantum meruit." Nevertheless, the Appellate Court took occasion to note that there could not be both an express and an
implied agreement in reference to the same matter, relying on
some striking phraseology used by the Supreme Court in the
early case of Walker v. Brown.1 0 The court did not, however,
appear to notice that, even though there might be an express
contract on the point, it would still be possible, after full performance thereof, to maintain a suit, as in general assumpsit, on an
8 See Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 147 N. E. 797 (1925) ; People v. Kastings,
307 Ill. 92, 138 N. E. 269 (1923).
9347 Ill. App. 390, 107 N. E. (2d) 45 (1952).
10 28 Ill. 378 (1862). Breese, J., at p. 383, stated: "As in physics, two solid
bodies cannot occupy the same space at the same time, so in law and common sense,
there cannot be an express and an implied contract for the same thing, existing
at the same time."
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indebitatus count, although the express contract rate would regulate the amount of the recovery." The situation is one of the
few instances where, in law, two bodies can occupy the same space
at the same time.
SALES

Two judicial decisions arising during the year dealt with
aspects of the law of sales. One case, that of Bangert v. Emmco
Insurance Company,' 2 reiterated old principles with respect to the
right of a conditional vendor of a chattel to regard the same at
the buyer's risk from the time of delivery and to repossess in case
of default without obligation to restore the status quo, but did
deal with a new point with respect to the seller's duty, in case of
destruction or damage, to make a bona fide settlement with any
insurer so as not to minimize the buyer's interest or to enhance
his debt for the balance due. The evidence was, to some degree,
in conflict but as a jury could have found that the conditional
seller had wrongfully settled the insurance claim for less than a
fair amount, the case was ordered retried. In the other, that of
Duncan v. Martin's Restaurant, Inc.,13 the court ruled that a
woman who became ill, and bore a child prematurely, due to the
eating of unwholesome food in a restaurant, could recover from
the owner thereof for those damages in the form of pain and
mental anguish suffered as the result of the miscarriage, but was
not entitled to any recovery for anguish of mind, wholly sentimental, caused by the loss of the child.
Legislative action in the field is to be observed in that a new
statute has been passed which prohibits, under penalty, the advertising of auction sales unless the bidding is open to the general
public;14 the penalty for violating the provisions of the statute
dealing with the sale of paints, oils, and other compounds has been
increased ;15 and the Trust Receipts Act has been modified to make
11 Sands v. Potter, 165 Ill. 397 at 407, 46 N. E. 282 at 286, 56 Am. St. Rep. 253
(1897).
12 349 Ill. App. 257,110 N. E. (2d) 528 (1953).
13 347 Ill. App. 183, 106 N. l. (2d) 731 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
14 Laws 1953, p. 1654, H.B. 105; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 1211/2, § 219.1.
V; Laws 1953, p. 907, H.B. 686; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121%, § 95.
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it a felony for a trustee to wilfully and wrongfully fail to pay
over the amount due under a trust receipt in violation of the duty
to account or arising by means of an unauthorized dealing with
the property covered thereby. 16 Even more thorough was the
complete revision made in the Securities Act which followed right
on the heels of an attack upon the constitutionality of the old
statute on the ground the provisions thereof were so vague as to
violate the federal and state due process clauses. Although the
Supreme Court, in Jaffee v. Cruttenden,1 7 repelled the attack so
made, the former law was repealed and replaced by a new codification,' 8 one designed to become effective on January 1, 1154.
III.

CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES

While the legislature failed to take action to the end that the
people might have a chance to modernize the judicial article of
the state constitution,' the year did uncover some points with
respect to the authority and powers of existing courts. 2 For
example, the possibility of conflict between an Illinois circuit court,
3
acting to control custody in connection with a divorce proceeding,
and an Illinois county court, sitting in a juvenile delinquency
matter,4 was brought to the fore by the original petition for
habeas corpus filed in the Supreme Court in the case entitled
16 Laws 1953, p. 389, H.B. 44; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121 , § 183.1. The
provision appears to have been adopted to offset the holding in People v. Levin,
412 Ill. 11, 104 N. E. (2d) 814 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 387.
The statute there construed was repealed and replaced by the measure in question.
17 412 Ill. 606, 107 N. 1I. (2d) 715 (1952).
18 Laws 1953, p. 1329, H.B. 146; Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121 , § 137.1.
1 See Zacharias, "The Proposed Illinois Judicial Article," 30 CHICAo-K&xT LAW
REviEW 303-38 (1952).

2 The mandatory requirement establishing probate courts in counties having' a
population of a designated figure or more has been amended so as to increase the
population factor, but existing courts are not disturbed and opportunity still
remains to organize other such courts in areas where the local inhabitants may
desire to vote to establish the same: Laws 1953, p. 113, S.B. 175; Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 299 et seq. The population factor has been increased
from 85,000 to 125,000. Counties having populations between 75,000 and 125,000
may vote on the point.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
4 Ibid., Ch. 23, § 190 et seq.
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People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard,5 but the court resolved the
possible conflict by holding that custodial rights based on a divorce
decree had to yield before the superior right of the state, as parens
patriae,over the dependent and delinquent youth. 6 The customary
principle that, when courts of concurrent jurisdiction exist,7 the
one which first takes jurisdiction shall retain the same without
interference by the other was there held to be inapplicable.
Limitations on the jurisdictional power of courts to hear and
determine causes being what they are, the result achieved in the
case of Adams v. Holland"is not a surprising one even though the
parties appear to have attempted a common-sense solution of
their dispute. The case began with a suit in the circuit court to
contest a will previously admitted to probate before a probate
court.9 The contestant was a legatee under both the admitted will
and an earlier one but stood to gain no more than a certain grandfather clock if the admitted will was rejected and the older will
established in its place. 10 The defendants, by counterclaim, sought
to force on the contestant the advantage he stood to gain from a
successful contest, with a view toward dismissal of the will contest, but he resisted and the counterclaim was ordered stricken.
The order was affirmed on the ground the probate court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the estate and its personal assets, hence
the circuit court had no power to entertain the counterclaim as its
authority was limited to determining the validity of the will and
nothing more.
Although the Supreme Court did nothing to settle the controversy regarding the power of an Illinois judge, after appointment
5415 Ill. 315, 112 N. E. (2d) 697 (1953).
6 See also the new Youth Commission Act, Laws 1953, p. 620, S.B. 276, II. Rev.
Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 220d.1 et seq., which creates a Youth Commission to
receive persons committed to it under ibid., Ch. 23, § 190.
7 Juvenile proceedings may be filed in either the circuit or the county court
of the county: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 191.
8 348 Ill. App. 320, 108 N. E. (2d) 815 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
9 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 242.
10 The opinion does not so indicate, but it can only be supposed that there were
other discrepancies between the two wills in favor of other parties, for the cost
of suit and appeal would seem to outweigh the material benefit to be gained by
the contestant, much as he may have been interested in vindicating Jurisdictional
principles.
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to the Appellate Court, to grant rehearing in a case determined
by his predecessor," it did clarify one issue of particular importance to Cook County, but also of significance in other counties
where probate courts exist, having to do with the filling of a
vacancy caused by the death of the incumbent judge. By means
of an original petition in mandamus 1 2 presented in the case of
People ex rel. Gregg v. Tauchen,13 it was determined that a clerk
of a probate court has the power to make necessary temporary
appointments to the bench, 14 at least until the vacancy is filled by a
proper special election or by appointment of the governor, 5 and
that the one so temporarily appointed does not succeed to the office
of probate judge but serves only pursuant to the terms of the
designation and call so made.
Acquisition of jurisdiction over the parties is about as important to litigation as the presence of a court empowered to hear
and determine the cause. In that connection, upon issuance, the
summons should be placed with the sheriff or other person authorized to serve the same to the end that notice may be promptly
given and jurisdiction acquired. 16 As a corollary thereto, upon
failure to secure service, an alias writ is authorized, 1 7 which alias
is normally in the same form as the original except for necessary
changes in dates. The holding in the case of Department of Public
Works and Buildings v. Lauter's now indicates that defects in the
original summons, tending to make the same invalid, may be corrected at the time the alias is issued, as the prime jurisdictional
fact today is the filing of the complaint and not, as was once the
case, the issuance of a valid writ. 19
11 See Glasser v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 346 Ill. App. 72, 104 N. E. (2d) 510
(1952), commented on in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvImW 187, and the action taken,
on leave to appeal, as noted in 414 Ill. 190, 111 N. E. (2d) 124 (1953).
12 Filed pursuant to il. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 2.
13415 Ill. 91, 112 N. E. (2d) 94 (1953).
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, §325.
15 See Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 32.
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.3.
17 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 259.5.
Is 413 Ill. 581, 110 N. E. (2d) 179 (1953).

19 The case reflects a common practice on the part of some attorneys to place
the summons, after issuance by the clerk, in the office file and to forget to deliver
the same for service until after the writ has expired. Even more reprehensible
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Since service is also necessary, it is worthy of note that provisions for substitute service of process on non-resident motorists
who become involved in accidents while driving within the state
20
have generally been vindicated on the so-called "agency" theory,
under which the non-resident is deemed, either actually or impliedly, to appoint a designated public official as agent for purpose
of service of process. Extension of the doctrine to resident motorists who subsequently depart from the state 21 would, seemingly,
also follow along the same line, so the action of the Appellate
22
Court for the Third District, in the case of Ogdon v. GianakoS,
by refusing to give retroactive effect to the new provision, thereby
denying validity to a substituted service on a former resident who
was involved in an accident prior to the date of the amendment
to the statute but who left some time thereafter, would appear to
be the only logical one to take, for the appointment of an agent,
if one was made, had to come at the time the resident drove his
car. The Supreme Court, however, on leave to appeal granted,
but not in the period of this survey, came to an opposite conclusion when it declared the service provision to be merely procedural in character and regarded it as controlling with respect
to a service made after the amendment. 23 To justify this result,
the court took the position that substitute service did not depend
on consent but rested more nearly upon a legislative declaration
made in the exercise of the police power. Sound as this theory
may be with respect to a citizen who remains domiciled within the
state, or who maintains a point of contact with its laws although
physically absent, 24 in which cases it might well be said that state
appears to have been the conduct of the attorney for the petitioner, as reported
therein, in changing the return dates, after issuance, so as to give the original
summons an appearance of validity which it did not possess. Such conduct smacks
of contempt of court at least, even if not of forgery: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol.
1, Ch. 38, § 277.
20 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
Justice
Butler there pointed out that the difference between "formal and implied appointment is not substantial."
21 Laws 1949, p. 1134; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 23.
22 348 Ill. App. 576, 109 N. E. (2d) 628 (1953).
23 See 415 Ill. 591, 114 N. E. (2d) 686 (1953).
24 Glineberg v. Evans, 341 Ill. App. 332, 93 N. E. (24) 520 (1950), abst. opin.
See also Rawstorne v. Maguire, 265 N. Y. 204, 192 N. E. 294 (1934).
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power could be applied, the expression seems strained when applied to one who, by departing and establishing a domicile elsewhere, has indicated that he no longer considers himself bound by
the power of the state, especially with respect to any future exer25
cise thereof.
One not properly served might, nevertheless, confer jurisdiction over his person by voluntary appearance. It would have
been thought that the old technical quiddities with respect to
special, as opposed to general, appearance had been banished by
the 1945 revision of Section 20 of the Civil Practice Act, 26 but the
argument was made, in the case of Sutton v. Hole,27 that a nonresident corporate defendant had submitted to the jurisdiction of
an Illinois court because the special and limited appearance which
accompanied a motion to quash the service of summons was signed
in its behalf by a firm of local attorneys. The court very properly
28
held that the point was without merit.
Some minor issues with respect to periods of limitation controlling the institution of suits were also settled during the year.
In Fourt v. DeLazzer,29 for example, it was held that the recently
enacted limitation with respect to dram shop suits3" was retroactive as well as prospective in operation, hence applied to a
cause of action which had arisen before the passage thereof. A
saving clause as to suits by receivers or trustees in bankruptcy5 '
25 The Supreme Court does not appear to have given consideration to the decision in Sanders v. Paddock, 342 Ill. App. 701, 97 N. E. (2d) 600 (1951), noted in
29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvmw 359. The holding therein must, however, now be
considered discredited.
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 144.
27 349 HI. App. 219, 110 N. E. (2d) 455 (1953).
28 It also indicated that any authority contained in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 140, specifying the manner of personal service of process outside of
the state, had to be considered in the light of the limitation expressed in Section
138 thereof, and consequently had to be confined for use only in connection with
actions "affecting property or status" within the jurisdiction. Constructive service
in in personam actions was, therefore, held defective.
29348 Ill. App. 191, 108 N. E. (2d) 599 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REviEw 273.
30 Laws 1949, p. 816; 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, § 135.
31 11 U. S. C. A. § 29 provides for a two-year extension from the date of adjudication in bankruptcy on "any claim against which the period of limitation . . .
had not expired at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy."
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was, in Schmidt v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Company,32 held
inapplicable to a suit brought by a minority shareholder on behalf
of his insolvent corporation for defamation occurring subsequent
to the adjudication, as a consequence of which the regular one-year
limitation a8 was held to be controlling. Difficulty in distinguishing
whether the case was one for personal injury based on negligence,
in which event the two-year statute would control,34 or was for
breach of an implied warranty of fitness of food for human consumption, to which a five-year limitation would attach,8 5 formed
the basis for the appeal in the case of Seymour v. The Union News
Company.8 6 The court, on finding that the claim for damages included elements for medical and hospital bills, as well as loss of
earnings, treated the action as one for personal injuries, falling
within the shorter of the two periods. There is occasion to doubt
the validity of the reasoning there relied on, for the measure of
recovery in the food cases is not limited to the difference in value
between food as warranted and food as supplied but may include
87
a consideration of special circumstances.
8 s held constitutional
Although the case of Stephens v. Kasten3
those provisions of Section 64 of the Civil Practice Act regulating
the time and manner for demanding trial by jury, 9 the court did
there indicate that, in the interest of preserving the cherished
right to jury trial, the court should exercise a reasonable discretion when passing upon belated requests for the granting thereof.
Absence of such a request became the critical point in the case of
Vail, Mills & Armstrong v. City of Paris,40 for it was there held
that the grant of additional time in which to plead did not im32 349 Ill. App. 229, 110 N. E. (2d) 464 (1953).

Leave to appeal has been denied.

3a Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 14.
34

Ibid., Ch. 83, § 15.

35 Ibid., Ch. 83, § 16.
36 349 Ill. App. 197, 110 N. E. (2d)

475 (1953).
See, for example, Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E.
105, 74 A. L. R. 339 (1931), where, in an action for breach of warranty, plaintiff was permitted to recover for the physical injury sustained at the time of
consuming bread containing a pin.
38 383 Ill. 127, 48 N. E. (2d) 508 (1943).
39 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 188.
40 344 Ill. App. 590, 101 N. E. (2d) 861 (1951).
37
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pliedly extend the time in which to file a jury demand. The still
more recent case of Roszell v. Gniadek4' now throws additional
light on the subject for while it agrees with the view that a mere
extension of time in which to plead does not enlarge the period in
which to demand jury trial it does illustrate the practice to follow
in making the late request. Frankness on the part of the movant,
by way of explanation for the earlier failure to act, appears to
have played no small part in influencing the discretionary result
attained.
While on the subject of jury trial, it might be here noted that
the constitutional guarantee with respect to trial by jury,42 once
confined to those cases wherein jury trial would have been proper
according to the course of the common law,4 8 has been extended,
by other constitutional language, to eminent domain proceedings,
at least where the just compensation for private property taken
is to be made by others than the state itself. The absence of
specification as to the manner of trial to be followed when the
state acts to condemn was, however, in the case of Department of
Public Works and Buildings v. Kirkendall,44 made the basis for
a determination that the state has no constitutional right to demand a jury trial. Unless the legislature provides otherwise, it
would also seem to follow that the private owner would, in such
situations, likewise be denied the right to trial by jury.
Issues concerning the proper parties to litigation came before
the court in several instances. 45 So far as parties plaintiff are
4
concerned, the case of Miller v. First Granite City National Bank 6
deserves notice for, while the outcome was undoubtedly correct,
since the plaintiffs suing there constituted only a part of the
membership of an unincorporated union, the inference might be
41348

Il1. App. 341, 109 N. E. (2d) 222 (1952).

Il1. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 5. See also Il. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13, and Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 1, which contains almost identical language.
43 Johnson v. Joliet & Chicago Railroad Co., 23 Ill. 124 (1859).
42

44 415 i1. 214, 112 N. E. (2d) 611 (1953).

45 A person seeking to change his name by judicial proceedings may now include the spouse and any adult unmarried children, as well as minor children, as
parties to the petition under Laws 1953, p. 1279, H.B. 635. See also Ill. Rev.
°
Stat. 1953, VoL 2, Ch. 96, § 1 et seq.
46 349 Ill. App. 347, 110 N. E. (2d) 651 (1953).
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drawn from some language in the opinion that the only persons
entitled to sue upon a deposit contract existing between the union
and the bank would be those who, as authorized signatories, had
made the contract or who possessed the power of withdrawal.
The extreme difficulty evident in state practice with respect to
suits by or against unions calls for legislative attention to the
matter. In much the same way, in the case of Southerland v.
Copeland,47 it was held proper to dismiss a suit brought by certain
so-called "trustees" of an unincorporated voluntary association,
designed to recover for damage done to property which belonged
to the entire membership, because of the absence of any allegation
showing the existence of a trust.
One interesting issue arose concerning the right to conduct
representative suits. Certain telephone subscribers, in Burke v.
Illinois Bell Telephone Company,48 sued on behalf of themselves
and all other subscribers in a designated area to obtain a refund
of a charge made for directory service on the ground the utility
had wilfully neglected to revise and distribute telephone directories. The suit was ordered dismissed on the ground the plaintiffs
had not exhausted their administrative remedies 49 but the court
also noted that, in the light of the holding in the case of Newberry
Library v. Board of Education"° and similar cases, each subscriber
had a legally separate and distinct claim, which operated to prevent one subscriber from suing in a representative capacity.5 1
Regardless of federal rules and precedents on the subject, 52
the Illinois practice as to representative suits is limited to pro47350 Ill. App. 313, 112 N. E. (2d) 733 (1953).
48 348 Ill. App. 529, 109 N. E. (2d) 358 (1952). Further appeal has been dismissed.
49 It was held that the action was one for "reparations" within the meaning of
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 76, rather than one for damages under
Section 77, requiring preliminary resort to the Public Utility Commission.
50387 I1. 85, 55 N. E. (2d) 147 (1944), noted in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw

82.
51 Compare the holding therein with that attained in Johnson v. Halpin, 413 Ill.
257, 108 N. E. (2d) 429 (1952), where one person who made out-of-state purchases
of cigarettes was allowed, in a representative capacity, to test the validity of
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 453.1 et seq., on the ground the result of
the action would affect all such purchasers alike.
52 See Federal Rule 23 as to class suits.
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ceedings of equitable character5 3 and, typically, is there available
only with respect to representative plaintiffs for due process
requirements hardly permit of suits against a representative defendant.5 4 For these reasons, the court, in the case of Arthur
Rubloff & Co. v. Leaf, 55 found it proper to strike a complaint at
law which sought to recover damages for breach of an agency
contract from a single defendant who had been sued as the representative of the holders and owners of the capital stock in a named
corporation. Leave was given, however, to file an amended complaint naming all stockholders as parties since the contract relied
on appeared to have been made in their behalf.
Perhaps without consciously intending to do so, the Supreme
Court, through its decision in the case of People v. Roth, Inc.,56
has provided an excellent illustration of the possibility for joinder
of causes and parties, within the framework of one modern civil
case, leading to the expeditious disposition of a number of claims
at one time. 5 7 The state there sued several night club and restaurant proprietors, each operating independently, to secure the return of sales tax deposits which had been illegally refunded to
them. Although charged as joint tort feasors, the several defendants were each concerned only as to the particular amounts personally deposited and withdrawn. Being parties to a transaction,
or series of transactions, out of which the cause of action arose
the several defendants, while not conspirators, were correctly
joined in the one suit even though their liability was several in
character.5 8
The absence of a clear provision in Illinois authorizing the
53 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 125, directs that, as to all matters of
practice not regulated by statute or rule of court, the practice at common law
and in equity shall prevail.
54 But see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 22, § 6, as to suits against persons not
in being.
55 347 Ill. App. 191, 106 N. E. (2d) 735 (1952).
56412 Ill. 446, 107 N. E. (2d) 692 (1952).
57 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 148(1).
58 The court held that, there being no showing of conspiracy from the mere fact
the several defendants had been represented by one attorney and had co-operated
with one another in the refund proceedings, it was proper to enter separate judgments against the several defendants pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 193, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 174(1).
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use of third-party practice5 9 does not necessarily require that a
civil suit must be confined to those named as parties in the original
complaint for Section 25 of the Civil Practice Act authorizes the
bringing in of new parties where required for a "complete determination of the controversy,"I6 ° provided such new parties are
concerned in the "controversy" disclosed by the complaint. For
that reason, a counterclaim would ordinarily be confined for use
as against those already in the litigation0 ' and would not, normally,
be available to bring in new parties. The case of Curran v. Harris
Trust & Savings Bank,62 however, would indicate that, if the
counterclaim is in the nature of a cross-bill in equity, it may be
utilized to bring in additional parties provided they would have
been appropriately added as defendants to a cross-bill under the
former equity procedure. In that connection, the court noted that,
while Section 25 of the Civil Practice Act superseded former
Section 34 of the Chancery Act,6 3 the new provision was designed
to preserve in full the former chancery practice on the point, 6 4 so
it approved the addition of new parties to the interpleader suit
before it. The decision should, however, be carefully analyzed
before being applied to other situations, particularly to suits at
law, for it cannot be said to give unquestioned approval to unlimited third-party practice.
Little has been said concerning the availability of legal remedies for most issues with respect thereto have long since been
decided. 5 In that connection, it might be noted that while the
action of trover, as originally conceived at common law, was intended to cover the conversion of specific items of tangible personal
59

See, in particular, 28
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Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 149.
61 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 162(1), purports to restrict the counterclaim for use by one
or more defendants "against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or more codefendants."
62348 Ill. App. 210, 108 N. E. (2d) 729 (1952), noted in 41 Ill. B. J.472.
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1931, Ch. 22, § 34.
64 See Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated (The Foundation Press, Inc., Chicago.
1933), particularly p. 53.
65 If there Is doubt, and the Civil Practice Act is not specific on the point, it
should be remembered that the practice at common law is to prevail: Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 125.
60
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property, 66 modern developments have extended the scope of the
remedy to cover situations involving the conversion of instruments
for the payment of money. T The holding of the case of People v.
Roth, Inec., 65 would now indicate that an action analogous to trover
might be maintained for the conversion of money placed on
deposit with the state treasurer in a protest fund, by an illegal
withdrawal thereof, since the state enjoys a special title thereto
until the same is legally ordered refunded. The money there concerned, although mingled with other deposits in such fund, was
considered sufficiently segregated to be regarded as identifiable
property.
By way of contrast to the seemingly settled state of the law
concerning legal remedies, some cases of equitable nature call for
attention. In Liberty National Bank v. Metrick,69 for example, the
owner of a building sought a mandatory injunction to compel the
removal, by a taxicab company, of a telephone box which had been
fastened to a pole on a sidewalk in front of the building. The
owner had contended that rental values would decline because of
the congestion caused by the presence of cabs and drivers in front
of the building which obstruction would, in turn, impair access to
the premises. An order dismissing the complaint for want of
equity was upheld on the ground the primary right to the use of
city streets and sidewalks was in the public, not in the abutting
owners, and any inconvenience the property owner might suffer
would be suffered equally by the general public. As the installation
had been made with city permission, it was said that any action
charging obstruction had to be brought by a proper public official
and not by a private citizen.
The presence of laches could operate as a reason for denying
70
equitable relief but, according to the holding in Ludwig v. Ludwig
66 Trover and detinue were, in many respects, correlative remedies: Kettle v.
Bromsall, Willes 118, 125 Eng. Rep. 1087 (1738). By virtue of this fact, neither
action would lie for a sum of money unless the same was ear-marked in some particular fashion: Brown v. Ellison, 55 N. H. 576 (1875).
67 Rauch v. Fort Dearborn Nat. Bank, 223 Ill. 507, 79 N. U. 273, 11 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 545 (1906), indicates that an unauthorized dealing with a negotiable instrument would be a conversion.
68 412 Ill. 446, 107 N. E. (2d) 692 (1952).
69 347 Ill. App. 400, 106 N. E. (2d) 889 (1952).
70413 Ill. 44, 107 N. E. (2d) 848 (1952).
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the mere lapse of time would not operate to prevent an inquiry
into the fundamental validity of a Nevada divorce decree particularly where the person claiming lack of jurisdiction to grant the
divorce had never, in any way, recognized the decree. The case of
Krile v. Swiney 7 ' also, in that respect, contains a concise statement
with regard to the circumstances under which an action to quiet
title will lie.
Injunction practice became the matter of concern in two
72
cases. The first, that of Fox v. Fox Valley Trotting Club, Inc.,
indicates that allegations verified merely on information and belief
will be insufficient to support an order for a temporary injunction.
The second, being the case of Montgomery Ward & Company v.
United Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Employees of
America, C. I. 0., 73 dealt with issues concerning the right to claim
damages by way of suggestion 74 following reversal of an injunctional order. One such suggestion had been presented, heard, and
dismissed but no appeal was taken from the order of dismissal.
A second suggestion, seeking an increased amount and containing
allegations as to the existence of an injunction bond, was countered with a claim of res judicata. A majority of the Appellate
Court for the First District agreed that there was. no merit in
the second suggestion, hence held the same was properly denied,
since the mere increase in amount did not make the claim a
different one and the reference to the bond added no new features.
The court said that if the enjoined party was interested in enforcing liability under the bond a separate legal action for this purpose
would have been necessary.
In the course of hearing a proceeding, a chancellor may have
occasion to use the services of a master in chancery 75 but chancel71413 Ill. 350, 109 N. E. (2d) 189 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw
267.
72349 Ill. App. 132, 110 N. E. (2d) 84 (1953). See also Hope v. Hope, 350 Ill.
App. 190, 112 N. E. (2d) 495 (1953).
Schwartz, J., wrote a concurring
73.348 Il. App. 198, 108 N. E. (2d) 784 (1952).
opinion. Tuohy, J., wrote a dissenting opinion. Leave to appeal has been denied.
74 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 69, § 12.
75 The legislature has authorized an increase in certain fees chargeable by masters in chancery: Laws 1953, p. 1555, H.B. 474; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953. Vol. 1, Ch. 53,
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lors have also been known to appoint special commissioners for
this purpose. Prior criticism has been addressed to this practice7 6
as well as to the general practice of forcing private litigants to
pay fees for the services rendered by masters 7 7 in cases which
ought to be heard by the judges themselves. 78 A further blow
appears to have been struck by the decision in the case of Pokorney
v. Pokorney.7 9 The court there pointed out that reference to a
special commissioner in divorce cases would be proper only with
respect to petitions for the allowance of temporary alimony,8 0
never in connection with petitions for modification of alimony
orders already entered, and that the practice of making such
references forcibly illustrated the evils inherent in compelling
litigants to pay the actual cost of procuring justice.8 '
Although a fundamental doctrine proclaims that no action
should be maintained in equity where there is an adequate remedy
at law, there would seem to be some doubt as to whether the
same thing is true with respect to the quasi-equitable statutory
proceeding for a declaratory judgment. 8 2 It has been held that
the available presence of a customary remedy would normally
preclude use of a proceeding for a declaratory judgment,8 3 but
the case of Kitt v. City of Chicago8 4 now indicates that, even
though mandamus would lie, recourse to the "speedy and in§ 38. It has, however, placed considerable limitation on the fees recoverable for
services rendered in cases involving petitions for temporary separate maintenance: Laws 1953, p. 1571, H.B. 991; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 22.
76 See Simpson v. Harrison, 328 I. App. 425, 66 N. E. (2d) 494 (1946).
77 The chancellor may, of course, exercise wide discretion in assessing these
costs among the parties: Jones v. Washington, 412 Ill. 436, 107 N. E. (2d) 672
(1952).
78 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 22b, and note thereon in 26 CHICAGOKENT LAW REvMw 40-1.
79 348 Ill. App. 364, 109 N. E. (2d) 254 (1952).
80 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 16.
81 The defendant there, seeking relief from an alimony order on the ground of
his inability to pay, stood faced with an obligation to pay over $400 in commissioner's fees for taking testimony, much of which consisted of an agreed stateinent of facts, and for the making of a report thereon.
82 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.1.
83 See, for example, the tax case of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tierney, 411
Ill. 421, 104 N. E. (2d) 222 (1952), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 535. See also Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments, 2d Ed., pp. 320 and 342.
84 415 Ill. 246, 112 N. E. (2d) 607 (1953).
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expensive" method of determining disputes by declaratory judgment is permissible where there is an actual controversy or where
it is necessary to secure a construction of a statute or municipal
ordinance. 5 One using a declaratory judgment proceeding should,
like any other litigant, be obliged to state a case and, when required, be able to prove it if he is to have the benefit of the statute.
The Supreme Court decision in the case of Powell v. Trustees of
Schools8 6 is, in that respect, noteworthy for the court there required a party, seeking a declaration that he held title to a parcel
of real estate, to establish his claim on the strength of his own
title, as would have been required if he had sued in ejectment,
thereby denying him the right to rest his case on the weakness
of the title of his adversary.
PR"ARkATION OF PLBADINGS

If the Civil Practice Act did nothing else, it certainly made
it possible for a pleader, in doubt as to which of two or more
defendants was the one liable to the plaintiff, to set up his case
in alternative form, in one count or in separate counts, 7 to the
end that the one actually responsible could be compelled to respond
8
for his fault. Despite this, the plaintiff in Lustig v. Hutchinson,
with the approval of at least a majority of the judges of the
Appellate Court for the First District, seems to have found a novel
way to approach the problem by stating his case as to one defendant and then adding the names of others who might, in the
alternative, be liable but without the addition of any charge as to
them. It must be acknowledged that the court was helped toward
reaching its approval of this method of pleading by the failure of
the defendants so joined to question the sufficiency of the complaint 9 until after trial, but even so, it is doubtful if any doctrine
85 The case would also appear to be authority for the point that, by suitable
amendment, existing litigation seeking coercive relief may be converted into a
proceeding for no more than a declaration of rights. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 170.
86 415 Ill. 236, 112 N. E. (2d) 478 (1953).
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 148.
88 349 Ii1. App. 120, 110 N. E. (2d) 278 (1953), noted in 31 CHICAQO-KENT LAW
RWi[Ew 275. Kiley, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
89 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 169, authorizes objection to pleadings by
motion.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

of aider by verdict could go to the length of supplying an entire
statement of a case, much as it might be used to help out a
defectively stated one.
Insofar as defensive pleadings are concerned, the provisions
of Section 43 of the Civil Practice Act 90 would appear to treat
the defense of release as being truly affirmative in character,
with the burden of proof being assigned in accordance with the
principle that he who must plead should also prove. If, however,
according to the case of Williams v. East St. Louis Junction
Railroad Company,9 1 the plaintiff admits the making of the release but seeks to avoid the effect thereof because of fraud or
mistake, the burden is then on him to establish at least a prima
facie case in this respect before being entitled to have the jury
pass on the point.92 This being true, the court found little difficulty there in avoiding the effect of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad
Company,95 a case which required submission of the question
of the existence of a release to the jury, in federal employer's
liability situations, in conformity with federal rather than state
doctrines on the point, because the plaintiff had failed to offer
prima facie proof. In the absence thereof, it was held proper for
the court to take that issue from the jury by means of a directed
verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Although repeal by implication is not favored, the case of
Schmidt v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc.,9 4 would tend to
indicate that the statutory requirement as to verification of certain pleas in abatement9 5 is inapplicable with respect to the
modern substitute in the form of a motion to dismiss. 96 Accept90 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 167(4).
91,349 Ill. App. 296, 110 N. E. (2d) 700 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
92 See Callen v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 332 U. S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, 92 L. Ed.
242 (1948).
98342 U. S. 359, 72 S. Ct. 312, 96 L. Ed. 398 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REvIEw 364.
94 349 Ill. App. 252, 110 N. E. (2d) 538 (1953).
95 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 1, § 1, states: "That no plea in abatement,
other than a plea to the jurisdiction of the court . . . shall be admitted, unless
the same is verified by the affidavit of the person offering the same, or of some
other person for him."
96 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 172.
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ing, for the purpose, that verification is still necessary, the court
nevertheless found the affidavit before it sufficient on the ground
the out-of-state notary public, who lacked a seal of office, had
sufficiently demonstrated his authority to administer an oath by
attaching a certificate of magistracy.9 7 In that same case, the
Appellate Court expressed belief that a trial court could, by
overruling a motion to strike a motion to strike, 98 leave the issue
created by the first of these motions unsettled so as to permit the
opposing party to take issue with the facts therein relied upon.
It would seem, at least with respect to motions made pursuant to
Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act, 99 that, if the opposing party
believes the motion to be inadequate as to form or substance,
he should call the same up for disposition on the then state of
the record rather than to engage in a form of practice equivalent
to demurring to a demurrer.' If the court should conclude that the
motion to dismiss was in proper form, it would still have the right
to deny the same without prejudice, especially if it was made to
appear that there was likely to be a dispute as to the facts. The objection could then, both logically and correctly, be made by an answer in abatement and a reply thereto, 2 without encumbering the
record with a confusing series of motions.
Most of the pleading questions turned on the right to make
necessary amendments to pleadings. 3 What started out to be
a movement for a very illiberal attitude on the. point received a
set-back when the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in the
case of Vukovich v. Custer.4 A complaint for personal injuries
97 Ibid., Ch. 101, § 6, was said to possess no more than prima facie effect, and
that proof in the manner provided by Ch. 99, § 6, dealing with domestic notaries,
would be an acceptable substitute.
98 The first of the motions therein was actually a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, filed pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172(1) (a), supported with an affidavit as to facts existing
outside of the record, thereby partaking of the nature of a "speaking" demurrer.
99 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172.
1 Camlibell v. St. John, 1 Salk. 219, 91 Eng. Rep. 194 (1689).
2 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(3) and § 156.
3 The case of Williams v. Fredenhagen, 350 Ill. App. 26, 111 N. E. (2d) 578 (1953),
might be here mentioned for it extends the application of the amendment provisions
of the Civil Practice Act to scire facias proceedings brought to revive a judgment under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 24b.
4415 Ill. 290, 112 N. E. (2d) 712 (1953), reversing 347 Ill. App. 547, 107 N. E.
(2d) 426 (1952), noted in 31 C11CAGo-KENT LAW RE viw 184.
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had there been filed in the name of the injured person on the
day he died as a consequence of the injuries complained about.
Just short of one year after institution of the suit, the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff secured permission to be
substituted as a party and then offered an amended complaint,5
designed to change the action to one for wrongful death. The
amended complaint was afterwards stricken on motion. The
Supreme Court, reversing both the trial court and the Appellate
Court, held the amendment proper, although it seems to have
treated the substituted complaint as being more nearly an original
rather than an amended one, at the same time that it refused to
resolve the dispute as to the effect to be given to the death of a
nominal plaintiff prior to the institution of the suit.6 One is
left to speculate on the validity of a summons, forming the basis
of jurisdiction, which specifies the name of the non-existent party.
The course of action taken in the case of Rasgaitis v.
RasgaitiS7 would indicate that, despite emphasis on the abolition
of distinctions in the manner of pleading between actions at law
and suits in equity,8 procedural methods utilized in the two types
of cases do still differ. In a suit at law, for example, it would
have been highly objectionable for the plaintiff to have anticipated a defense 9 since the proper procedural method required
the plaintiff to await the raising thereof by the defendant's plea
and thereafter, through a replication, nullify the effect thereof. In
direct contrast, the former equity complainant who had failed to
notice a potential defense was obliged, through an amended bill
of complaint, to give recognition thereto at the time he pleaded
the new matter designed to avoid that defense. 10 The modern
procedure would seem to suggest that the plaintiff should not
anticipate, especially in the case of the truly affirmative defenses,1"
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Oh. 110, § 170, deals with the amendment of pleadings.
6 The opinion intimates that the holding in Pease v. Rockford City Traction Co.,
279 Ill. 513, 117 N. E. 83 (1917), may have been nullified by the present statutory
provision concerning amendment of pleadings.
7 347 Ill. App. 477, 107 N. E. (2d) 273 (1952).
8 111. Rev. Stat 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 155(1).
9 Conte v. Allen Candy Co., 230 II. App. 471 (1923).
10 Cushman v. Bonfield, 139 Ill. 219 at 247, 28 N. E. 937 at 946 (1891).
11ll. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 167(4).
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but should wait until the same are raised and then combat by the
use of a reply. 12 Despite this, in the case mentioned, the court
appears to have approved the action of the plaintiff in there filing
an amended divorce complaint setting forth supplemental acts
of cruelty to offset the affirmative defense of condonation based
on continued cohabitation.' 8 If there is any justification for
practice of that nature, it can only be found in Rule 10 of the
Illinois Supreme Court with its doubtful reference to the fact
that, as to all matters cognizable by courts of equity, the same
"shall be heard and decided in the manner heretofore practiced
14
in courts of equity.'
The desire that civil litigation should achieve a speedy and
final determination "according to the substantive rights of the
parties ' ' 15 is further reflected in the provision that defects in
pleadings, either as to form or substance, not objected to in the
trial court "shall be deemed waived."' 6 The last mentioned statement has been considered to be a statutory reference to something
17
at least akin to the common law doctrine of aider by verdict.
Pursuant thereto, pleadings which might be lacking in that degree
of particularity or clarity necessary to withstand a motion to
strike may, if no objection is made until after trial, be considered
sufficient on appeal.' 8 The case of Gustafson v. Consumers Sales
Agency'9 serves to throw additional light on the subject for the
complaint therein, based on an alleged wrongful death, made no
direct charge that the decedent left next of kin2 and would
12 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 156, directs that "when new matter by way of defense . . . is
pleaded in the answer, the reply shall be filed by the plaintiff." Italics added.
13 See Lipe v. IApe, 327 Ill. 39, 158 N. E. 411 (1927).
14 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.10.
15 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 128.
16 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 166(3).
17 Connett v. Winget, 374 Ill. 531, 30 N. E. (2d) 1 (1940), noted in 19 CHIOasOKENT LAw Rvi 'w 189.
Is Owen-Illinois Glass Co. v. McKibbin, 385 Ill. 245, 52 N. E. (2d) 17T (1944).
19414 Ill. 235, 110 N. E. (2d) 865 (1953), reversing 346 Ill. App. 493, 105 N. E.

(2d) 557 (1952).
20 The Injuries Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2, specifies that the
amount recovered shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow and next of kin.
Where none survive, the maximum possible recovery is sharply curtailed in favor
of other designated persons.
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have been vulnerable to a motion to strike for that reason 21 but,
no objection having been made in the trial court,22 a judgment for
plaintiff was nevertheless sustained because some vague references in the complaint to "plaintiff's intestate" together with a
degree of similarity in the names of the parties, plus some proof
on the point, was enough, under the doctrine of aider by verdict,
to cure the defect without the necessity of an amendment.
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE

Antecedent to the trial itself, some questions may be generated regarding such things as judgment by confession, 23 summary
judgment, pre-trial procedure and the like. While summary
judgment procedure in the federal courts may be used without
limitation, 24 the practice in state courts is to confine the use
thereof to a case in which no genuine controverted issue of fact
exists and provided the case also falls into one or more of four
specified categories. 25 It was argued, in the case of Rowan v.
Matansky,2 6 that a claim for treble damages under Section 205
of the Housing and Rent Act 2 7 fell within the class of contracts
"implied in law," so as to justify the use of summary judgment
procedure, but the court, treating the case as one to recover a
statutory penalty, hence more nearly in the nature of a suit in
debt, 28 ruled that it was improper to grant summary judgment
therein.
Although the legislative provisions with respect to the giving
21 North Pier Terminal Co. v. Hoskins Coal & Dock Corp., 402 fl1. 192, 83 N. E.
(2d) 748 (1949).
22 A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict had been presented, but it
was not specific on the point. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 192(1).
23 The case of Skolnik v. Susco Production Corp., 349 Ill. App. 402, 111 N. R. (2d)
180 (1953), would indicate that a variance between the contractual language used
In a note authorizing judgment by confession and the cognovit on which the confessed judgment was based would be insufficient to warrant reversal of the judgment In the absence of a showing of prejudice. See, however, the case of Woerter
v. Labowitch & Morris Discount Service, 348 Ill. App. 168, 108 N. E. (2d) 519
(1952), regarding the confession of judgment against a partnership.
24 See Federal Rule 56.
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 181.
26 348 Ill. App. 296, 108 N. E. (2d) 799 (1952).
27 50 U.

S.

C. A.

§ 1895.

28 But note the holding in Waiman v. Williamson, 256 N. Y. 117, 175 N. E. 534
(1931).
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of notice prior to the entry of a default judgment were declared
2 9
unconstitutional in the case of Agran v. Checker Taxi Company,
the uncriticized portions of the Civil Practice Act dealing with
default procedure3" still contain a limitation in that a true default
judgment, as there authorized, is to be entered only when there
is a total want of appearance. If, following appearance,, there
is a failure to answer or plead in the manner and within the time
required by Rule 8 of the Supreme Court, 31 steps to default a
neglectful party should be taken only after notice. In that connection, the case of Admiral Corporationv. Newel132 is important
for the court there, when construing Rule 7, which deals with the
sufficiency of notice and the manner of service thereof, 83 came
up with the conclusion that a default judgment would have to be
set aside in case there was a non-compliance therewith inasmuch
as substantial compliance with the terms of the rule was deemed
to be essential.
One about to take a default judgment should be aware of
the fact that, while there is authority for the rendition of more
than one judgment in the cause, 84 as well as further provision
to the effect that a judgment against one of several joint debtors
shall not bar a remedy against the others,3 5 the statute is silent
as to the effect to be given to a judgment pronounced against
one of several joint tort feasors provided nothing is said therein
36
as to the liability of the others. The case of Martinez v. Seymour
reaffirming earlier practice on the point, 7 now indicates that the
taking of a final judgment as to one joint tort feasor operates as
29412 11. 145, 105 N. E. (2d) 713 (1952), noted In 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RE
383.
3o See -Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174(6).
31 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 259.8.

32 348 Ill. App. 180, 108 N. E. (2d) 521 (1952). Leave to appeal has been-denied.
33 The record indicated that the attorney who filed the appearance failed to comply with. Rule 6(5) by omitting therefrom information concerning his business
address. Notice of application for default was likewise defective because, while

served by mail, It failed to disclose the "complete address" appearing on the envelope in which such notice was mailed.
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174(1).
.35 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 151.
36 348 Ill. App. 112, 108 N. E. (2d) 30 (1952).
37 See Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Likes, 225 Ill. 249, 80 N. E. 136 (1907),
followed in Pierson v. Lyon & Healy, 243 Ill. 370, 90 N. E. 693 (1910).
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an implied dismissal as to the others. There would, then, appear
to be reason to refrain from taking judgment as to a defaulting
tort feasor until all issues have been resolved, for Rule 16 of
the Supreme Court 8 is apparently intended to keep the litigation
alive only when the summary judgment does not dispose of all
of the issues in the case.
Matters relating to pretrial discovery were concerned in two
cases. In one of them, that of Elliott v. Brown,3 9 it was held
that an unwillingness on the part of a defendant to exhibit documents in his possession relating to the case, although concurred
in by the trial court which had sustained an objection to a motion
to compel production,4 ° was adequate reason for excluding such
documents when they were later offered at the trial.4 1 In the
other, that of Pink v. Dempsey,42 it was said that the taking of a
pretrial deposition 43 from a claimant against a decedent's estate,
but which deposition was not offered at the trial, did not operate
to waive the provisions of the "dead man's" act 4 4 or make the
claimant competent to testify in her own behalf. 45 The opinion
therein deserves careful reading for it appears to have explored
46
the question thoroughly.
A question concerning the admissibility of evidence of a compromise agreement made between a defendant and a third person
injured in the same accident arose in the case of Feinberg v.
Rosenthal.47 The third party had become a witness by deposition,
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.16.
39349 Ill. App. 428, 111 N. E. (2d) 169 (1953).
40 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.17(4).
41 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 259.17(6).
42350 Ill. App. 405, 113 N. E. (2d) 334 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 182.
44 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2.
45 The earlier case of Chapman v. Bruton, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 334, 60 N. E. (2d)
125 (1945), had reached the same conclusion, but the decision therein turned on an
examination made pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 184.
46 An informative statement as to the scope and purposes of pre-trial procedure
in federal district courts is provided, at 14 F. R. D. 417 (1953), by Judge Alfred
P. Murrah, Chairman of the Pre-Trial Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States. While confined to a discussion of the federal rules on the subject,
the article might serve to shed light on parallel areas in Illinois practice.
47348 Ill. App. 510, 109 N. E. (2d) 402 (1952), noted in 16 U. of Detroit L. J.
201. Leave to appeal has been denied.
38 Il.
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in which deposition the compromise payment stood disclosed,
and the objection rested on the well-known theory that evidence
as to a settlement should be excluded in order to facilitate compromise of claims outside of court. The plaintiff, on the other
hand, wanted the evidence admitted as it would tend to show bias
on the part of the third person. No unusual circumstances having
been shown to take the case out of the general rule, nor any fraud
or questionable practice indulged in to procure or influence the
testimony, the action of the trial court in excluding that portion
of the deposition relating to the compromise was sustained.
Much more startling was the evidence ruling contained in
the criminal case of People v. Lettrich.48 The defendant there
had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death on evidence
consisting principally of his own confession. He urged, on
appeal, that error had been committed by the trial judge in refusing to admit hearsay evidence that another person, not then
before the court, had confessed to the crime. There is no question but that the general rule is that extra-judicial statements
by a third person to the effect that he committed the crime in
question, while patently against his interest, are inadmissible
and the case of Domelly v. United States49 has been the outstanding authority on the point for many years. The Supreme
Court, acting to reverse the conviction because of other errors
in the record, said that, under the special circumstances of the
case, a departure from the rule would be proper, particularly
where the state was relying upon the repudiated confession of
the defendant. To quote from the opinion of Justice Maxwell,
it would seem that "justice requires that the jury consider every
circumstance which reflects upon the reliability" of a confession,
and a confession by a third party "is such a circumstance. ' °
No Illinois case was cited, however, so the instant holding appears
to be the first to intimate that the rule of the Donnelly case is
not all-inclusive.
48413 Ii. 172, 108 N. E. (2d)

488 (1952), noted in 6 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 924.
49 228 U. S. 243, 38 S. Ct. 449, 57 L Ed. 820 (1913).
50 413 II. 172 at 179, 108 N. E. (2d) 488 at 492.
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Problems concerning impeachment of witnesses were also
considered. In the case of People v. Van Dyke, 51 the prosecution
sought to impeach one of its own witnesses, who had refused to
answer questions pertaining to the crime under investigation for
constitutional reasons, by asking, on cross-examination, whether
the witness had not made certain inconsistent statements to the
assistant state's attorney. This line of investigation was held
not to be error on the theory that, as allowed in previous cases, it
might "refresh the memory of the witness or awaken his conscience," hence was permissible not for the purpose of demonstrating unworthiness or incredibility on the part of the witness
but merely to show the prior inconsistent statements. But query,
just where is the line between the two? On the other hand, in
People v. Kirkpatrik,52 it was held improper to seek to impeach
the defendant's testimony by producing a record of his prior
conviction for violation of the federal Dyer Act, an infamous
crime under the federal law, because the earlier conviction was
not regarded as being infamous within the meaning of the appli58
cable provision of the state criminal code.
Statutory modification of evidence law has been brought about
by amendment which extends the privilege of taking depositions
from witnesses within, as well as those without, the state,5 4 but
subject to the limitations heretofore expressed. Another amendment makes it clear that any discovery obtained at the trial as
the result of conducting an examination of an adverse party is
to be regarded as part of the record in the case.55 By virtue of
a new provision, no witness may be compelled to testify, whether
before a court, a commission, an administrative agency, or other
tribunal, if any portion of the testimony is to be broadcast or
televised, or if motion pictures are to be taken of him while so
51414 Ill. 251, 111 N. E. (2d) 165 (1953), cert. den.. 345 U. S. 978, 73 S, Ct..1127,
97 L. Ed. (adv.) 958 (1953), noted In 1953 i1. L. Forum 296.
52413 Ill. 595, 110 N. E. (2d) 519 (1953), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RwIvw
380.
58 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 587.
54 Laws 1953, p. 1555, H.B. 572 ; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. .51, § 25.
55 Laws 1953, p. 857, S.B. 306; Ii. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 184.
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testifying. 56 While possessing its source in the Criminal Code,
a change in the procedure for testing the competency of an alleged
confession, before the same is offered in a criminal case, has
bearing on the law of evidence. Under the new provision, 7 the
defendant may, on preliminary motion, have the question tested,
with the result that if the court finds the confession incompetent
it shall be suppressed and may not be offered or received at the
trial. A failure to make such a motion, or an adverse ruling
thereon, is not to prejudice the defendant's right to show incompetency, if he can do so, at the trial of the case.
DAMAGES

Mention has been made elsewhere concerning the rule to be
followed in awarding damages in tort cases where the injured
person has proceeded against the careless servant and also against
the master on the theory of respondeat swperior.58 The tort case
of Hall v. Chicago & North Western Railway Company5 9 is also
worthy of brief note for the defendant's counsel there sought to
comment on the fact that the amount which might be assessed as
damages would not be subject to deduction for federal income
taxes 60 but was restrained from so doing by the trial court. The
Appellate Court for the First District, with an eye on the fact
that juries probably speculate on whether or not their awards
will be subject to taxation and, from misconception as to the law
on the point, frequently produce larger verdicts than would otherwise result, held the defense comment was proper under the
circumstances. It could find only one decision, a recent Missouri
case, 6 1 which had, prior to this, dealt with the same point, but it
considered the defendant's comment proper to offset the plaintiff's common practice of urging the jury, when assessing damLaws 1953,
Laws 1953,
58 See above,
a discussion of
56
57

(1952),

p. 1165, H.B. 344; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 57.
p. 1166, S.B. 622; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 736.1.
under the topic of Principal and Agent, particularly note 25, for
the case of Aldridge v. Fox, 348 Ill. App. 96, 108 N. E. (2d) 139

noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 277.

59 349 Ill. App. 175, 110 N. E. (2d) 654 (1953). Appeal therein has been dismissed.
6026 U. S. C. A. §22(b) (5).
61 See Dempsey v. Thompson, - Mo. -, 251 S. W. (2d) 42 (1952).
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ages, to consider the depreciation which has taken place -in the
value of the dollar.
In the only other damage case of significance, that of Randall
v. General Motors Corporation,6 2 the plaintiff, when suing for
breach of a covenant contained in a lease, was faced with a rider
covering a security deposit which provided that, in case of default, the deposit should become additional rent as liquidated
damages without prejudice to the lessor's other rights "except
additional monetary damages." The plaintiff saw fit to urge the
provision was essentially one for a penalty, probably because he
thought he could prove a greater amount of damage than the
sum fixed by the rider, but the Appellate Court held him to the
terms thereof, particularly since the security deposit had never
been applied toward the satisfaction of the rent due under the
lease. To reach such result in the absence of any Illinois precedent, the court relied on an Oklahoma decision. 3
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE

The time for taking an appeal with respect to certain interlocutory orders, such as the granting of an injunction or the
appointment of a receiver, is fixed not only by statute but also
by rule of court, 4 with an alternative provision to the effect that,
if a motion to vacate such an order is not decided within seven
days after presentation, the appeal may then be taken without the
need for further delay. The case of City of Edwardsville v. Illinois Terminal Railroad Company 5 offers the further thought
that, if the litigant is willing to allow the trial court additional
time in which to rule on a motion to vacate, he should not be
barred from appeal, even though the time normally allotted may
have expired, but is to be entitled to have the full time period
for appeal following the disposition of the motion. The suggestion is a commendable one for the litigant, by suffering the delay
62 350 Ill. App. 384, 112 N. E. (2d) 915 (1953).
63 Southern Motor Supply Co. v. Shelbourne Motor Co., 172 Okla. 495, 46 P. (2d)
562 (1935).
64 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 202 and § 259.31.
65 350 Ill. App. 63, 111 N. E. (2d) 707 (1953).
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without exposing himself to loss of the right to secure review,
may find that no appeal is necessary. Provided an appeal has
been perfected in accordance with Section 76 of the Civil Practice
Act and within the time there mentioned, 66 the holding in the
case of Rowan v. Matanky67 would indicate that a two-day delay
in serving notice of appeal, if done within the ten-day period
after the filing thereof, but beyond the ninety-day period from date
68
of judgment as specified in Rule 34 of the Supreme Court, will
not serve to nullify the appeal, at least in the absence of a showing of prejudice to the appellee.
If an appeal is taken as a matter of right within ninety days
from the entry of the order complained of,69 the time in which
other necessary steps, such as preparing a report of the proceedings, must be taken may be enlarged from time to time, provided
each new extension is secured before, the expiration of the period

preceding

it.70

If not, the appellant may have to seek permission

to file his appeal under the so-called "long appeal" provisions
with the burden of showing the absence of culpable negligence
on his part. 7 1 The case of McLean v. Board of Education7 2 would,
in that connection, indicate that the carelessness of a court reporter in mislaying her stenographic notes ought not be chargeable to the appellant for that fact would not evidence culpable
negligence on the appellant 's part.
Once the appeal has been providently taken, provided it is
taken to the appropriate reviewing court, 78 the appellant may
66 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 200.
67 348 Il1. App. 296, 108 N. E. (2d) 799 (1952).
68Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 259.34(1) (a), directs that, when an
appeal is taken as of right, the notice shall be served "within ninety days from the
entry of the order ... from which the appeal is taken."
69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 200.
70 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 259.36.
71 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 200.
72 350 Ill. App. 209, 112 N. E. (2d) 630 (1953).
78 Following in line with the holding in People v. Home Real Estate Improvement
Corp., 379 Ill. 536, 42 N. E. (2d) 80 (1942), wherein it was held that an interested
school district had no right to direct appeal to the Supreme Court from a sale on
tax foreclosure where no issue of revenue was directly involved, is the more recent
case of People v. Smith, 413 Ill. 382, 109 N. E. (2d) 196 (1952). The dispute there
concerned rival claims, by private parties, to be declared the successful bidder at a
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be faced with the problem of what to do in case some change in
law occurs while his appeal is pending. The case of Quitman v.
Chicago Transit Authority7 4 is, for that reason, important inasmuch as, while the appeal therein was pending before the Appellate Court, the statute relied on was, at the instance of other
parties, declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.7 5 This
fact was brought to the attention of the reviewing tribunal by
means by supplemental briefs, whereupon the appellee urged that,
as no constitutional issue had been raised in the case at hand, or
if raised had been waived by taking an appeal to the Appellate
Court,76 the appeal should be decided without taking the decision
as to the constitutionality of the statute into consideration. The
reviewing court, however, refused to close its eyes on the point
for it considered the statute as void ab initio, hence in no way
controlling in the case before it.
In the event it is possible to secure further review on leave
to appeal, it might be noted that the statute authorizing the
Supreme Court to act in no way restricts the appellate jurisdiction of that court to those matters urged in the petition on which
such leave is granted. 77 It would, however, be normal to expect
that the reasons assigned, reasons which probably motivated the
court to grant leave to appeal, would be the ones assigned and
passed upon on further review. The opinion in the case of
Glasser v. Essaness Theatres Corporation" is surprising, therefore, in that the court, after noting that appellant's petition for
leave to appeal had contained much on the point of an alleged
tax foreclosure sale. The appeal was ordered transferred on the ground the case
was not one in which the state was "interested," either as a party or otherwise, nor
did it directly involve issues relating to state revenue. Following transfer, the
decree was affirmed in 350 Ill. App. 127, 111 N. E. (2d) 841 (1953).
74 348 Ill. App. 481, 109 N. E. (2d) 373 (1952). See also Hannigan v. Chicago
Motor Coach Co., 348 Ill. App. 473, 109 N. E. (2d) 381 (1952).
75 The issue was one concerning the application of the first paragraph of Section
29 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 166,
to a suit brought by a covered employee against a third-party tort feasor. The
statute was declared unconstitutional in the case of Grasse v. Dealers Transport
Co., 412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
375.
76 See Armour & Co. v. Industrial Board, 275 II. 328, 114 N. E. 173 (1916).
77 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199(2).
78 414 Ill. 180, 111 N. E. (2d) 124 (1953).
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impropriety on the part of an appellate court in granting a
rehearing, 9 but which point had thereafter apparently been
abandoned if the total silence with respect thereto in appellant's
brief offered any guide whatever, then proceeded to decide other
issues raised by the brief. The practice of seeking leave to appeal
on the basis of controversial points in need of clarification, and
then abandoning these points when leave has been obtained,
is scarcely one to be commended. It would also seem to be one
which ought not be countenanced by the Supreme Court in the
interest of protecting itself from imposition.
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

When, in contradiction to the common-law practice, the legislature opened the door to the rendition of more than one judgment in a civil action, it generated a degree of confusion which
0
has not yet been allayed. The case of Zboinsky v. Wjocik does
indicate, however, that, after a judgment has been rendered
against one of several joint tort feasors named as co-defendants
in the one suit, but with a reservation of jurisdiction as to the
others, subsequent events which might affect the liability of the
remaining defendants will not operate to change the liability of the
judgment defendant. In that case, a release given to one of the
non-judgment defendants, which would ordinarily have operated
to discharge all,"' was held not to affect the judgment debtor
nor entitle him to a satisfaction of the judgment pronounced
against him on the ground that, by virtue of the judgment, his
liability was thereafter separate and distinct from that of his
fellow wrong-doers. It was, therefore, deemed proper to confine
8 2
the judgment debtor pursuant to a capias ad satisfaciendum.
Another dram shop case, that of Hyland v. Waite,83 is particularly noteworthy for a question arose therein whether a bona
79 This point is covered in a note in 31 CHICAGO--KENT LAW REVIEW 187, discussing
the holding of the Appellate Court in 346 Ill. App. 72, 104 N. E. (2d) 510 (1952).
80347 Ill. App. 226, 106 N. E. (2d) 764 (1952), noted in 30 CHIcAGO-KENT LAW
RIiEw 384.
81 Welty v. Laurent, 285 Ill. App. 13, 1 N. E. (2d) 577 (1936).
82 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 5.
83 349 Ill. App. 213, 110 N. E. (2d) 457 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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fide purchaser of land, occupied and used for tavern purposes,
would take the property subject to the lien of a judgment not
pronounced until after the sale to such purchaser in proceedings
not even then begun but based upon a then existing cause of
action for violation of the Dram Shop Act.8 4 The plaintiff there
contended that the lien of his judgment, enforcible under the
statute against the premises in which the violation occurred,8
should be held to possess retroactive effect back to the date when
the cause of action arose, regardless of the absence of notice. If
this contention were true in law, a cloud would be cast on the
title to every parcel of land now in use, or which had been used,
for tavern purposes. The Appellate Court for the First District,
however, came to the conclusion that, without regard to what the
rule might be where some notice could be said to exist in the form
of a pending suit, the circumstances in the case before it required
a holding that the bona fide purchaser should be protected in his
8 6
purchase.
The garnishment case of Kores Carbon Paper & Ribbon
87
Manufacturing Company v. Western Office Supply Co., Inc.,
while not essentially new in law, is interesting in its factual aspects. The judgment creditor there sought to garnishee a bank
account of a corporate judgment debtor on the theory the bank
in question had permitted improper withdrawals from the funds
on deposit, which money, if replaced, would then be available to
satisfy the judgment. At the time of the deposit, the bank had
been directed to pay out only on corporate checks bearing two
specified signatures. It did, nevertheless, pay out the deposit,
almost to the point of exhaustion, on checks signed by only one
person. On the basis that the corporate depositor, by silent acquiescence, had ratified the bank's conduct in honoring the irregular checks, hence could not complain, the court reached the result
that the liability of the garnishee to the judgment debtor would
84 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 43, J 135.
85 Ibid., Ch. 43, § 136.

86 The court could cite only the early Ohio case of Bellinger v. Griffith, 23 Ohio
St. 619 (1873), as having any bearing on the point.
87 349 I1. App. 208, 110 N. E. (2d) 461 (1953).
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be no greater than the balance remaining on deposit in the ac88
count.
IV.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

Interpretation and clarification of portions of the Criminal
Code and of criminal provisions to be found elsewhere among the
statutes has been accomplished by means of a number of new
decisions and by legislative action although basic rules have
remained largely unchanged. Looking first to cases, it is to be
noted that the state, as well as the ordinary individual, is a party
to be protected according to the decision in People v. Gibbs,' one
construing the confidence game statute. 2 It was there decided that
the word "person," as used in the statute to describe the party
imposed upon, includes the body politic. Although no prior decision existed on the point, a part of the act dealing with construction of statutes s was cited as direct support for this holding.
One case of note, involving the crime of conspiracy, that of
People v. Dorman,4 presented a new question. The pertinent statute, prohibiting conspiracy to do certain designated acts, concludes
with the words "or to do any illegal act injurious to the public
trade, health, morals, police, or administration of public justice.' '5
The second count of the indictment in question charged a conspiracy to do an illegal act injurious to the public morals, to-wit:
keeping book. A motion to quash this count having been sustained,
the state brought writ of error, thereby directly placing in issue
the question as to whether or not the offense of keeping book was
an "illegal act" within the meaning of the conspiracy statute.
The Appellate Court for the Third District, applying the doctrine
88 It might be noted that some revision has been made in the Garnishment Act.
The penalty for illegally serving a wage demand before judgment has been entered

has been enlarged, and an increase has occurred in the amount of exempted wages,
to mention but two points.

See Laws 1953, p. 220, S.B. 113, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,

Vol. 1, Ch. 62, § 1 et seq.
1413 Ill. 154, 108 N. E. (2d) 446 (1952).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 257.
3 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 131, § 1.05.
4 347 Ill. App. 317, 106 N. E. (2d) 842 (1952). The decision was later affirmed
by the Supreme Court, not in the period of this survey: 415 11. 85, 114 N. E. (2d)

404 (1953).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 139.
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of eiusdem generis, held the general words at the end of the
statute were to be controlled by the prior specific words, hence a
conspiracy to keep book was not an actionable conspiracy. In
support of that holding, the court pointed to the fact that the
actual keeping of a book was an offense already prohibited as a
misdemeanor.8 If the defendants were to be held on a conspiracy
charge, the range of prospective prosecution would become extremely broad, even to the point where two people who had decided to become intoxicated, or to go fishing without first obtaining
licenses, would be subject to indictment.
The Uniform Narcotic Act, as adopted in this state, 7 was
tested and construed in two cases. Constitutionality of the section
providing for aggravated punishment for repeaters8 was challenged in People v. Hightower,9 wherein the defendant had been
sentenced to serve up to fifty years in the penitentiary as a
repeater. The challenge was based on the technical ground that
the bill had not been passed by the legislature in accordance with
the constitutional requirement that every bill should be read at
large on three different days in each house.' 0 The legislative
record on the particular section showed that the measure, a house
bill, had been amended on second reading, had proceeded to a
third reading, and had been given three readings in the state
senate. The Supreme Court, acting on the basis that the modifications in the bill were germane to the original subject matter, held
that three complete readings of the amended bill in each house
were not necessary,1 1 hence the amended bill became a valid law
and the sentence thereunder was proper.
The second narcotics case yielded a definition of the "subsequent offense" for which a guilty prisoner may suffer an increased penalty. Prior to 1951, it was the law that a repeater
could be subjected to a higher penalty even though the first offense
6 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 336.
7 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 192.1 et seq.
8 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 192.23.
9 414 Ill. 537, 112 N. E. (2d) 126 (1953).
10 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 13.
11 See Giebelhausen v. Daley, 407 I1. 25, 95 N. E. (2d) 84 (1950).
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had been no more than a misdemeanor. 1 2 Whether this rule continued was apparently made the subject of some doubt by an
amendment adopted in that year which provided that any offense
under the act was to be regarded as a "subsequent offense" if
the violator had been "previously convicted of a felony under any
law of the United States of America, or of any State or Territory
relating to narcotic drugs. '13 The case of People v.
Shamery14 now indicates that one who has been convicted of a
narcotics misdemeanor prior to the 1951 amendment, and is again
convicted for a narcotics crime thereafter, is to be regarded as a
subsequent offender, hence liable to the full increased penalty. It
would, therefore, appear that the court interpretation has, supplemented rather than replaced the old rule.
The law relating to narcotic drugs 5 has also now been armed
with stronger enforcement provisions. In the first place, every
drug addict is required, under penalty, to register with the Department of Registration and Education, and to carry his registration card with him at all times. 16 A search warrant may be
procured by "any person," not simply by an officer, if such person
reasonably suspects unlawful possession of narcotic drugs. 17 The
penalty for the first offense of selling, etc., is now fixed at imprisonment for a period of from two years to life,' rather than
the former comparatively short period of from one to five years.
An illegal sale has been classed with other offenses for which
there may be prosecution and punishment under the law relating
to habitual criminals"9 and the same conduct has been included
20
in the definition of infamous crimes.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.23.
Laws 1951, pp. 90-1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.23.
14 415 Ill. 177, 112 N. E. (2d) 466 (1953). Maxwell, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
Cert. den. - U. S. -. 74 S. Ct. 55, 98 L. Ed. (adv.) 47 (1953).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.1 et seq.
16 Laws 1953, p. 355, H.B. 698; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.29 et seq.
17 Laws 1953, p. 1531, H.B. 699; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.16 and
§ 692. Under the former provisions, the application for a search warrant had to be
made by a police officer or by an employee of the Department.
18 Ibid., p. 1531, H.B. 699; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 192.23.
19 Laws 1953, p. 1530, H.B. 652; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 602.
2
o Laws 1953, p. 1529, H.B. 651; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 587.
12
13
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Other much needed changes in the substance of the criminal
law have been made by the legislature. The revised law relating
to prosecutions for perjury now provides that, in every indictment for perjury, it shall be sufficient to allege the giving of
contradictory statements under oath, on those occasions when an
oath is required by law, without alleging in the indictment which
of the statements is true and which false. 2 1 It has also been provided, in a newly added section, 22 that presumptive proof of
falsity is made by proof of such contradictory statements on the
same basis. The new section does, however, contain a proviso to
the effect that, where the contradictory testimony occurs in the
same continuous trial, the witness' admission of prior untruthfulness, coupled with subsequent truthful testimony, shall constitute a complete defense, at least to the extent that the untruthful
statement has been corrected.
An incongruity existing in the law relating to burglary has
been eliminated. Although the common-law requirement that the
crime of burglary ought to be committed in the night-time had
been deleted in the statutory definition of that offense, 28 it had
been retained in the section dealing with attempted burglary. 24
As a consequence, it was held, in the case of People v. Glickman,25
that an indictment for attempted burglary would be fatally defective unless it alleged that the acts were done at night. The
rule of that case has now been avoided by an amendment designed
26
to bring the two sections into harmony with each other.
Changes in the Criminal Code appear to reflect the high cost
of living. For example, the critical value which determines whether
the crime of receiving stolen property is to be punished as a
felony or a misdemeanor has been raised from fifteen dollars to
21 Laws 1953, p. 30, S.B. 96; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 475.
22 Ibid. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 475a.
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 84.
24 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 85.
25377 Ill. 360, 36 N. E. (2d) 720 (1941). A note thereon in 21 CHrcAGo-KaiT
LAW REvrw 41 gives details as to the legislative history.
26 Laws 1953, p. 1533, H.B. 725; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 85.
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fifty dollars. 27 By this amendment, the larceny 2s and receiving
sections form a more coherent pattern, but it is to be noted that
the critical value of fifteen dollars as yet remains unchanged in
the section relating to the alteration of the brand or mark of a
domestic farm animal with intent to steal the same.2 9 It might
also be noticed at this point that the matter of attorney's fees has
not been overlooked for the maximum fee allowable to counsel
seeking review on behalf of certain indigent criminal defendants
30
has been increased.
Beside making changes in existing laws, the legislature has
added certain new offenses to the Criminal Code. It is now criminal to abandon refrigerators in places accessible to children;31
to engage in indecent exhibitions ;32 to wear certain organizational
insignia without authority ;33 and to deposit rubbish on ice of
34
waters of this state.
In the realm of criminal procedure,3 5 it might be noted that
the immunity provisions of the Cigarette Tax Act 6 were held
constitutional in the case of Halpin v. ScottiST The Director of
Revenue there sought to compel the defendant to answer certain
questions in connection with an investigation he was conducting,
but his request was denied in the trial court, apparently on the
ground the immunity clause violated the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court, holding the provision to be valid, reversed and remanded with directions on the
ground the statute was broad enough to protect the witness
27

Laws 1953, p. 353, H.B. 109; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 492.

28 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 389.
29 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 446.
30 Laws 1953, p. 156, S.B. 109; Inl. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 730a. The
prior figure of $250 has been changed to $1,000.
31 Laws 1953, p. 869, S.B. 397; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 96.1.
32 Laws 1953, p. 1532, H.B. 719; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 159a.
3 Laws 1953, p. 352, H.B. 11; Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 269e. See also
a companion measure in Laws 1953, p. 434, H.B. 798, listed in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,
Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 269g.
84 Laws 1953, p. 157, H.B. 150; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 433a.
35 Cases involving matters of proof in criminal cases have been discussed above.
See Civil Practice and Procedure, sub-topic The Trial of the Case, particularly notes
48 to 53.
36 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 453.10a.

37 415 Ill. 177, 112 N. E. (2d) 466 (1953).
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against all future punishment for any offense to which the evidence related.
The sufficiency of the indictment was called into question in
two cases. In one of them, that of People v. Gibbs,8 it appeared
from the record that the grand jury had been discharged and had
then reconvened during the same term prior to the returning of
the indictment in question. There was, however, no entry in the
record of an order recalling the jury. After the indictment had
been quashed for the sole reason that the grand jury could only
have been properly reconvened by order of court duly entered of
record, the prosecution sought a writ of error. Although counsel
for the defendant did not seriously argue the point, and conceded
that the Criminal Code was directory only in this regard,3 9 the
Supreme Court explicitly stated that the entry of a recall order
was not jurisdictional, since the right of a regularly constituted
grand jury to reconvene could not be said to be dependent on
such an order, and the legislative purpose was to provide no more
than a convenient modus operandi for the guidance of the proper
officials. In the second case, that of People v. Kohler,40 the court
made short shrift of the defendant's somewhat incredible argument that an information charging "sexual relations" with a
child did not sufficiently state the statutory offense of contributing
to the delinquency of a minor 41 because the statute did not use that
phrase in defining delinquency.
The power of the Attorney General to nolle prosse a criminal
42
case was considered at length in People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli.
It appeared there that, after the trial judge had sustained a
motion by the defendant to suppress the evidence against him,
the Attorney General moved to nolle on the ground the prosecution, under this ruling, would lack sufficient competent evidence to
38413 Ill. 154, 108 N. E. (2d) 446 (1952).
39 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 713, provides that, if members of the grand
jury are dismissed, they may be summoned again at such times during the term as
the court may direct.
40413 Ill. 283, 109 N. E. (2d) 210 (1952).
41 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 103.
42415 Ill. 79, 112 N. E. (2d) 156 (1953), noted in 42 I1. B. J. 188.
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make out a case. When the trial judge refused to honor this
motion, the Attorney General sought an original writ of mandamus
from the Supreme Court to compel the trial judge to enter the
requested order, thereby prompting an examination into the constitutional powers of the Attorney General. By granting the
peremptory writ, and holding that he had discretionary power in
the matter except as to cases of abusive repetition, the court
adopted the view that the Illinois constitutional provision creating
the office of Attorney General 43 operated to bestow on that official
all the common-law powers of the office, including the one in question, and that he could not be denied the right to exercise these
powers. The court noted that, to permit a judge to refuse to enter
the order sought in the instant case, would constitute an unconstitutional encroachment by the judiciary on the powers of the
executive branch of the government.
Two cases involving sentencing procedure are worthy of note.
The power of a judge, rather than a jury, to fix punishment under
the Motor Vehicle Act 44 was established in People v. Davis.43
Although the general section of the Criminal Code provides that,
in cases tried before a jury, the sentence shall be fixed by the
jury,46 there is nothing in the statute to indicate whether this
rule is to apply to prosecutions based on other independent statutes
imposing penalties. The Appellate Court for the Third District,
making analogy to cases under the Medical Practice Act, 47 took
the view that the sentence-fixing procedure mentioned in the Criminal Code applied only to offenses named therein, leaving the trial
judge free to impose sentence in matters arising under other
statutes.
Power to impose consecutive sentences was dealt with in
another new case, that of People v. Stingely.48 There the defend48 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. V, § 1.
44 Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95,
§ 145.
45 349 Ill. App. 398, 110 N. E. (2d) 833 (1953).
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 754a.
47 See People v. Mainard, 348 Ill. App. 53, 107 N. E. (2d) 878 (1952) ; People v.
O'Dell, 343 Ill. App. 395, 99 N. E. (2d) 367 (1951).
48414 Ill. 398, 111 N. E. (2d) 548 (1953), cert. den. 345 U. S. 959, 73 S. Ct. 945,
97 L. Ed. 850 (1953).
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ant, having waived jury trial, was tried by a court under an
indictment in two counts, charging assault with intent to rape and
assault with intent to murder. He was found guilty on both counts
and sentenced to serve from ten to fourteen years on each, the
terms to run consecutively. On writ of error, the defendant contended that such procedure subjected him to double jeopardy and
denied him due process of law. Arguing pro se, he persuaded the
Supreme Court to hold that his sentences had to run concurrently.
The court recognized the rule of the federal courts which permits
the imposition of consecutive sentences under a multiple-count
indictment. It also acknowledged the well-established rule that
two separate indictments for distinct offenses arising out of
closely connected facts would justify the imposition of consecutive
sentences. The court, however, appears to have thought it significant that the two charges were included in the same indictment,
albeit in separate counts, and relying upon some Illinois dicta it
concluded that the prosecution was entitled to only one satisfaction.
Two cases presented problems arising in connection with
unjustified delay, on the part of public officials, in bringing about
the confinement of convicted persons, with resultant delay in the
completion of the term of imprisonment. In one of these, the
case of People ex rel. Ellis v. Babb,4 9 the established rule that a
sentence of punishment for crime is to be regarded as satisfied
only by actual service found an unusual and rather harsh application. It appeared therein that the prisoner had been convicted
of robbery in 1944 and had been released on probation. Later, in
1945, during the probationary period, he was convicted of larceny
before another court and sentenced to one year of imprisonment
in a county jail. Shortly after this commitment, his probation was
revoked and he was sentenced to the penitentiary for participation
in several robberies, which sentence he fully served. Some five
years after his discharge from the penitentiary, he was re-arrested
and re-committed to the county jail to complete the service of
the one-year sentence. Denying a petition for habeas corpus, the
49 412 Il.

601, 107 N. E. (2d) 725 (1952).
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court relied on the comparable case of People ex rel. Kerner v.
McKinley,"° one wherein the defendant had been compelled to
complete an earlier and interrupted sentence, and pointed out
that default on the part of a public official could not create a right
in the prisoner to be discharged. In United States ex rel. Meiner
v. Ragen,5 1the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that,
in view of the Illinois law, the arrest of the petitioner outside of
Illinois for parole violations and his return to the state to complete the service of his sentence would not violate due process
requirements notwithstanding a fourteen-year delay between issuance of the warrant and actual arrest.
Attention ought to be called to one case illustrating the workings of the Post Conviction Hearing Act. 52 After an earlier
commitment to an asylum for insanity, the petitioner in People v.
Reeves 53 was returned to the jurisdiction of the trial court on a
petition by an assistant public defender alleging recovery from
insanity to such a degree that the defendant could be tried. A
jury was empanelled to determine the question of sanity and, on
the basis of a statement by the assistant public defender, the
judge directed a verdict of sanity. Trial and conviction for
murder followed, with a long-term sentence to imprisonment. The
prisoner then contended, under the Post Conviction Hearing Act,
that he had been denied his constitutional right to counsel because
the attorney assigned to represent him had displayed unusual
incompetence.5 4 When confronted with this petition, the trial court
sustained a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution. On writ of
error, the Supreme Court reversed, deciding that the allegations
of the petition, if established, were sufficient to overcome the
50371 Ill. 190, 20 N. E. (2d) 498 (1939).
51199 F. (2d) 798 (1952).
52

IMI. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 826 et seq.

58412 Ill. 555, 107 N. E. (2d) 861 (1952), noted in 41 Georgetown L. J. 282.
54 The incompetence charged was said to consist of (1) a failure to object to the
introduction of a confession obtained while the defendant was insane; (2) a failure
to object to evidence of a previous conviction; (3) a failure to present to the jury
the fact of the petitioner's prior adjudication of insanity and the irregularity of
the proceeding in which he was determined to be sane for the purpose of the murder
trial; and (4) a failure to confer with the petitioner until the day of trial.
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usual presumption of competence of counsel, hence did present a
constitutional issue which the prisoner was entitled to have considered, as he could not be said to be competent to waive the same.
Challenge to the validity of the appointment of a criminal
court judge was made via habeas corpus in the case of United
States ex rel. Scott v. Babb,"" heard before the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit. The petitioner, sentenced to death for
murder by the Criminal Court of Cook County, claimed that the
judge before whom he had been tried had never subscribed to an
oath that he would faithfully discharge the duties of judge of that
court and that this omission led to a violation of requirements in
the state and federal constitutions." The judge in question had
been duly elected, qualified, and sworn as a judge of the Circuit
Court of Cook County and had, from there, been assigned to serve
in the Criminal Court. The Supreme Court of Illinois, on appeal
from the conviction, had held that the judge's assignment to duty
was sufficient to qualify him without the necessity of taking any
other oath of office. 7 The Court of Appeals, apparently considering the federal question for the first time, also held that a second
oath was not necessary inasmuch as the judge was, virtute officii,
a member of the bench of the court in question and was not a
new judicial officer.
Some important legislative procedural changes have also been
made. Most significant is the enactment into law of the suggestions offered by the Crime Commission relating to the granting
of immunity to state's witnesses. The new immunity section 5
provides that, whenever it appears to the court that any material
witness may produce incriminating evidence, the State's Attorney
may cause an order to be entered in the record releasing such
witness from all liability from prosecution "on account of any
transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may be required
55 199 F. (2d) 804 (1952), cert. den. 344 U. S. 935, 73 S. Ct. 507, 97 L. Ed. 443

(1953).
56 Il1. Const. 1870, Art. V, § 25; U. S. Const., Art. VI, clause 3.
57 See People v. Lindsay, 412 Ill. 472, 107 N. E. (2d) 614 (1952).
58 Laws 1953, p. 31, S.B. 97; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 580a.
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to testify or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise."" The
refusal by a witness, granted this immunity, to give testimony
would constitute a punishable contempt. It may be expected that
the new section will facilitate the discovery of much information
which otherwise would have been kept concealed. Another statute
permits a criminal defendant to make a preliminary motion for
the suppression of an alleged confession which he believes to be
incompetent. 60 A third makes the writ of error a writ of right in all
criminal cases 6 ' while also providing that a supersedeas shall be
issued as a matter of course in those cases where the sentence is
death.
It can also be expected that some sentencing and parole procedures will change hereafter. Definitive action has been taken by
the legislature to revamp existing methods for the handling of
youthful offenders. Succeeding to part of the supervisory role
formerly occupied by the Department of Welfare, a newly-created
Youth Commission is to be established with the two-fold purpose
of (1) conserving the human resources in the youth of the state,
and (2) protecting society by more effectively preventing delinquency or in rehabilitating those found delinquent.6 2 The most
important feature of the new legislation lies in the power given
the Commission to issue such orders for the treatment of individuals committed to it as are, within defined limits, deemed best
suited to the needs of the individual and to the interest of the
public.6 3
This reform scheme is paralleled by other changes in the
sentencing and parole sections of the Criminal Code. While resort
64
to the indeterminate sentence has become a familiar principle,
59 The Supreme Court, in the case of Halpin v. Scotti, 415 Ill. 104, 112 N. E. (2d)
91 (1953), noted above in this section at note 37, upheld the constitutional validity
of an immunity provision in the Cigarette Tax Act couched in similar language.
60 Laws 1953, p. 1166, S.B. 622; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 736.1.

61 Laws 1953, p. 78, S.B. 91; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 769.1. See also
ibid., Ch. 38, § 772.1, which describes the procedure to be followed in order to obtain
a supersedeas in other criminal cases.
62 Laws 1953, p. 620, S.B. 276; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 220dI et seq.
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 220d.11.
64 Ibid., Ch. 38, § 802, providing for such sentences, excepts those cases listed in
Section 801 thereof. In the excepted cases, determinate sentences are to be given.
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fixed or determinate sentences have heretofore been given in cases
of conviction for misprision of treason, murder, rape or kidnapping. The crime of voluntary manslaughter has now been added
to the list. 65 Over persons who might be sentenced to fixed terms
under the latter rule, the Youth Commission will apparently have
no jurisdiction for there is no provision allowing commitment of
such persons to that body. Where an indeterminate sentence might
be given, however, the youthful offender, found guilty after December 31, 11053, is to be sent to the Youth Commission with no
fixed term, but to be held subject to the orders of the Commission
for a period not longer than the maximum term fixed by law for
the offense involved. 6
In conclusion, it may be mentioned that a new condition has
been added to the list of terms on which a convict may be released
on parole. The legislature has now provided that, in the case of
a man released on an out-of-state parole, it shall be a condition
of the release that the parolee shall not violate any law or ordi67
nance of the other state.
V. FAMILY LAW
Considerable activity, both in the form of judicial decisions
and legislative action, may be noted in the field of family law.
Among the new decisions is the case of Brown v. Glickstein,'
wherein a question as to whether or not a malicious interference
with a contract to marry would give rise to a cause of action on
behalf of the injured party was considered for the first time in
this state by the Appellate Court for the First District. That
court affirmed the dismissal of such a suit, in line with the
65 Laws 1953, p. 1529, H.B. 651; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 801.
66 In the event the maximum term would expire after the youth reached the age
of 21, the control of the Youth Commission is to terminate at that point but the
convicted person is then to be transferred to the penitentiary or to the reformatory,
to become subject to the supervision of the Parole and Pardon Board. See Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 803.1, and Ch. 23, § 220d.23.
67 Laws 1953, p. 1527, H.B. 545; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 787(1).
1347 Ill. App. 486, 107 N. E. (2d) 267 (1952), noted in 31 CmCAGo-KENT LAw
Rqvi w 175.
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majority of cases on the point,2 on the ground that the fullest
freedom ought to be permitted to interested third parties in the
giving of advice with respect to a pending marriage in order best
to insure the permanence of the subsequent marital relationship.
While the case actually concerned close relatives, the court appears
to have assumed this freedom would extend to all third parties,
with no distinction being made between one who responds upon
inquiry and one who maliciously volunteers information.
The validity of a marriage appears to have been brought into
question, in the case of Haderaski v. Haderaski, on the ground
4
that no license for the celebration thereof had been procured.
There was evidence, however, that a religious ceremony had been
performed by a qualified member of the clergy. Treating the
license provision as being merely directory for this purpose, 5 the
Supreme Court held the marriage valid, treating the case before
it as being no different than those in which other licensing provisions had been disregarded.6
The concluding chapter in the case of Sutton v. Leib7 seems
to have been written by the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. That court held that the divorced husband in
question had, at no time, been excused from his obligation to pay
alimony ordered paid by a court decree, notwithstanding the fact
that his divorced spouse had, for a time, enjoyed support from
an alleged new husband who, by reason of the invalidity of his
Nevada divorce, was found to be legally incapable of entering into
a matrimonial union with her. The holding in the case of Lehmann
v. Lehmanns was there distinguished on the ground the interven2 See, for example, Conway v. O'Brien, 269 Mass. 425, 169 N. E. 491, 73 A. L. R.
1448 (1929).
3415 Ill. 118, 112 N. E. (2d) 714 (1953).
4 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 89, §6, in part, provides that all "persons about
to be joined in marriage must first obtain a license."
5 Ibid., Ch. 89, § 15, merely provides for a penalty to be imposed on the officiant
who performs the ceremony without ascertaining whether or not a license has been
obtained.
6 See, for example, Boysen v. Boysen, 301 Ill. App. 573, 23 N. E. (2d) 231 (1939),
noted in 18 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEw 206.
7199 F. (2d) 163 (1952), noted in 41 Georgetown L. J. 263, 4 Syracuse L. Rev.
387, and 27 Tulane L. J. 485. Earlier aspects of the case were discussed in 30
CHICAGO-KENT LAw REviEw 266.

8 225 Ill. App. 513 (1922).
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ing marriage concerned in that case was voidable rather than void.
The controlling statute must, therefore, hereafter be read as if it
stated, in express terms, that the successful party is not to be
entitled to recover additional periodic alimony after contracting a
valid remarriage.9
Several new questions were presented concerning the law of
separate maintenance and divorce. The case of Ribergaard v.
Ribergaard,10 decided by the Appellate Court for the Second
District in apparent conflict with a view expressed elsewhere in the
state," purports to establish an exception to the general rule that
property rights are not to be adjusted in separate maintenance
proceedings. In that case, both the plaintiff and the defendant
requested a declaration as to their property rights and each introduced evidence with respect thereto. Under the circumstances, it
was considered to be proper for the court to adjudicate these
rights and enter a decree accordingly, but it might be noted that
no action was taken with respect to their jointly owned real
estate.
An apparently novel question was raised in the divorce proceeding entitled Vanuuren v. Vancuren12 having to do with the
applicability of Section 2 of the Evidence Act 8 to a divorce case.
After the husband therein had obtained a divorce for desertion,
with jurisdiction based upon service by publication, the defendantwife brought a proceeding to set aside the decree. 1 4 The plaintiff
died before a hearing on the merits could be had and the husband's administrator was substituted as party plaintiff. When
the trial court ultimately found that the plaintiffs had failed to
prove the charge of desertion by a preponderance of evidence, the
original decree of divorce was vacated and the suit was ordered
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
10349 Ill. App. 99, 110 N. E. (2d) 89 (1953).
11 See, for example, the decision of the Appellate Court for the First District in
the case of Petta v. Petta, 321 Ill. App. 512, 53 N. E. (2d) 324 (1944), noted in
22 CHIeAGo-KENT LAw RLvlxw 281.
12 348 Ill. App. 351, 109 N. E. (2d) 225 (1952). Leave to appeal has been denied.
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 51, § 2.
14 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174(g), authorizes relief In this fashion if the applica-

tion is made in apt time.
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dismissed. It was urged, on appeal, that the applicable section
of the Evidence Act operated to bar the defendant from testifying
in her own behalf, but the Appellate Court for the Third District
held the testimony competent, relying on the ground that a statutory exception exists where the deposition of the deceased is read
into evidence. While the husband's testimony, as preserved in the
record, was not exactly a deposition, the court treated it as one
since it had much the same force and effect. To give effect to the
testimony of the deceased husband with regard to the desertion
without allowing the defendant to testify would have led to a
gross injustice.
With respect to matters arising subsequent to divorce, 15 it
might be noted that the statute allowing a court to award appellate
expense money and temporary alimony pending an appeal received
6
interpretation in the case of Riddlesbarger v. Riddlesbarger.1
The plaintiff there had obtained a divorce and had successfully
defended the decree on appeal. The defendant then hastily satisfied the judgment based on the decree. Shortly thereafter, the
plaintiff filed her petition seeking an allowance of an additional
sum for attorney's fees and expenses on which judgment went
against the defendant. Dealing directly with the defendant's argument to the contrary, the Appellate Court held that, under a fair
construction of the statute, it was not necessary for the plaintiff
to file her petition for additional expenses during the pendency of
the appeal since it would have been unreasonable to require her
to seek recompense at a time when the amount of her expense had
not then been determined.
The jurisdiction of a divorce court to modify a decree with
respect to the custody of minor children of the divorced parents
was declared to be a continuing jurisdiction, 1 7 not one terminated
15 The case of Pokorney v. Pokorney, 348 Ill. App. 364, 109 N. E. (2d) 254 (1952),
dealing with the right of a court to refer a petition for reduction of alimony to a
special commissioner for hearing, has been noted above. See Civil Practice and
Procedure, particularly note 79. The legislature has also acted to limit the fees
payable to masters in chancery for bearing petitions for temporary separate maintenance: Laws 1953, p. 1571, H.B. 991; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 22.
16348 Ill. App. 31, 107 N. E. (2d) 770 (1952). Cause transferred, 410 Ill. 329,
102 N. E. (2d) 319 (1951).

17 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

by the death of one of the divorced parents, under the Supreme
Court decision in the case of Jarrettv. Jarrett.' That jurisdiction
was, however, in the case of People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard,19
forced to yield before the concurrent jurisdiction of a county court
over proceedings based on the Juvenile Court Act. 20 Treating the
question as one of first impression, the Supreme Court there
pointed out that a dissimilarity exists between the issues raised
in a divorce case, where the fitness of the parents for purpose of
custody is primarily in issue, in contrast to those engendered in
proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, where the issue is
whether the behavior of the child requires intervention on the
part of the state. This basic dissimilarity, the court said, justified
the exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction regardless of the prior
continuing jurisdiction of the divorce court.
The law of torts between the spouses, after a long period
of
uncertainty, has at last become certain in one respect. It will be
recalled that, under the decision reached by the Appellate Court
for the First District in Brandt v. Keller,21 the spouse there suing
was denied the right to recover against the other spouse for tortious conduct resulting in personal injury. On further appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed,2 2 holding that the Married
Women's Acts operated to remove the common-law rule of immunity. Particular emphasis was placed upon that part of the
statute which states that a married woman may, "in all cases,
sue and be sued without joining her husband with her, to the
same extent as if she were married. "2 Although the Appellate
Court had concluded that the phrase "in all cases" referred to
suits against third parties, the Supreme Court held that a more
liberal construction was called for. The decision thus reached
18415 Ill. 126, 112 N. E. (2d) 694 (1953), noted in 31 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REmw
373, affirming 348 Ill. App. 1, 107 N. E. (2d) 622 (1952).
19 415 Ill. 135, 112 N. E. (2d) 697 (1953).
20 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 190 et seq.
21347 Il. App. 18, 105 N. E. (2d) 796 (1952), noted in 30 CmIOAGO-KENT LAW
REvIw 343.
22 See 413 Il. 503, 109 N. E. (2d) 729 (1953), noted in 2 DePaul L. Rev. 285,
41 Ill. B. J. 330, 1953 Ill. L. Forum 150, and 48 Northwestern L. Rev. 75.
23 Il. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 1.
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24
followed in logical sequence upon the holding in Welch v. Davis,
wherein it was said that an action for wrongful death could be
maintained against the estate of the husband responsible therefor,
and that attained in Tallios v. Tallios, 25 a case indicating that a
wife could have a cause of action against the employer of her
husband for injuries arising from the husband's negligent conduct
in the course of his employer's business.

It can only be said, however, that the legislature appears not
to have been satisfied with the final decision in the Brandt case,
for it acted promptly to restore the common-law rule. The statute
in question was amended, in 1953, by the addition of a proviso to
the effect that "neither husband nor wife may sue the other for a
tort to the person committed during coverture. ' ' 26 Even if it
accomplished nothing more, the Supreme Court decision at least
served the useful purpose of provoking legislative clarification on
a point much in doubt. If the proviso should be interpreted to
leave the holdings in the Welch and Tallios cases untouched, for
they do not appear to be expressly covered thereby, the law would
remain in an illogical state, so additional legislative clarification
would appear still to be in order.
Rights of infants were considered in three cases. In the first,
that of Noel v. Olszewski, 27 the court insisted upon a rigid- compliance with the statutory requirement that a child over the age
of fourteen years, in order to be validly adopted in Illinois, had
to appear in open court and there personally acknowledge his
written consent.28 As the infants in question were living in Poland
at the time the adoption decree was entered, the decree was
adjudged to be void. The other two cases dealt with the right of
24 410 Ill. 130, 101 N. E. (2d) 547 (1951).
It is of interest to note that, on
25 345 Iii. App. 387, 103 N. E. (2d) 507 (1952).
remand, the trial court found the wife to be a guest within the meaning of Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 58a, hence not entitled to recover as a matter of fact
although her complaint had been held to state a cause of action in law. This
decision was affirmed in 350 Ill. App. 299, 112 N. E. (2d) 723 (1953). Leave to
appeal was thereafter denied.
26 Laws 1953, p. 437, S.B. 194; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 1.
27350 Ill. App. 264, 112 N. E. (2d) 727 (1953), noted in 31 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW
RviEw 372. Leave to appeal has been denied.
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 3-3.
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an infant to recover for prenatal injuries. In Amain v. Faidy,29
the administratrix of the deceased infant, on behalf of the next
of kin, sought to recover for the child's death produced as a result
of prenatal injuries. The action was stricken, and this decision
was affirmed, on the basis of the earlier Supreme Court holding
in the case of Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital. ° The Appellate
Court for the Second District, while giving recognition to the fact
that a number of recent decisions elsewhere had allowed such an
action, there expressed the belief it did not have authority to
declare the Supreme Court decision erroneous. The case of
Rodriguez v. Patti,31 arising in the First District, although involving an action by an infant, suing by next friend, to recover for
his own prenatal injury, achieved a similar result.
Questions concerning reciprocal obligations of family members to support their relatives, as demanded by the recently enacted Mental Health Code,3 2 were considered in Kough v. Hoehler. 38 The plaintiffs there brought a proceeding to enjoin enforcement of those provisions of the Code which purported to charge
the costs of detention, care, and treatment of patients in state
34
It
hospitals to the patients, their estates, or to their relatives.
was said that the statute was unconstitutional since it arbitrarily
exempted mentally ill persons in custody on criminal charges by
excluding themA5 The classification scheme was, however, considered to be reasonable by the Supreme Court. It explained that the
public possessed a vital interest in the confinement of persons in
the category of criminally insane, since they were held primarily
for the protection of society, whereas no such direct interest
The Supreme Court, not in the
29 348 Ill. App. 37, 107 N. E. (2d) 868 (1952).
period of this survey, reversed and held the complaint sufficient: 415 Ill. 422, 114
N. E. (2d) 412 (1953). It appears to have treated the complaint as one presenting
a case of injuries which, while inflicted prenatally, caused the child's death at a
time subsequent to its birth alive.
30 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900).
31 348 Ill. App. 322, 108 N. E. (2d) 830 (1952). Reversal subsequent to the period
of this survey may be noted in 415 Ill. 496, 114 N. E. (2d) 721 (1953).
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 91%, § 1-1 et seq.
33413 Ill. 409, 109 N. E. (2d) 177 (1952), noted in 41 Ill. B. J. 330.
34 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 91%, §§ 9-19 to 9-25.
35 Ibid., § 1-8.
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existed with regard to other persons who were being treated in
state hospitals primarily for their own health and welfare, or for
that of their relatives.
A fair degree of legislative activity in the realm of family
law may also be noted. Most widely publicized of the new measures
relating to divorce is the new "cooling-off period" act,86 one which
requires a person intending to commence an action for divorce,
separate maintenance, or annulment of marriage, to file a written
statement of such intention with the clerk of the court sixty days
before the complaint is actually filed in order to permit the utilization of reconciliation measures. The court may waive the requirement in cases where immediate action is necessary. To facilitate
action thereunder, counties and cities are authorized to employ
qualified administrative aids to assist the appropriate courts in
the administration of divorce, separate maintenance, and annul7
ment proceedings.
Section 1 of the act relating to separate maintenance88 has
been amended to permit the court, on application of either party,
to make such order concerning the custody and care of minor
children of the parties during the pendency of the cause as may
be deemed expedient and for the benefit of the child. The legislature has also acted to delete that part of the section, added by
amendment in 1935, heretofore held unconstitutional," which purported to limit the granting of separate maintenance to a period
of two years and declared the separation, in certain instances, to
be desertion for purpose of divorce. In regard to other matters
concerning support, certain statutory provisions now make both
40
husband and wife responsible.
36 Laws 1953, p. 284, S.B. 407; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, §§ 23-9. See
also Miner, "The 60-Day Cooling Off Period," 41 Ill. B. J. 636 (1953).
37 Laws 1953, p. 1011, S.B. 646; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, §§ 7a-7c.
38 Laws 1953, p. 1571, H.B. 991; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 22.
39 See DeMotte v. DeMotte, 364 Ill. 421, 4 N. E. (2d) 960 (1936).
40 The Uniform Support of Dependents Act has been changed to define "dependent" so as to include both spouses: Laws 1953, p. 246, S.B. 250, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953,
Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 51(d). In much the same way, the Public Assistance Code now
includes spouses in the definition of responsible relatives: Laws 1953, p. 236, S.B.
251, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, §§ 436-12 and 439--2. The Wife and Child
Abandonment Act now puts both spouses under the sanctions thereof : Laws 1953,
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Two newly added sections modify the procedural law with
respect to adoptions. One of these empowers the court to appoint
a state's attorney, or other licensed attorney, to serve as guardian
ad litem to represent the mentally ill parents of a child about to
be adopted and to give consent in their behalf. The power is
limited to cases of long-continued mental illness wherein it would
appear that no cure is likely to occur in the foreseeable future. 41
The other provides that a consent to adoption, once executed and
duly witnessed or acknowledged, shall be irrevocable unless the
same has been obtained by fraud or duress. 4 2 The provision appears to have overruled the decision in Weisbart v. Berezin, 43 a
case in which it was held to be within the discretion of the trial
court to permit a natural mother to revoke her consent to adoption
three days after it had been filed and before final action had been
taken thereon.
Another series of statutory changes would indicate that the
status of an adopted child is, hereafter, to be the same as that
of a natural child for many legal purposes. To this end, the
adoption statute now contains a new provision having to do with
the construction of instruments, one which provides that, for the
purpose of determining the property rights of any person under
any written instrument executed after January 1, 1954, an adopted
child is to be deemed a natural child unless the contrary intent
appears by the terms of the instrument. 4 4 A child lawfully adopted
is also now deemed to be a descendant of the adopting parent for
purposes of inheritance by and from the adopting parent and by
and from the lineal and collateral kindred of the adopting parent,
p. 244, S.B. 249, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, §§ 24 and 26. It is also now
made a felony for a mother to abandon her child under the age of fourteen, notwithstanding the fact that another person may have legal control or be in the
position of loco parenti8 to the child: Laws 1953, p. 544, S.B. 494, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 99.
41 Laws 1953, p. 1061, H.B. 367; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, §§ 3-42 and
4-1. For a similar provision with regard to delinquent children, see Ch. 23,
§ 209(4).
42 Laws 1953, p. 1480, H.B. 457; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 3-7.
43 346 Ill. App. 445, 105 N. E. (2d) 814 (1952). See also Dickholtz v. Littfin, 341
Ill. App. 400, 94 N. E. (2d) 89 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 183.
44 Laws 1953, p. 1059, S.B. 132; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 165. See also
Laws, 1953, p. 1137, S.B. 520; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 11-1.
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with certain minor exceptions. 45 Finally, the adopted child and
his adopting parent are now classed among the next of kin referred
to in the statute relating to wrongful deaths.4 6
VI.

PROPERTY

REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
Little has been said concerning the acquisition of present
rights by way of title to land in Illinois for most of the cases involving aspects of real property law were of stereotyped nature.'
Two cases concerning rights arising under joint tenancy estates
are, however of significance. In the first, that of Klouda v.
Pechousek,2 the decedent and the defendant held registered lands
in that fashion. Desiring to convey his interest to the plaintiffs,
while still retaining use and possession during his lifetime, the
decedent, in his lifetime, executed a deed of his interest to plaintiffs. This deed contained a provision to the effect that it was
not to be registered nor take effect until after the grantor's death,
but it was, on execution, delivered to one of the grantees on behalf
of all of them. Upon the grantor's death, plaintiffs began a suit
to compel the Torrens registrar of titles to issue a certificate of
title to them for an undivided interest in the land. The Supreme
Court found no difficulty in concluding that a joint tenancy in
property not under Torrens would have been severed by acts of
the character pursued by the deceased, for delivery would have
passed the fee immediately to the grantees with no more than a
reservation of a life estate in the grantor. Although the mere
delivery of a deed to Torrens property would have no effect on
the legal estate, since registration is essential for this purpose,
the court concluded the joint tenancy had been severed by the
45 Ibid.

46 Laws 1953, p. 368, H.B. 359; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
1 The decision in the case of Hyland v. Waite, 349 Ill. App. 213, 110 N. E. (2d)
457 (1953), in which leave to appeal has been denied, has been noted above. See
Civil Practice and Procedure, sub-topic Enforcement of Judgments, particularly
notes 83 to 86. The case deals with a dispute between a bona fide purchaser of real
estate and another who claimed a lien thereon arising from a later judgment in a
cause of action based on the Dram Shop Act.
2414 Ill. 75, 110 N. E. (2d) 258 (1953).

fJHIUAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

delivery on the theory the unregistered deed took effect as a
contract to convey, hence would be sufficient, at least in equity.
Whether severance of a joint tenancy had occurred also became the question in the case of Schuck v. SchuckA Following a
decree for partition entered therein, the premises were sold but,
before confirmation of the sale could be had, the plaintiff, one
of the joint tenants, died. On these facts, the Supreme Court
held that the joint tenancy had been severed, explaining that,
while a decree for partition would be interlocutory as to the mode
of partition it would nevertheless be final for the purpose of
determining the rights of the parties, unless an appeal was taken
therefrom. 4 It followed that the death of one party prior to confirmation of the sale would not operate to revive the joint tenancy
so disrupted.
While on the subject of joint tenancies, it might be noted that
the mode of creating such estates in real property has been simplified by some new legislation which eliminates the necessity for
using the services of a straw man and permits the present titleholder to convey directly to himself and another in joint tenancy.5
The estate so created is to have all the effects of a common-law
joint tenancy.
Rights in the use and development of real property concerned the Appellate Court in the case of Deer Park Civic
Association v. City of Chicago,7 wherein a judgment was sought
by resident property owners living within the area to declare
that the defendant company had no vested right to construct a
manufacturing building in a district zoned for family dwellings.
It appeared that the defendant had purchased the land in question
at a time when the area was zoned for manufacturing, had applied
3413 Il. 390, 108 N. E. (2d) 905 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
270.
4 Rabe v. Rabe, 386 Ill. 600, 54 N. E. (2d) 518 (1944).
5 Laws 1953, p. 114, S.B. 126; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § I(b).
6 The oil and gas case of Phoenix v. Graham, 349 Ill. App. 326, 110 N. E. (2d)
669 (1953), is discussed hereafter in conjunction with the topic of Landlord and
Tenant.
7347 Ill. App. 346, 106 N. E. (2d) 823 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Rnvrxw 192. Leave to appeal has been denied.
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for and received a building permit just fifteen days prior to the
effective date of an amendatory zoning ordinance designed to
restrict the area to family dwellings, and had commenced building
operations. The court, affirming a judgment for the defendant,
adopted a rule which had been applied elsewhere, one which provides that a permittee is to be protected against a subsequent
ordinance where either substantial construction or substantial
liability has been incurred relating directly to construction. Inferentially, the court admitted that the construction, or the debt,
would have to be undertaken in reliance on the permit and ought
to occur between the time of issuance and the effective date of
the amendatory ordinance.
One conveyancing decision is worthy of brief mention. In
Berigan v. Berigan,s the Supreme Court announced that an unacknowledged deed is entitled to the presumption that it was
executed and delivered on the date it bears. 9 Reliance was placed
upon the decision in Calligan v. Calligan,10 a case very nearly in
point. It should be noted, however, that this rule would not
apply to a release of homestead rights for such an instrument
must be acknowledged to be effective."
While there are no decisions of importance affecting the law
of future interests, three important statutory changes have been
made. Of prime importance, marking the end of an era of
thwarted intentions, is the brief addition made to the Conveyances Act which reads: "The rule of property known as the
rule in Shelley's Case is abolished."1 2 The new provision is expressly made to apply only to wills of decedents dying, and to
deeds and other written instruments executed, after the effective
date,' 3 so the ancient learning on the subject is not entirely
8 413 Ill. 204, 108 N. E. (2d) 438 (1952).
9 An acknowledged deed may be read in evidence without proof of execution: Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 34.
10259 Ill. 52, 102 N. E. 247 (1913).
11 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 52, § 4.
12 Laws 1953, p. 1479, H.B. 402; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 186. See
also Schuyler, "Rule in Shelley's Case Abolished," 41 Ill. B. J. 711 (1953), and
Corrigan, "Obituary for the Rule in Shelley's Case," 36 Chicago Bar Rec. 34 (1953).
Is111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 187.

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

obviated. Law students especially, and some lawyers also, will
be heard to heave a profound sigh of relief over the point. A
companion measure amends the statute on entailment, 1 4 expressly
excluding operation of the rule in Shelley's Case from the estate
thereby created. 15
A person holding a right of entry or a possibility of reverter
in real estate is now subjected to a new limitation on his power
to declare a forfeiture. Such a person must, hereafter, bring his
action to recover the land in question within seven years after the
time when the condition first became broken and, for this purpose,
continuing breaches shall not operate to extend the period. 16
Under another section, 17 the right of action is still deemed to accrue in the person holding the future interest at the time when
the breach of condition occurs, but there is nothing in this section
to indicate whether or not a new right of action arises with every
breach. In view of certain decisions which, either on a theory of
waiver' s or as a result of reading this last mentioned section
together with another conferring legal title after seven years'
payment of taxes, 19 have barred such future interests, 20 some
uncertainty has existed as to the length of time within which a
person holding a right of entry or a possibility of reverter might
retain his power to declare a forfeiture without exercising it.
The amended limitation provides a clear rule, so it may be presumed that the marketability of real estate will thereby be enhanced in those cases where a breach of condition has occurred
or there is a question as to such breach.
14 Laws 1953, p. 1508, H.B. 401; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 5. The
section provides that in cases where, by the common law, a person would become
seized in fee tail, he shall instead take a life estate, with remainder in fee simple
to the persons who, at common law, would first take on the life tenant's death.
15 The statute would appear to render obsolete the view that the rule in Shelley's
Case could operate on the life estate and remainder created under the statute.
See Carey & Schuyler, Illinois Law of Future Interests (Burdette-Smith Co.,
Chicago, 1941), p. 165.
16 Laws 1953, p. 374, S.B. 176; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § la et seq.
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 3(4).
'8 See Sanitary District of Chicago v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 278 Ill. 529,
116 N. E. 161 (1917).
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 83, § 6.
20 Storke v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 390 Ill. 619, 61 N. E. (2d) 552 (1945).
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The accumulations statute has also been amended. It is
now permissible to dispose of real or personal property so as
to accumulate income for as long as a life or lives in being and
twenty-one years beyond, i. e., for the common-law period of
perpetuities, but no longer. Any direction to accumulate in violation of this rule is declared null and void. 21 The new provision
applies only to deeds which become legally effective, and to wills
of testators dying, on or after the effective date of the amendment. The chief importance of the amendment lies in the fact
that it substitutes the common-law rule as to perpetuities for a
series of four different periods which prevailed under the former
22
act. These periods, modeled upon the original Thellusson Act,
were the source of some uncertainty and their elimination may be
regarded as a clear improvement in the law.
Only two cases involving the law of personal property are
worthy of any mention. The first case, that of Doubler v.
Doubler,23 presented a new construction for the statute relating
to the creation of joint bank accounts. 24 Under that statute, a
bank in which a joint account has been opened is permitted to pay
the funds to a survivor, or survivors, of the parties in whose name
the joint account stands provided an agreement to that effect has
been signed by all such parties. The instant case presented a
question as to whether or not the survivor would be entitled to
payment when she had not signed such an agreement, although
her husband, at the time of opening the account, had directed the
entry of her name in the passbook as a joint tenant. The Supreme
Court gave a strict construction to the statutory proviso, held
that an agreement signed by both parties was necessary to create
a joint tenancy, and denied the survivor any interest in the fund.
The second case simply contained a statement which could be
seized upon to raise some doubt as to the right of owners of personal property, holding as tenants in common, to recover such
Laws 1953, p. 112, H.B. 48; Il1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 153.
22 39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 98 (1800).
23 412 Iil. 597, 107 N. E. (2d) 789 (1952), noted in 2 DePaul L. Rev. 292 and 41
Ill. B. J. 171, reversing 343 Il1. App. 643, 100 N. E. (2d) 761 (1951), abst. opin.
,24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § 2.
21
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property from a bailee who has possession by virtue of delivery
from the owner's agent, acting as bailor. In that case, one entitled
Miller v. First Granite City National Bank,25 the plaintiff and a
number of other individuals sued, as former members of a union,
to recover bonds placed in the defendant's safety deposit box
by the officers of the union. The case actually held that the complaint did not sufficiently show that those suing as plaintiffs had
the right, either as exclusive owners or as agents for those who
were, to remove the bonds. With this decision there can be no
quarrel. The opinion does, however, contain the following query:
"Upon what basis does membership in a union at a past time
(or even currently) give these individuals the personal right to
demand that the bank pay over to them, individually or collectively, funds belonging to the union and deposited by it?' '26
If it could be assumed that the plaintiffs were the exclusive
owners, and comprised the total membership in the union, an
inference to be drawn from the presence of the query would
suggest that, as a matter of law, the individuals compromising an
unincorporated association should be regarded as distinct from
the association itself and, as such, should not be entitled to recover their properties from a bailee, even though, in law, they
27
were the rightful owners. It is clear that such is not the law,
so any interpretation of the language of the opinion tending to
produce a different result ought to be avoided.
Action by the General Assembly appears to have operated
to bring the law of finder's rights up to date. The finder is now
encouraged to make an honest effort to find the loser for, under
the amended act, if he will appear before a justice of the peace
and will advertise the goods as required by statute, he may claim
legal title to the lost article if the owner does not appear within
the period prescribed by statute, 28 instead of having the same
349 Ill. App. 347, 110 N. E. (2d) 651 (1953).
349 Ill. App. 347 at 350, 110 N. E. (2d) 651 at 652. Italics added.
27 See Follett v. Edwards, 30 Ill. App. 386 (1888).
28 Laws 1953, p. 876, S.B. 103; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 50, §§ 16, 24, 28,
and 29a. Under the former law, title vested in the finder, in absence of an owner's
claim, only in case the goods or money were valued at less than $15 or, if watercraft, at less than $5.
25
26
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go to the county, as was formerly the case. New safeguards for
the owner's rights also appear, for the statute now requires that,
in addition to making an affidavit describing the goods and saying
that he has not altered or changed the appearance thereof, the
finder must also swear that he does not know the owner, and that
he has not secreted, withheld, or disposed of a portion of the
29
property.
Not only has the statute on joint rights and obligations been
amended so as to permit the creation of a joint tenancy in personal property without the use of a straw man3" but, in addition,
the beneficial provisions thereof, designed to protect banks in
the payment of funds deposited in a joint account, have now been
extended to state and federal savings and loan associations with
respect to their certificates of indebtedness or ownership.3 1
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

32
While a lease is generally regarded as a species of contract,
it should not be forgotten that it also partakes of the nature of
a conveyance of an interest in land, 33 for which reason it must
generally be in writing3 4 and be delivered to be effective. Failure on the part of the lessee to establish the element of delivery
logically produced the decision achieved in the case of Kleinhaus
v. Ohde35 where the court held the long-term lease before it was
ineffective as a lease and, because insufficiently witnessed, was
also inadequate to serve as a testimentary instrument. In much
the same way, in the case of BlIumenfeld v. NeUn, 36 the court
applied doctrines relevant to the burden of proof in suits to cor29 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 50, § 36.
3o Laws 1953, p. 115, S.B. 127; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § 2.1.
31 Laws 1953, p. 371, S.B. 315; 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 76, § 2(c).
32 In that regard, note the decision in Randall v. General Motors Corp., 350 Ill.
App. 384, 112 N. E. (2d) 915 (1953), discussed above under the topic of Damages,
dealing with the question as to whether or not a security deposit provision was one
for a penalty or for liquidated damages.
33 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, § 37, and Ch. 77, § 3.
34 Ibid., Ch. 59, § 2.
35 350 Ill. App. 177, 112 N. E. (2d) 498 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
36 350 Ill. App. 306, 112 N. E. (2d) 742 (1953).
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rect mistakes in deeds3 7 to a case involving a scrivener's mistake
in the description set forth in a lease to the demised premises.
Other cases dealt with specific aspects of leasing arrangements. Percentage rent clauses being not uncommon in commercial leases, the decision in the case of Schoen-McAllister Company v. Oak Park National Bankss should prove to be of general
interest for the court there construed the phrase "gross sales,"
upon which the percentage rent was to be calculated,3 9 so as to
include therein the amount of the sales tax paid by the customer
to the tenant under the terms of the Illinois Retailer's Occupation Tax Act.4 0 An effort to prove a mercantile custom to the
contrary was rejected on the ground the context of the lease was
clear and unambiguous, hence extraneous evidence to vary or
augment the terms of the lease was inadmissible. The court
noted, however, that it knew of no other case precisely in point.
Options of varying character frequently appear in leases.
While an option to purchase the demised premises may be carried
over into a renewal .term, provided the same is created pursuant to the provisions of the original lease, 41 the case of Wanous
v. Belaco42 would indicate that the converse is true where the
extension of the term arises by reason of a hold-over tenancy.
As the option to purchase is not, in Illinois, regarded as being an
independent covenant, it would necessarily expire with the lease
in which it appears, for the terms of the hold-over tenancy do not
incorporate all the provisions of the lease from which the holdover tenancy stems but merely carries forward those provisions
essential to the new condition of things. 43 The case of Kleros
Building Corporationv. Battaglia44 is also worth brief mention for
37 See, for example, Tope v. Tope, 370 Ill. 187, 18 N. E. (2d) 229 (1938).
38349 Il. App. 500, 111 N. E. (2d) 378 (1953).
39 The lease defined "gross sales" as being "the total price or charge paid or
agreed to be paid on each sale made or service undertaken" at the demised premises.
40 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 440 et seq.
41 Hindu Incense Mfg. Co. v. MacKenzie, 403 Ill. 390, 86 N. E. (2d) 214 (1949),
noted in 27 CHIoAGo-KENT LAW REviEw 323.
42412 Ill. 545, 107 N. E. (2d) 791 (1952), noted in 41 Ill. B. J. 235.
43 Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370, 72 N. E. 1070, 68 L. R. A. 610 (1904).
44 348 Ill. App. 445, 109 N. E. (2d) 221 (1952).
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it was there held that an option to renew,4 5 contained in a lease
running to two lessees, could not be exercised by one of them, even
though he had succeeded to the interest of his co-tenant, in the
absence of consent to the assignment.
Construction of the lease in question was called for, in the
case of Cerny Pickas & Company v. C. R. Jahn Company,46 when
a lessee contended that the customary surrender provision, under
which the lessee is to yield up the premises in good condition with
"loss by fire and ordinary wear excepted," operated to absolve
the tenant from liability for destruction of the demised premises
by reason of a fire brought about through the ignition of installations made therein by the lessee in violation of the municipal
building code. A trial court determination that such a provision
would excuse the lessee even from the effects of his own fault was
reversed when the Appellate Court for the First District concluded
that, if the lease had clearly expressed such an intent, which it did
not, the terms of the lease would have been opposed to public policy
and void. In that connection, the court drew a distinction between
leases of commercial and residence property on the one hand
and those granted by railroad corporations on the other. In the
last mentioned instances, exculpatory clauses have been upheld
47
by reason of the public interest in the operation of the carrier.
The exculpatory clause relied on in the case of Jackson v.
First National Bank of Lake Forest,48 however, was held to be
valid and enforcible, as well as applicable, despite the claim the
same was illegal and void. The landlord there relied on a provision designed to exempt it from liability to the lessee "for any
damage or injury to him or his property occasioned by the failure
45 The case of Westain v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 349 Il1. App. 365, 110 N. E. (2d)
649 (1953), would indicate that a reserved privilege, in favor of the lessor, to
cancel a lease on giving notice would not carry over into a renewal thereof, in the
event the tenant exercised an option to renew.
46347 Ill. App. 379, 106 N. E. (2d) 828 (1952).
47 See Checkley v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 257 Ill. 491, 100 N. E. 942, 44 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1127 (1913).
48348 I1. App. 69, 108 N. E. (2d) 36 (1952). The Supreme Court, on leave to
appeal granted, but not in the period of this survey, affirmed the holding: 415 Il.
453, 114 N. E. (2d) 721 (1953).
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of the lessor to keep the premises in repair. ' 49 Following suit
by the lessee for personal injury sustained when a stair-railing
affixed to a common stair collapsed because of a latent defect
therein, the trial court and the Appellate Court both declared the
provision to be controlling and valid since it related to the private
affairs of the parties and in no way involved aspects of public
50
concern.
Despite a split of authority elsewhere on the point of the
landlord's responsibility for the condition of private walks used
as a means of egress and ingress to residential property occupied
by multiple tenants, the Appellate Court for the Second District,
in the case of Cronin v. Brownlie,51 reached the conclusion that
the landlord would not be liable for injuries sustained by a tenant,
while walking thereon, produced by a natural accumulation of
snow and ice. 52 The court did emphasize the importance, in its
holding, of the absence of a covenant on the landlord's part to
keep the walks clear of obstruction, together with the fact that
the presence of snow and ice was in no way attributable to any
other defect in the premises, and that there was evidence tending
to disclose contributory negligence on the tenant's part, so a
change in any one of these factors might well have led to a
different result. There is, however, no split of authority as to
the lack of responsibility on the part of a landlord for injury
sustained by a tenant's minor child in falling through on open
screened window, provided the screen so furnished is of normal
character and size, for the Appellate Court for the Fourth Dis53
trict, as evidenced by its decision in the case of Rogers v. Sins,
agrees with the earlier holding achieved by the First District
49 See also Kelly v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 348 Ill. App. 419, 109 N. E. (2d)
206 (1952), concerning the operative effect of other language in a clause of similar
nature.
50 In general, see annotation in 175 A. L. R. 8.
51 348 Ill. App. 448, 109 N. E. (2d) 352 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REvimw 271.
52 See Riccitelli v. Sternfeld, 349 Ill. App. 63, 109 N. E. (2d) 921 (1952), for a
discussion of a tenant's liability to third parties for personal injury caused by the
piling of snow along a public walk adjacent to the demised premises.
53 349 Ill. App. 353, 110 N. E. (2d) 643 (1953).
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in the case of Crawford v. Orner & Shayne, Inc. 54 An attempt to
argue that an open hall window was, to some extent, an attractive
nuisance, because the landlord had previously observed the child
climbing to the sill thereof and had seen fit to warn the parents
of this fact, was rejected when the court declined to extend the
attractive nuisance doctrine to the case before it.
The tenant, on the other hand, according to the case of
Phoenix v. Graham,5 5 will not be liable to the landlord for pollution of the water supply in the absence of some showing of neglect
by the tenant in the conduct of oil-drilling operations on the demised premises. An attempt to establish a case on the basis that
the tenant's conduct amounted to a statutory nuisance5 6 was
there rejected.
The imminent expiration of federal rent control caused the
legislature to adopt an emergency measure with respect to stay
of execution in forcible entry and detainer proceedings upon
terms which might be regarded as equitable under the circumstances. 57 The statute is, however, shot through with exceptions,
so it is fortunate that the life thereof has been limited to two
years at the most, by which time conditions in the rental market
should have become stabilized if they have not already done so.
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS

Little of interest has been decided with respect to issues of
law concerning real estate mortgages or rights arising thereunder,58 but some points have been made with respect to other real
54331 Ill. App. 568, 73 N. E.

(2d)

615 (1947),

noted in 26 CHrCAGO-KENT LAW

REvIEw 72-3.
55349 Ill. App. 326, 110 N. E. (2d) 669 (1953), noted in 31 CICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIfw 378.
56 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 466(13).
57 Laws 1953, p. 53, S.B. 235; Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 57, § 17.1.
58 The complicated foreclosure litigation noted in the case of Illinois Nat. Bank
of Springfield v. Gwinn, 348 Ill. App. 9, 107 N. E. (2d) 764 (1952), in which leave
to appeal was denied, represents no more than a logical sequitur to the principles
laid down In the earlier decision in the same case reported in 409 Ill. 550, 101 N. E.
(2d) 90 (1951). For that matter, the holding in Benckendorf v. Streator Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n, 350 Ill. App. 43, 111 N. E. (2d) 572 (1953), recognizing and
enforcing an oral agreement to extend the period of redemption from a mortgage
foreclosure sale, finds ample support in the decision In Ogden v. Stevens, 241 Ill.
556, 89 N. E. 741 (1909), although cases of that character are fairly rare.
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estate, or similar, security interests. Priority of lien, as between
the holder of a duly recorded real estate mortgage and a mechanic's lien claimant for work done on the encumbered property is a
relatively simple matter to resolve. 9 For that matter, the same
thing is true with respect to issues regarding priority as between
mortgagee and the federal government, in the event the latter should
assert a lien for unpaid taxes due it.6 The problem can, however,
according to the decision in Samms v. Chicago Title & Trust
Company,6 1 become quite complicated when the mortgagee, the
government, and the mechanic's lien all claim priority in the
premises or the improvements placed thereon. In that case, the
mortgage appeared of record prior to the time when the government asserted its tax lien, but a later mechanic's lien claimant
sought priority over both, at least with respect to the value contributed by his labor and materials. Treating the federal law
as being superior to any state doctrine on the subject, 62 and with
an eye to the enforcement of tax obligations, the Appellate Court
for the First District, finding no exception in the federal statute
in favor of later mechanic's claimants, 6 held the federal tax lien
to be superior to that of the mechanic, whose mechanic's lien
claim the trial court had found to be superior to the mortgage,
at least as to the enhanced value. This convoluted order of
priority threatened to produce confusion with respect to the
distribution of any proceeds of sale, but the court worked out
an ingenious scheme in that connection which preserved the
mechanic's right so far as it was possible to do so.
One small point concerning the validity of a chattel mort59 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 16.
60 26 U. S. C. A. § 3670.
61349 Ill. App. 413, 111 N. E. (2d) 172 (1953).
62 Republic National Life Ins. Co. v. Hedstrom, 346 Ill. App. 555, 105 N. E. (2d)
782 (1952).
68 The opinion does not disclose whether the work was done before or after the
filing of the federal tax lien. In view of the attitude taken with respect to the
superiority of federal over state law, it would appear to make no difference when
the work was done even though the lien, as to other parties, would be perfected
despite the fact that notice of lien might not be filed until four months after
completion: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 82, § 7.
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gage6 4 was made through the case of People ex rel. Cohen v.
Barrett. 5 The relator therein sought to compel the issuance, in
his favor as purchaser at a sale held pursuant to a judgment
against the registered owner, 66 of a clear automobile certificate
of title free from notation with respect to an earlier chattel mortgage previously listed thereon running to one of the defendants
on the ground such mortgage was defective because improperly
acknowledged. 67 The mortgage in question had been acknowledged before a conveniently located public official in Indiana although the mortgagor resided and encumbered property was
located in Illinois. It was argued, from the basis of the presence
of a statutory form of acknowledgment giving "State of
Illinois" as the venue thereof,"8 that the acknowledgment would
be valid only if taken within the state. The court, exercising
a sound degree of common sense, came to a contrary conclusion
and denied mandamus.
For that matter, the validity of other security instruments
executed elsewhere than in Illinois also came up for consideration
in the federal case of Freedom National Bank v. Northern Illinois
6 9 where the domestic lender, who had perfected
Corporation
security rights in an automobile trailer under a conditional
sales agreement, sought to assert the same to defeat claims made
by an earlier foreign lender who had advanced funds on the
strength of a Pennsylvania bailment-lease made at a time when
the property was physically located in that state. The court
rejected the claim that the earlier bailment-lease agreement
amounted to a conditional sale in disguise7" and, on finding the
presence of an adequate notation on the certificate of title concerning the same, it treated such legend as constructive, if not
64 The legislature has extended the filing time, with respect to the validity of
chattel mortgages as against third persons, from 10 days to 15 days from date of
execution: Laws 1953, p. 1274, H.B. 960; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 4.
65349 Ill. App. 236, 110 N. E. (2d) 452 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
66 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%, § 80(e).
67 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 95, § 1, requires acknowledgement "as hereinafter directed."
68 Ibid., Ch. 95, § 2.

69202 F. (2d) 601 (1953).
70 As to the effect of such an agreement in Pennsylvania, see the case of General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Hartman, 114 Pa. Super. 544, 174 A. 795 (1934).
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actual, notice to the subsequent domestic lender who dealt with
the chattel after it was brought into Illinois. 7 1 The rights of
the domestic lender were, for these reasons, subordinated to
those acquired by the foreign security claimant.
TRUSTS

The annual crop of new and startling trust cases was sparse
for, while the courts rendered a goodly number of decisions in
that field, most of the cases did no more than reiterate wellestablished principles or, at best, applied such principles to new
factual situations. The opinion in Tucker v. Countryman72 could,
however, serve to emphasize the need for the careful drafting of
testamentary trust instruments in order to avoid later difficulties
and uncertainties. In that connection, it would seem to be of
particular importance to provide for the disposition of the entire
interest of the testator, especially where the testator has expressed an intention to provide for those nearest to him, so a
residuary clause should be included as an added safeguard. If
not, the whole trust might be declared void for want of certainty,
thereby upsetting the testamentary scheme. It might also be
73 serves to present
suggested that the case of Staude v. Heinlein"
an interesting discussion of the circumstances under which a
fiduciary relation could be found to be in existence or be lacking.
The presence of that relationship may, at times, be a matter of
great importance, since the abuse thereof could give rise to a
constructive trust.
Three cases did deal with items concerning trust administration. In Ruddock v. Amterican Medical Association,74 the Supreme
Court pointed out that the fact that a trustee's sale of trust
property would require prior court approval would not render
an agreement to sell void, particularly where the agreement
71 Recognition to foreign security interests on a comity basis has been provided
by the decision in First Nat. Bank of Nevada v. Swegler, 336 Ill. App. 107, 82 N. E.
(2d) 920 (1948).
72414 Ill. 215, 111 N. E. (2d)

101 (1953).

73414 Ill. 11, 110 N. E. (2d) 228 (1953), noted in 41 IH. B. J. 544.
74 415 11. 63, 112 N. E. (2d) 107 (1953).
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stipulated that the sale was subject to court approval. The case
of United States Trust Company of New York v. Jones,75 involving a trust created for the benefit of the settlor's children and
their issue with contingent remainder interests granted to other
persons, concerned the proper construction to be given to a
direction to pay all taxes out of the income arising from trust
principal. Specifically, the question was whether a capital gains
tax, assessed by reason of the sale of capital assets, should be
paid out of income or principal. The Supreme Court adopted the
latter view, declaring that the spirit of the trust instrument,
rather than the letter thereof, should control. By its reversal of
the holding in Stone v. Baldwin," the Supreme Court would appear to be relaxing the principle that fiduciaries should exercise
the highest degree of good faith and that even the slightest possibility of conflicting interest should serve to disqualify. It there
held that an attorney could be appointed to act as a successortrustee under a testamentary trust even though he had served as
attorney for the predecessor trustee, at least in connection with
the trustee's final accounting. The fact that the attorney had
severed himself from all further service as attorney for the predecessor was said to be sufficient to remove any disqualification.
WILL

AND ADMINISTRATION

Only a single wills case possesses enough significance to call
for comment and the court there applied the well-known rule
that parol evidence of a decedent's declarations are admissible
to explain a latent ambiguity in a will, but not for the purpose
of explaining a patent one. 77 In Krog v. Hafka,78 involving a
75414 Ill. 265, 111 N. E. (2d) 144 (1953), reversing 346 Ill. App. 365, 105 N. D.
(2d) 122 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 194.
76414 Ill. 257, 111 N. E. (2d) 97 (1953), reversing 347 Ill. App. 128, 106 N. E.
(2d) 379 (1952). Schaefer, J., wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by
Hershey, J.
77 Ordinarily, a latent ambiguity is one which arises out of extrinsic facts, not
appearing in the document, which compels a choice between two or more possible
meanings, although the language employed suggests but a single meaning. A patent ambiguity, on the other hand, arises merely from the language employed in the
will, and may be recognized simply from a reading of It, without looking to the
extrinsic facts: Higginbotham v. Blair, 308 Ill. 568, 139 N. E. 909 (1923).
78413 Ill. 290, 109 N. E. (2d) 213 (1952), noted in 41 Ill. B. J. 478 and 1953 Ill. L.
Forum 147.
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will containing a devise to "Harry E. Hafka and his wife Ethel
May Hafka," the court held that the fact that Harry had died
before the testatrix created a "latent" ambiguity, justifying the
admission of parol evidence of declarations of the testatrix to
show that she intended a class gift. It would seem that the
ambiguity in the case was a patent one, arising solely from the
words of the instrument, so that, by classifying it as "latent,"
the court was straining orthodox definitions in order to consider
evidence which it thought pointed to a just result.
Statutory rights of inheritance were concerned in two cases.
A new statement with respect to pre-1951 dower law was made
by the Supreme Court in Krile v. Swiney. 9 In that case, a
married woman had died intestate in 1948 owning real estate
in fee. She had been survived by certain collateral relatives and
by a husband, who died within ten months after letters of administration had been issued on the wife's estate without having taken
any action with respect to his dower right in her property. Purchasers claiming under the wife's collateral relatives sought to
quiet title against the heirs of the husband, the latter claiming
that, since the husband had not perfected dower in the real
estate, he had inherited one-half thereof in fee, which interest
descended to them. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that,
under the statute in force in 1949, waiver of dower was not a
condition precedent to the vesting of a fee in the surviving spouse.
By so holding, the court virtually- overruled the earlier cases of
Braidwood v. Charles and Bruce v. McCormick, both declaring
that waiver of dower was a condition precedent. 80 Although the
effect of the last mentioned case had been superseded by the 1951
revision of the law relating to dower, 8 ' it presumably remained,
until the instant decision, as authoritative statement of the law
existing prior thereto.
79 413 II. 350, 109 N. E. (2d) 189 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RgvwrW
267, 41 Il. B. J. 326, and 1953 Ill. L. Forum 147.
80 See 327 Ill. 500, 159 N. E. 38 (1927), and 396 Ii. 482, 72 N. E. (2d) 333 (1947),
respectively. The last mentioned case was noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw
324.
81 Laws 1951, p. 974; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 173a.
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The second, that of Spencer v. Burns,8 2 provided interpretation for the descent statute in force during the period from 1939
to 195383 by holding that an illegitimate child could inherit only
from its mother and from lineal ascendants of the mother, thereby
excluding from inheritance an illegitimate half-brother and the
descendants of an illegitimate half-sister of the decedent. Some
earlier cases had held that an illegitimate person could inherit
from collaterals8 4 on the basis of a statute which then provided
that an illegitimate could inherit from "any person from whom
its mother might have inherited, if living."' 5 This older provision was dropped at the time of the adoption of the present
Probate Act, and the Supreme Court, in the instant case, treated
the deletion as being significant, notwithstanding a statutory
requirement calling for a liberal construction. 6 A recent decision by the Appellate Court in Calamia v. Dempsey17 was expressly disapproved. The legislature, however, after the Supreme
Court decision had been announced, acted to restore the provision thus deleted,88 so it may be presumed that the older cases
again control the situation.
A novel argument regarding an executor's duty to pay certain real estate taxes which had accrued before the testator's
death8 9 was made in Kiley v. Neuwnan. 9 ° No claim for reimbursement for these taxes was filed against the estate, but the
devisees sought to compel the executor to pay the same to prevent
the accrual of penalties. The probate court held for the executor
but on trial de novo in the circuit court judgment ran in favor
of the devisees. On further appeal, the executor contended that,
82413 Ill. 240, 108 N. E. (2d) 413 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW Ri-v w
268, 2 DePaul L. Rev. 300, and 41 Ill. B. J. 210.
83 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 163.
84 Morrow v. Morrow. 289 Ill. 135, 124 N. E. 386 (1919) ; Chambers v. Chambers,
249 11. 126, 94 N. E. 108 (1911).
Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 39, § 2.
85 Laws 1872, p. 352; Ill.
86 Ill*
Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch.3, § 159.
87 344 Ill. App. 503, 101 N. E. (2d) 611 (1951).
88 Laws 1953, p. 286, H.B. 7; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 163.
89 See In re Estate of Muldoon, 316 Ill. App. 540, 45 N. E. (2d) 577 (1942), noted
in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 268, as to the liability of the estate in such a
case.
90348 Ill. App. 464, 109 N. E. (2d) 461 (1952).
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as no claim for taxes had been filed, allowed, or classified, 9 1 the
probate court was without authority to order payment. The
Appellate Court for the First District, affirming the action of
the circuit court, held that it was not necessary that a claim for
taxes should be either filed or classified before payment could
92
be ordered.
Some outstanding changes have been made by the legislature
during the last year. 93 Proof of heirship should be facilitated by
an amendment to Section 57 of the Probate Act, one permitting
proof by affidavit sworn to before any judge of any court of
record in the United States, its territories or possessions, and
certified by the clerk thereof, or before any United States consul,
or consular agent, or commissioned officer in active service within
or without the United States. 94 A petition to probate a will creating a testamentary trust need no longer include the names and
addresses of beneficiaries who are not heirs, for a recent amendment provides that it is sufficient simply to give the name and
address of the trustee. 95 A new section purports to validate
orders admitting wills to probate, entered prior to the effective
date of the new statute, provided notice had been given to heirs
of the decedent, even though other interested parties, normally
entitled to notice, had not been furnished with notice. 98 A newly
added section 97 declares that the Department of Public Welfare
may, with court approval, designate one of its employees to serve,
without compensation, as conservator of the personal estate of a
patient in a state mental hospital, provided the estate does not
exceed $1,000. In other cases, no guardian or conservator is
needed where the personal estate of the minor or incompetent is
91 See Il1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 344 et seq., particularly §§ 354 and 356.
92 While the court could cite no Illinois decision in support of its ruling, it did
rely on 21 Am. Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 351, where the principle was
stated as being the rule in several other jurisdictions.
93 See above, this section, at note 88, with respect to the right of illegitimate
persons to inherit by descent. See also the section on Family Law, particularly
notes 44 to 46, for reference to legislative changes concerning rights of inheritance
between adopted children and adopting parents.
94 Laws 1953, p. 69, S.B. 76; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 209.
95 Laws 1953, p. 234, S.B. 128; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 215-6.
96 Laws 1953, p. 235, S.B. 267; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 216a.
97 Laws 1953, p. 967, H.B. 864; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 270b.
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Heretofore, the maximum figure had been fixed

Proceedings under the Probate Act were, until recently, governed by the terms of the Civil Practice Act except as to matters
concerning the sale or mortgage of a ward's or decedent's real
estate,1 which matters were declared exempted from the operation of Section 50(8) of the Civil Practice Act.2 A similar exemption has now been made with respect to a sale or a mortgage of
real estate by nonresident fiduciaries.8 It could also be noted
that a redefinition of the terms "executor, administrator, administrator to collect, guardian, and conservator," as used in
the Probate Act, has occurred with the result that foreign corporations, banks, and national banking associations authorized
to act in a fiduciary capacity, may now serve in any of the desig4
nated capacities.
VII. PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Administrative law cases of significance appear to be equally
divided between those dealing with problems of administrative
procedure and those concerning judicial review of administrative
decisions. In the former category, three decisions appear to be
worthy of comment. The case of Illinois Bell Telephone Company
v. Illinois Commerce Commission' required a clear-cut determination of an issue which the court had previously passed upon only
inferentially. The telephone company there concerned had filed
schedules with the commission calling for an increase in rates. At
the close of the hearings, the City of Chicago moved that the
Laws 1953, p. 184, S.B. 50; I11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 479-80.
99 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 480.
1 Ii. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 155.
2 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 174(8). The provision in question permits a defendant without
notice, over whom jurisdiction has been acquired by publication, to petition to set
aside a final decree within one year from the date of its entry.
3 Laws 1953, p. 836, S.B. 80; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 155.
4 Laws 1953, p. 1060, H.B. 884; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 152.
1414 I. 275, 111 N. E. (2d) 329 (1953), noted in 31 CmcAGo-KFNT LAW Rsviw
374.
98
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commission should disregard the evidence and cancel the schedules
upon the theory that two years had not elapsed since the last order
had been entered regarding rates, 2 but the commission refused so
to do. It was argued, on appeal, that the statutory provision in
question established a minimum time period which had to elapse
before the commission could entertain another request for an
alteration of rates. The Supreme Court, however, held that the
statute was not intended to create an absolute two-year period of
repose, relying upon the interpretation which had been given to
the statute by the commission over a period of many years. The
court noted that alteration of rates depends primarily upon changing economic conditions, which changes are often unpredictable, so
it would be unfair to place a time restriction on the availability of
a remedy intended to provide relief from such occurrences.
The plaintiff involved in the case of Smith v. Department of
Registration and Education3 was a doctor authorized to practice
medicine within the state against whom proceedings had been
instituted for the revocation of his license on the ground that, as
an advocate of the Koch treatment of cancer, he had been guilty
of making false claims concerning his skill in the treatment of that
particular malady. A medical committee, appointed to conduct
hearings, made certain findings based on the evidence presented
and recommended revocation, which recommendation was adopted.
On complaint under the Administrative Review Act, the Department's order was affirmed by the trial court but, on appeal to the
Supreme Court, the order was reversed and remanded with directions. It appeared that the plaintiff had made two requests prior
to the hearing, to-wit: (1) that a dedimus potestatem should issue
to procure a prehearing deposition from the non-resident complaining witness, and (2) that the medical committee so appointed
should be declared disqualified for bias and prejudice. 4 It was
2 The city relied on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 71.
3 412 Ill. 332, 106 N. E. (2d) 722 (1952).
4 In support of this point, it was alleged that the entire committee was made up
of members and officers of the American Medical Association which association had
gone on record as denouncing the Koch treatment and characterizing the plaintiff
as the "Number 1 quack of Chicago." It was alleged that there were thousands
of doctors in the area, not identified with the association, who could be recruited
to form an unbiased committee.
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contended that the denial of these requests violated constitutional
rights since, under almost identical circumstances, the Department
and the medical committee had granted requests of this nature in
other matters. The court, while not passing upon the validity of
this exact argument, stated that, as the accusation of prejudice
had not been denied, and facilities for the appointment of adifferent committee were present, the request for change of venue
should have been granted. 5
It was also argued that the evidence relied upon by the committee to support some of its findings was insufficient, particularly
with respect to the therapeutic value of the Koch treatment. No
evidence was presented on this phase of the problem for the committee appears to have drawn on its own knowledge and professional skill in determining the point. In that connection, the
Supreme Court felt that facts known to an administrative agency,
but not established by evidence presented at a hearing, could not
be utilized to support an order. The conclusion would appear to
be sound for, while an administrative body made up of experts
might possess a great deal of knowledge and skill in the particular
field, they should not be allowed to use the same to fill gaps in
the evidence, otherwise parties affected by the decision would
have no opportunity to know the evidence presented and would,
therefore, be in no position to refute the same. The expertness of
an administrative tribunal should be utilized to understand and
weigh the evidence, not to supply it.
The consequence of a failure to take advantage of available
administrative procedure is well illustrated by the case of Colton
v. Commonwealth Edison Company.6 The plaintiff there concerned
received service from the defendant under a special rate. The
defendant, wishing to cancel such rate as of a specific date, filed a
revision of the rate with the Commerce Commission. That body
issued no order but merely made an entry in its minutes indicating
5 The fact that it was possible to appoint a new medical committee ruled out any
application of the "doctrine of necessity," which doctrine provides that, where there
is only one available tribunal In existence for the administration of a statute, it
cannot be disqualified, even though bias and prejudice exists, since otherwise the
law would go unadministered.
6 349 Ill. App. 490, 111 N. E. (2d) 363 (1953). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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that it would take no action with respect to the rate. Several days
before the rate was to be cancelled, the plaintiff, in accordance
with the provisions of the Public Utility Act, 7 filed a complaint
with the commission but later abandoned the same before a hearing was held and, instead, began an action before a court to enjoin
the cancellation of the rate in issue. This suit was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, because of the failure to exhaust the administrative remedy. While not novel, the case provides a restatement
of the well-accepted rule that a party must exhaust the administrative remedy before seeking relief before another forum."
So far as the Illinois Administrative Review Act 9 is concerned,
the courts of the state, in the past year, have merely applied
well-recognized rules to several cases. For instance, in Ross v.
Chicago Land Clearance Commission, ° the Supreme Court held
that there was no right to review under the act from a decision
of the State Housing Board since the statute creating that agency
did not include an adoption of the provisions of the former." It
also became necessary for the reviewing tribunal to remind trial
courts that, at the time of reviewing decisions by administrative
tribunals, they are limited by a lack of power to hear additional
evidence, for the trial court is to do no more than scan the record
compiled at the administrative hearing, which record, if inadequate, must be remanded to the board for supplementation. It
might also be noted that the Administrative Review Act has been
amended by the addition of a provision requiring the trial court,
when entertaining an appeal, to give effect to any bond requirement contained in the statute creating the tribunal whose order
is about to be reviewed, 12 and a number of subsidiary statutes
establishing administrative agencies have been amended to call for
I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 111%, § 36.
104, 112 N. E. (2d) 91 (1953), dealing
with the right to grant immunity from prosecution in return for information
divulged, is noted above. See Criminal Law and Procedure, notes 35-7. The value
of the case in the field of administrative law is inestimable for, without information,
the administrative body would frequently be unable to perform its functions.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq.
10 413 II. 377, 108 N. E. (2d) 776 (1952).
11 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 265.
12 Laws 1953, p. 1597, H.B. 710; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 275(i).
7

8The decision in Halpin v. Scotti, 415 Ii.
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review of the decisions and order thereof in accordance with the
terms of the Review Act.' 8
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Although nothing of significance occurred in relation to conflict of laws, 14 the judicial year witnessed some nineteen attacks on
Illinois statutes for a variety of constitutional reasons, ranging
from claimed violations of the revenue article to special legislation
because of improper classification, but these attacks were sustained
in only four instances.
One case, that of Antle v. Tuchbreiter,'5 stands out above all
others, not so much for the specific holding therein, which can be
sustained on other grounds, but because of its possible, or even
probable, future effect in the field of constitutional law. In that
case, the constitutionality of the Social Security Enabling Act'
was unsuccessfully challenged for the court answered, and overruled, each contention by applying recognized principles of state
constitutional law. The concluding paragraph of the opinion
therein is particularly important. The court there stated that
compliance with the terms of the Federal Social Security Act
constituted a contract between the state and the federal governments with the authority to make such contract being derived
from the supremacy clause of the federal constitution. It having
been decided, in Dyer v. SimIs," that a state could not assert the

provisions of its own constitution to invalidate a contract made
with another state, it was not difficult to conclude that the state
government could not deny this particular contract by virtue of
13 The statutes affected appear in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, under the designation of
Ch. 23, § 437-2.17; Ch. 24, § 7-4; Ch. 24, § 950; Ch. 561h, § 269; Ch. 95Y2, § 73.11;
Ch. 1111/2, § 183; Ch. 120, § 453.72; Ch. 122, §§ 8-9; and Ch. 122, § 34-113.1.
14 The case of People ex rel. Cohen v. Barrett, 349 Ill. App. 236, 110 N. E. (2d)
452 (1953), in which leave to appeal has been denied, dealing with an issue as to
the validity of a chattel mortgage executed and acknowledged in a foreign state, Is
discussed above under Property, sub-topic Security Transactions, particularly notes
65-8.
15 414 Ill. 571, 111 N. E. (2d) 836 (1953).
16 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 254b.1 et seq., provides for the bringing

of state employees under the federal statute, consonant with the provisions of
42 U. S. C. A. § 418.
17 341 U. S. 22, 71 S. Ct. 557, 95 L. Ed. 713 (1951).
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anything in the Illinois constitution. In that connection, the court
appears to have announced principles of state constitutional law
essentially similar to the doctrine propounded in the case of
Missouri v. Holland."' In view of the increasing tendency on the
part of the federal government to enlist state co-operation in the
carrying on of various projects, it would appear that the last word
on the subject has not yet been spoken.
The revenue article' 9 formed the foundation for attacks challenging the validity of two taxing statutes. In Mutual Tobacco
Company v. Halpin,20 the Cigarette Tax Act 2' was challenged on
the ground that it was not uniform in that it was a flat tax per
cigarette without regard to the selling price, thereby causing the
tax rate to vary percentage-wise in relation to the selling price.
Upholding the statute, the Supreme Court indicated that absolute
equality of taxation, being at times impracticable, was not required by law. In the other case, that of Johnson v. Halpin,22 the
companion Cigarette Use Tax Act 23 was unsuccessfully attacked
on the ground that it was a tax upon a right, hence not authorized
by the revenue article, 24 but the court held the use of cigarettes
to be no more than a privilege. Privileges, the court noted, are
not restricted to those things which may be done only with legislative sanction, for many things heretofore regarded as being
matters of right may now be made the subject of taxation on the
basis of being privileges. 25 Relying on the holding in Nelson v.
Sears, Roebuck & Company,26 the court turned aside another attack
based on a claim of unconstitutional interference with interstate
commerce.
18252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641, 11 A. L. R. 984 (1920).
19 Il. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § § 1-2.
20 414 Ill. 226, 111 N. E. (2d) 155 (1953).
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 453.1 et seq.
22413 Ini. 257, 108 N. E. (2d) 429 (1952), noted in 41 Ill. B. J. 279, cert. den.
345 U. S. 923, 73 S. Ct. 781, 97 L. Ed. 668 (1953).
23 I. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 453.31 et seq.
24 See Bachrach v. Nelson, 349 I1. 579, 182 N. E. 902 (1932), for a discussion of
the scope of the taxing power.
25 The case of Harder's Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 235 Ill. 58, 85 N. E. 253
(1908), was relied upon. Actually, that case involved the "privilege" of using public
property, to-wit: city streets.
26 312 U. S. 359, 61 S. Ct. 586, 85 L. Ed. 888 (1941).
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Two cases arose calling for an interpretation of the phrases
"public purpose" and "corporate purpose." In People v. City of
Chicago,27 the validity of the tax provision of the Illinois Civil
Defense Act 28 was questioned on the ground the tax was not one
for a corporate purpose. The court treated the measure as valid
inasmuch as it was regarded to be a proper exercise of the police
power for the city to make advance preparation for the health,
welfare and safety of the public.2 9 In the second case, that of
People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago,80 the 1949 amendment 3 to the Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act 2 was attacked
for a number of reasons, but principally because it was said to
involve the taking of private property for other than a public
purpose.8 3 An attempt was made to distinguish the problem from
the one concerned in the case of Chicago Land Clearance Commission v. White 34 on the ground the amendment applied to vacant
land. The statute was sustained since the court felt that even
vacant land could be blighted and slum clearance was a "public"
purpose, with the part being played by private interests serving
merely as a means to that end.
Three cases dealt with aspects of due process of law and, in
all of them, the specific objection raised was that the statutory
provisions concerned were too indefinite and vague. In People
ex rel. Montgomery v. Lierman,3 5 the section of the Revised Cities
36
and Villages Act relating to the union of contiguous communities
27413 Ill. 83, 108 N. E. (2d) 16 (1952), noted in 41 Ill. B. J. 232.
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 281.

29 The statute was also held not to violate U. S. Const., Art. I, §§ 8-10, since, by
its terms, the purpose was evidently one to carry out functions other than those
for which the military forces would be primarily responsible.
30414 Ill. 600, 111 N. E. (2d) 626 (1953), noted in 101 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1246.
Crampton, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
31 Laws 1949, p. 997. The amended provision appears in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1,
Ch. 67%, § 64.
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 67Y, § 63 et seq. The general validity thereof
was tested in People ex rel. Touhy v. City of Chicago, 399 Ill. 551, 78 N. E. (2d) 285
(1948), and Chicago Land Clearance Commission v. White, 411 Ill. 310, 104 N. E.
(2d) 236 (1952).
33 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13.
34 411 Ill. 310, 104 N. E. (2d) 236 (1952).
85 415 Ill. 32, 112 N. E. (2d) 149 (1953).
36 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 6-1 et seq.
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was challenged, but the court, after a detailed review of the provisions of the statute, thought there was no ambiguity present. In
Jaffe v. Cruttenden,37 the attack was directed toward some provisions of the Illinois Securities Law designed to exempt certain
sales from the operation thereof 38 with particular criticism being
directed to the phrases "reasonably related to the current market"
and "recognized manual." These terms were said to be sufficiently
definite when measured by the common understanding and practice
in the field. The third case, that of People v. Adduci,39 concerned
the law prohibiting state officers from becoming interested in state
contracts. 40 It was said that the words "become directly or indirectly interested," as used therein, were adequate to apprise as
to the nature of the prohibited contracts.
The section of the School Code operating to restore pension
payments previously taken away from retired public school teachers4 1 was again brought under fire in the case of Voigt v. Board
of Education of the City of Chicago,4 2 but it was again sustained
on the authority of an earlier case 43 wherein the theory had been
expressed that the state was under a moral obligation to restore
the pension, hence the payments were not considered to be pro44
hibited extra compensation for past services.
Improper classification served as the primary ground for the
claimed unconstitutionality urged in three cases, in two of which
the contention was successful. The case of Ronda Realty Corporation v. Lawton45 dealt with a Chicago ordinance requiring apartment buildings to furnish parking facilities on the premises 46
which was held unconstitutional because the classification was said
37 412 I1.

606, 107 N. E. (2d) 715 (1952).

38 Ill.Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 121%, § 100(7). The statute has now been
replaced by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121%, § 137.1 et seq.
39 412 Il1.

621, 108 N. E. (2d) 1 (1952).

40 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 127, § 75.
41 Ibid., Ch. 122, § 34-90.

42 413 Ill. 233, 108 N. E. (2d) 426 (1952). Bristow, J., dissented.
43 See Krebs v. Board of Education, 410 Il1. 435, 102 N. E. (2d) 321 (1951).
44 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 19.
45 414 Ill.313, 111 N. E. (2d) 310 (1953).

46 Mu.

Code Chicago 1931, Ch. 194A, § 8(2).

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1952-19J3

to be both arbitrary and discriminatory in that boarding houses,
rooming houses, hotels, and the like were not essentially different
from apartment buildings insofar as the parking problem was
concerned. In Larvenette v. Elliott,47 certain amendments to the
Election Code 48 were stricken down. These sections purported to
direct that circulators of petitions for candidates for state offices
could not solicit outside of the county in which the circulators
resided but that those concerned with petitions for lesser offices
might solicit anywhere in the corresponding district. Although the
court agreed that the purpose of the statute was to minimize the
possibility of fraudulent signatures, it felt there was no essential
difference between state and other offices in this respect. The
charge of improper classification levelled at a city ordinance regu49
lating the slaughter of poultry by retail live poultry dealers
was, however, in the case of Charles v. City of Chicago,50 rejected
when the court expressed the belief that the classification scheme
was a reasonable one.
Two statutes were challenged on the theory they involved improper delegations of legislative power. A section of the Cities
and Villages Act 5 was held invalid in People ex rel. Chicago
Dryer Company v. City of Chicago52 for the reason that, by
requiring a city council to change the name of a street when so
petitioned by a stated percentage of the property owners abutting
thereon, an improper delegation to private persons had been purportedly authorized. In Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Lanter,"3 however, the attack on the Freeways Act 54 failed
when the court expressed satisfaction with the standards there
involved.
Three other cases possess some general interest. An unsuc47 412 Ill. 523, 107 N. E. (2d) 743 (1952).
48 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 46, §§ 156g-h.

49 Mun. Code Chicago 1931, Ch. 95, §29.1.
50413 Ill. 428, 109 N. E. (2d) 790 (1953), noted in 1953 I1.
den. 345 U. S. 974, 73 S. Ct. 1122, 97 L. Ed. 957 (1953).
51 I1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, § 23-26.
52 413 I1. 315, 109 N. E. (2d) 201 (1952).

53413 Ill. 581. 110 N. E. (2d) 179 (1953).
54 IH. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 121, §§ 334-43.

L. Forum 140. cert.
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cessful attack was made, in Kough v. Hoehler,55 on certain sections
of the Mental Health Code. 56 The charges there authorized to be
made against patients in mental institutions, or their relatives,
were said not to be a form of taxation, hence did not have to
comply with the revenue article. 57 In Gadlin v. Auditor of Public
Accounts5 s an attack on the Currency Exchange Act 5 9 failed to
produce results. The case possesses interest because, under the
holding therein, currency exchanges may be classed with other
businesses subject to prohibition in the absence of an affirmative
showing of public convenience and necessity. The Cemetery Care
Act,6 0 placed under fire in the case of Union Cemetery Association
v. Cooper6 for a whole host of reasons, also survived the challenge
directed against it.
Certain Illinois statutory regulations were charged with being
violative of the federal constitution. The case of Berger v. Barrett 6 2 concerned a provision of the Motor Vehicle Act which
required the payment of an investigation fee in order to secure
an Illinois certificate of title to an automobile not previously
registered in this state nor purchased from an Illinois dealer.6 3
The statute was said to discriminate against interstate commerce.
On the other hand, in City of Chicago v. Willett Company,6 4 a city
ordinance imposing a license tax on trucks travelling over the
city streets was held constitutional despite the claim made therein
that interstate commerce was being unduly burdened.
It would also be proper to note that, during the period of
this survey, two proposed amendments to the state constitution
received the approval of the electorate and were proclaimed
55413 Iil. 409, 109 N. E. (2d) 177 (1952), noted in 41 Ill. B. J. 330.
56 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 91Y2, §§ 9-19 to 9-25.
57 I1. Const. 1870, Art. IX, § 1.
58414 Ii. 89, 110 N. E. (2d) 234 (1953), criticized in 41 I. B. J. 599.
59 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 16Y2, § 30 et seq.
60 Ibid., Ch. 21, § 24.1 et seq.
61414 11. 23, 110 N. E. (2d) 239 (1953).
62414 111. 43, 110 N. E. (2d) 218 (1953).
§ 77.
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 95Y,
64344 U. S. 574, 73 S. Ct. 460, 97 LI. Ed. 333 (1953), noted in 31 CHICAGo-KENT
LAW REvIEW 353, reversing 406 Ill. 286, 94 N. E. (2d) 195 (1950), as clarified in
409 Ill. 480, 101 N. E. (2d) 205 (1951). Douglas, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
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adopted. One provision was designed to eliminate the double
liability which previously attached to holdings of stock in state
banks.6 5 The other, intended to remove a constitutional restriction
on the maximum compensation payable to county officers, is still
subject to the limitations there expressed and such other regulations as the general assembly may lawfully impose. 66
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

An Appellate Court holding in the case of Thomas v.Broadlands Community Consolidated School District6" outlines a theory
of considerable importance with respect to the tort liability of
school districts and the like but, as the specific point has not yet
reached the Illinois Supreme Court, it is impossible to prophesy
as to the depth of change made by the decision. The case was
one in which a school district was sued by a child injured while
playing in the school yard. The plaintiff's reference to the case of
Moore v. Moyle6" as being decisive, at least by analogy, could
hardly be conceded in substance, for a charity rather than a public
school was there involved. Nevertheless, the court held that,
where liability insurance is available to protect public funds, the
reason for the rule of immunity heretofore enjoyed by school
districts will vanish to the extent of the available insurance,
leading to something in the nature of a "waiver of immunity."
A considerable departure from historic policy in Illinois appears
to be shaping up.
Civil service and related issues were involved in two cases.
One of them, the case of People ex rel. Donahoo v. Board of
Education,6 9 called for statutory construction of that portion of
the School Code which directs that, where a teacher has been
employed for a probationary period of two consecutive school
terms, such teacher "shall enter upon contractual continued serv65 Ill.Const. 1870, Art. XI, § 6, as amended November 24, 1952.

66 Ibid., Art. X, § 10.
67348 11. App. 567, 109 N. E. (2d) 636 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 279 and 1953 Ill. L. Forum 162.
68405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950).
69413 Ill. 422, 109 N. E. (2d) 787 (1953), reversing 346 Il1. App. 241, 104 N. E.

(2d) 833 (1952).
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ice unless given written notice of dismissal stating the specific
reason therefor. ' 7 The teacher there concerned had completed
his probationary period but had been notified that his contract
would not be renewed, which notice of dismissal or non-renewal
gave no reason for the action. The Supreme Court, hearing the
matter on denial of a writ of mandamus, held the statutory provision was mandatory in character.
In the second case, that of Young v. Chicago Housing
Authority,71 the question presented was one as to the right of the
authority to take the fingerprints of all of its employees. One
employee, on behalf of himself and his fellows, objected to this
procedure stating that it was the ultimate dispbsition, rather
than the actual taking, of the fingerprints which was obnoxious
and not within the authority of the public corporation. After
taking, the fingerprints were to be forwarded to the state Bureau
of Identification and the federal Bureau of Investigation. A return
of confidential data would be made to the state police and thereafter be released to the employer. Considering the social implications involved, the Appellate Court expressed the belief that
this procedure could result in providing protection to the persons
and the property of tenants of the housing authority. Such being
the case, the program was classed as being reasonable and within
the discretionary powers granted. The opinion, of course, is
without precedent or analogy in this state.
Not wholly irrelevant to this topic, but more properly noted
under the heading of constitutional law, are some cases dealing
with aspects of municipal authority. In People ex rel. Gutknecht
v. City of Chicago,72 an attack on certain amendatory provisions
of the Blighted Areas Redevelopment Act 78 failed. There can be
no question but that social policy, bottomed upon judicial knowledge of contemporary conditions, was persuasive. In People v.
70 111. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 24(2).
71350 Ill. App. 287, 112 N. E. (2d) 719 (1953).
72414 11. 600, 111 N. E. (2d) 626 (1953), noted in 101 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1246.
Crampton, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
73 Laws 1949, p. 997; 11. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 67%, § 64.
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City of Chicago,74 the municipality was held to be constitutionally
entitled to. incur expense for, and to levy a tax on behalf of, the
adoption of civil defense measures, said to be in the interest of
the safety and welfare of the public. The case of Ronda Realty
Corporationv. Lawton, 75 however, would indicate that a city could
not require apartment buildings to provide adequate parking
facilities on the premises without imposing a similar requirement
on hotels, boarding houses, rooming houses, and the like. It was
also held, in Deer Park Civic Association v. City of Chicago76
that once a building permit has been issued and construction
begun, the city may not, by an amendatory zoning ordinance,
change the use to which the property may be put.
One further case might be mentioned because of the extensive
review of earlier cases provided by the opinion therein and also
because of the size of the potential damage claim. The facts in
77
the case of Wacker-Wabash Corporation v. City of Chicago
indicate that certain condemnation proceedings were begun which
would have resulted in the opening of a short street off the gigantic
Wacker Drive improvement in downtown Chicago. The building
corporation, in anticipation of the opening of this street, constructed a huge building, including a large garage, with a planned
entrance consistent with the proposed street improvement. 78 Ten
years later, the condemnation proceedings were abandoned and
this action for damages followed, with plaintiff asserting a claim
resting upon its reliance on the overall street plan, induced by
promises and representations on the part of certain of the city
officials, leaving the corporation with a building unavailable for
the planned use at the ground and street levels. The Appellate
Court ruled that the statements allegedly made by the municipal
officials established no contractual rights, either expressed or im74413 Ill. 83, 108 N. E. (2d) 16 (1952), noted in 41 Il. B.
75414 I1. 313, 111 N. E. (2d) 310 (1953).
76347 Ill. App. 346, 106 N. E. (2d) 823 (1952), noted in
REVIEW 192 and 2 DePaul L. Rev. 303.
77350 Ill. App. 343, 112 N. E. (2d) 903 (1953).
78 There was little question but that the plaintiff had
conform with the overall city plan, for it appeared that a
not have been issued if the plaintiff had not done so.

J. 232.
31 CHICAGo-KENT LAW

shaped its building to
building permit would
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plied, between the plaintiff and the city in the absence of a council
resolution, so the action for damages was defeated at the threshold
and plaintiff's invocation of estoppel was rejected.
PUBLIC UTILITIES

Mention has been made of one aspect 9 of the case entitled
Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. Illinois Commerce Comnmission. 0 Another question therein concerned the method adopted
by the Public Utility Commission in determining the value of the
company's property for the purpose of establishing the rate base.
In that connection, the commission seemed to have stressed a
certain factor obtained by comparing the stock market quotations
of the utility company's stock with the admitted book value thereof.
Accepting the original cost of the property to the company and
then applying this factor, the commission arrived at a valuation
figure called a "judgment estimate." It was told that it had erred
in relying on this "interest plus dividends" formula as an exclusive guide to rate-making, and it was cautioned, at least inferentially, that it should take into account such matters as current
economic conditions, present price levels, and reproduction costs.
The case, therefore, may be said to possess significance as indicative of a potential change in the composition of the rate-making
formula.
There is also some indication, by virtue of the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of City of Chicago v.
Willett Company,8 ' that the "home port" theory may be opening
up to permit licensing by municipalities of interstate cartage
companies where the interstate and local business operations are
inseparable. A claim advanced there that such regulation would
result in a forbidden obstruction upon interstate commerce was
rejected by a divided court.
79 See above, this section, notes 1 and 2, for a discussion of an administrative
law issue contained in the case.
80 414 Il. 275, 111 N. E. (2d) 329 (1953).
81344 U. S. 574, 73 S. Ct. 460, 97 L. Ed. 333 (1953), noted in 31 CImAOO-KENT
L.A-w REvmw 353, reversing 406 I1. 286, 94 N. . (2d) 195 (1950), as clarified in
409 Iil. 480, 101 N. E. (2d) 205 (1951). Douglas, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1952-1953

TAXATION

During the past few years, problems of taxation in connection
with divorce, both in the federal sphere as to gift and estate
taxes, and in the realm of state inheritance taxes, have been subjected to re-examination. Possibly under the impetus of the
liberalizing of income tax treatment,8 2 or because of the influence
of the public sentiment, there has been a marked tendency to
change the rules with regard to federal gift taxation. 8 The Illinois Supreme Court has now, through its decision in the case of
In re Estate of Greiner,14 also evidenced a degree of liberalization
in state matters. The case involved an appeal from an inheritance
tax assessment taken by an executor of a testator whose wife had
divorced him many years before under a decree which recited and
approved a property settlement. Contemporaneously therewith,
the husband executed a will leaving a substantial sum in cash to
the wife who was divorcing him, with the, provision that this sum
was to be in lieu of dower rights but that, if the bequest should
be altered, the wife would be "entitled to all her property rights,
including the right of dower" provided she survived the husband
and had not remarried. The executor contended that this sum
was taken by the wife, at the testator's death, as a creditor and
not as a legatee. The Supreme Court agreed, without indicating
too clearly whether, in its opinion, the right of the creditor arose
out of the settlement contract or out of the decree.",
This treatment of the point can hardly be said to be definitive,
and is rendered less so by the circumstance that the court sup82 See I.R.C. § 23(u), allowing the husband to deduct alimony payments, and
I. R. C. § 22(k), requiring the divorced wife to include such payments in her
return.
83 Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U. S. 106, 71 S. Ct. 181, 95 L. Ed. 111 (1950).
84 412 Il1. 591, 107 N. E. (2d) 836 (1952), noted in 1953 Il1. L. Forum i62.
8.5 It is clear that an interest taken at death by way of dower, or in lieu of
dower, is subject to inheritance tax: Billings v. People, 189 Ill. 472, 59 N. E. 798
(1901) ; Mayer v. Reinecke, 130 F. (2d) 350 (1942). The Supreme Court apparently
assumed that the surviving ex-wife had a claim against the decedent's estate
for the amount in question, but this could hardly be the case. If the decedent
had stricken the provision from his will, the ex-wife would not have been able
to file a claim, not even for breach of contract to leave property by will. At most,
the arrangement appeared to be one by which the husband had a right to redeem
or pay off the "marital" rights at a fixed round sum.
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ported its conclusion with a reference to contract cases. Nevertheless, the opinion in the case is susceptible of the interpretation
that a husband and wife would be permitted to enter into a postnuptial agreement, estimating the worth of the marital rights of
the wife and containing a promise on the part of the husband to
leave his wife that amount by will, under which she could then
assert a claim against his estate free from the inheritance tax
which would otherwise attach. It is obvious that the Greiner case,
if taken at face value, could serve to create a non-statutory "marital deduction" under the Illinois inheritance tax law, but it is
unlikely that the court will follow the decision to any such logical
conclusion. In the meantime, it is also equally obvious that further
confusion will be likely to result until the decision has been
brought into proper focus.8 6
The decision in People v. Becker 7 is worthy of mention for
it confirms the so-called "proration of deductions" doctrine, in
inheritance tax cases, previously announced in People v. Luehrs.s s
The court did, however, enlarge on the point by indicating that the
fact that another state has allowed all of the deductions to be
taken for purposes of the tax in that state would not deprive the
taxpayer of the benefit of the Illinois doctrine.
It is possible that, through the medium of the case of Modern
Dairy Company v. Department of Revenue,"9 the Supreme Court
has merely added another to its long list of decisions with reference to inclusion and exclusion of items within the Retailer's
Occupation Tax Act, but it may have enunciated a somewhat new
86 In a sense, the court appears to have achieved, with reference to the Illinois inheritance tax, a result comparable to that reached by the United States
Supreme Court, with reference to gift taxes, in divorce situations. In Merrill
v. Fahs, 324 U. S. 308, 65 S. Ct. 655, 89 L. Ed. 963,(1945), a five-to-four decision,
it was held that a transfer of $300,000 for a release of the intended wife's marital
right by ante-nuptial agreement was subject to a gift tax. In 1950, however, in
Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U. S. 106, 71 S. Ct. 181, 95 L. Ed. 111 (1950), another
five-to-four decision, the court held that the transfer of property pursuant to a
decree of divorce, even though based on a voluntary settlement agreement, was
not subject to federal gift taxes.
87 413 Ill. 102, 108 N. E. (2d) 5 (1952).
88408 Ill. 383, 97 N. E. (2d) 307 (1951). The doctrine holds, in substance, that
where property of the decedent is situated in a state or states other than Illinois, it is proper and equitable to prorate the deductions upon the basis of the
property in Illinois subject to inheritance tax.
89413 11. 55, 108 N. E. (2d) 8 (1952), noted in 2 DePaul L. Rev. 320.
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and liberalized approach to the whole problem in an attempt to
extricate itself from the rather narrow and technical attitude taken
in some of the earlier cases. What the court actually decided was
that sales of milk in bulk to a state hospital for consumption by
its patients did constitute sales at retail within the purview of the
statute 0
In the earlier cases, a very restricted meaning had been given
to the phrase "use or consumption," limiting "use" to mean
"long continued possession and enjoyment of a thing to the purposes for which it is adapted," and "consumption" to mean
"destruction by use." This test, as applied to vendors of leather
goods to shoe repair men,9 ' to vendors of optical goods to optometrists, 92 to vendors of medical supplies to hospitals and
94
doctors, 93 and to vendors of building supplies to contractors,
had produced the result that, in each instance, the sales were not
subject to the tax because the respective vendees were not ultimate
users or consumers.9 5 Reviewing attempts by the legislature to
rectify this situation by amendment, and noting the holding in
Fefferman v. Marohn,96 where sales of clothing and clothing materials to state and county institutions for the use of their wards
were held taxable, brought the court even with the facts in the
case in question. In support of the decision to reject the shackles
of the earlier cases, the court said it had come to the conclusion
that "it was not the intention of the legislature to use the terms
'user and consumer' in the title of the act in the strict and narrow
construction" previously given thereto. 7 It is likely, therefore,
that other occupations will feel the impact of the tax in question.98
90 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 122, § 440.
91 Revzan v. Nudelman, 370 Ill. 180, 18 N. E. (2d) 219 (1939).
92 American Optical Co. v. Nudelman, 370 Ill. 627, 19 N. E. (2d) 582 (1939).
93 Mallen Co. v. Department of Finance, 372 I1. 598, 25 N. E. (2d) 43 (1940).
94 Material Service Corp. v. McKibbin, 380 Ill. 226, 43 N. E. (2d) 939 (1942).
95 The net product was avoidance of the tax entirely, for the vendees were held
to transfer the personal property as a mere incident to the furnishing of services:
Huston Bros. Co. v. McKibbln, 386 Ill. 479, 54 N. E. (2d) 564 (1944); Babcock
v, Nudelman, 367 Inl. 626, 12 N. E. (2d) 635 (1938).
96 408 Ill. 542, 97 N. E. 785 (1951).
97 413 Ill. 55 at 65, 108 N. E. (2d) 8 at 14.
98 Note has been taken elsewhere of two other tax cases. The decision in Johnson
v. Halpin, 413 Ill. 257, 108 N. E. (2d) 429 (1952), holding the Cigarette Use Tax
Act, Ii1. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 453.33 et seq., to be valid, is discussed
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VIII. TORTS
It could be said that tort law experienced a veritable revolution for, in no less than four instances, acknowledged wrongdoers
were stripped of protections which they had, prior to this, enjoyed.
The case of Eick v. Perk Dog Food Company' was the first to
break with tradition. The Appellate Court for the First District
there recognized, for the first time in Illinois, a cause of action
based upon an alleged invasion of a right of privacy. The case
was one in which the defendant had obtained a photograph of the
plaintiff, a blind girl, and had, without her consent, used the
same to promote the sale of its dog food. 2 The court found
abundant support, in the decisions achieved in other jurisdictions,
for the view that the complaint stated a cause of action in tort,
notwithstanding the fact that the only damage alleged to have
been suffered took the form of mental anguish.
Although it would be technically proper only to mention that
3
the Appellate Court for the Second District, in Amann v. Faidy,
refused to overturn the hitherto well-established rule that, in
Illinois, an action may not be maintained, on behalf of an infant,
for injuries received by it prior to birth,4 it is especially significant
to note that the Illinois Supreme Court, by its decision therein,
coming after the period fixed for this survey, actually reversed
that holding and all earlier cases in point. The law would now
permit a recovery for such an injury, at least where the infant
was born alive.
Extremely short-lived, however, was the revolution generated
above under Constitutional Law, particularly notes 22 to 26 inclusive. Mention
of the holding in People v. Roth, Inc., 412 Ill. 436, 107 N. B. (2d) 692 (1952),
appears in the section on Civil Practice and Procedure, particularly notes 56-8.
While the last mentioned case tends to protect tax revenue against "deals," it suggests that if business men are not to be protected by the doctrine of res judicata.
except in those cases where the decision has been affirmed by the state supreme
court, the volume of tax litigation to be handled by the staff of the Attorney General will be due for an early increase.
1347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N. E. (2d) 742 (1952), noted in 31 CHICAGo-KENT LAw
REvIEw 261, 41 Ill. B. J. 120, 28 Notre Dame Law. 146.
2 A second count charging libel was stricken because the court held the captions
used in conjunction with the photograph were not defamatory.
3348 Ill. App. 37, 107 N. E. (2d) 868 (1952). See also the related case of
Rodriquez v. Patti, 348 Ill. App. 322, 108 N. E. (2d) 830 (1952).
4 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N. E. 638 (1900).
5 See Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N. E. (2d) 412 (1953).
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by the holding in the case of Brandt v. Keller,6 one which permitted a wife to sue her husband, in tort, for a personal injury
inflicted during coverture. The legislature, apparently opposed to
the view so taken, promptly amended the Married Women's Act
to provide that "neither husband nor wife may sue the other,"
7
as in tort, for matters of this character.
Paralleling a development similar to that made with respect
to charitable corporations,8 an immunity from tort liability formerly enjoyed by quasi-municipal corporations was partially destroyed by the holding in the case of Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School District, No. 201,9 wherein a minor
plaintiff was enabled to recover from the school district for injury
sustained while in the defendant's playground, at least to the
extent the school district carried liability insurance. A claim that
the defendant, like the state, was not subject to suit without its
consent was held to be without historical basis.
Less startling, but indicative of liberality in view, are decisions achieved in two other cases. In the first, that of McCleod v.
Nel-Co Corporation,0 the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was held
applicable to a situation wherein plaster fell from the ceiling of
a room in defendant's hotel upon the plaintiff sleeping there. In
the other, a case entitled Tatham v. Wabash Railroad Company,"
it was decided that a plaintiff could impose liability under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act upon his employer who had negigently hired one known to be vicious and ill-tempered and who had
failed to take reasonable steps to protect the plaintiff from an
intentional harm offered by the misfit, although the court noted
that contrary decisions existed elsewhere.
In addition to negligence cases discussed above, 1 2 mention
6413 Ii. 503, 109 N. E. (2d) 729 (1952), reversing 347 Ill. App. 18, 105 N. E.
(2d) 796 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 343.
7 Laws 1953, p. 437, S.B. 194; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 1.
8 See Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. (2d) 81 (1950), noted in 28 CHICAGOKENT LAW REVIEw 268, 38 Ill. B. J. 581.
9348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N. E. (2d) 636 (1953), noted in 31 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RiEwV
279.
10 350 Ill. App. 216, 112 N. E. (2d) 501 (1953).
11412 Ill. 568, 107 N. E. (2d) 735 (1952).
12 See above, under the heading of Property, sub-topic Landlord and Tenant,
particularly notes 51 to 56, for certain cases dealing with tort liability in conjunction with demised premises.
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ought to be made of the conflict which now exists, in at least two
of the Appellate Court districts, over the point as to whether or
not the operator of a motor vehicle, who leaves the same unattended with the ignition key in the switch, 13 should be held liable
for injury inflicted by a thief who is, thereby, enabled to steal the
14
car. The Third District, in the case of Cockrel v. Sullivan,
earlier absolved the operator from liability. The First District,
however, in the light of the decision in Ney v. Yellow Cab Company,15 appears to consider the matter to be one in which the
question of proximate causation should be left to the jury and
not be decided as a matter of law. In addition thereto, brief
mention might be made of the fact that, on the trial of a noteworthy case concerning the right of a spouse to recover from the
other spouse's employer for a negligent tort inflicted by the spouseagent, 10 it was determined that the injured plaintiff was a "guest"
within the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Act,17 hence not entitled
to succeed.'
This survey may well be closed with a note that, in the only
conservative tort decision of the year,' 9 the plaintiff was denied
a right to recover for a malicious interference with a contract to
marry in the absence of independent proof of slanderous or libel20
lous conduct.
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95Y2, § 189, forbids this practice.
14 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N. E. (2d) 878 (1951), noted In 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RKvHw 277.

15 348 11. App. 161, 108 N. E. (2d) 508 (1952). The case is consistent with the
earlier decision, achieved by a divided court, in Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App.
359, 77 N. E.

(2d) 537 (1948), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 225.

16 See the earlier holding in Tallios v. Tallios, 345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N. E. (2d)
507 (1952).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 95 , § 58a.
1STallios v. Tallios, 350 Ill. App. 299, 112 N. E.

(2d)

723

(1953).

The proof

revealed that the vehicle in question had been stopped to permit the plaintiff to
search for a lost purse but was started up again while the wife had one foot on

the ground and one on the running board. The Appellate Court held she was still
"riding in a motor vehicle as a guest."
App. 486, 107 N. E. (2d) 267 (1952), noted
19 See Brown v. Glickstein, 347 Ill.
in

31 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 175.

20 See ante, under the heading of Civil Practice and Procedure, particularly notes

34 to 36, for mention of the ultra-conservative holding in the case of Seymour v.
The Union News Company, 349 Ill. App. 197, 110 N. E. (2d) 475 (1953), dealing
with the applicable period of limitation In an nnwholesome food case.

